Pompey the Great

Roman statesman and military leader

• Born: September 29, 106 b.c.e.
• Birthplace: Probably near Rome (now in Italy)
• Died: September 28, 48 b.c.e.
• Place of death: Pelusium, Egypt

As a military leader and Imperial proconsul, Pompey greatly extended the bounds of the Roman Republic and, with Julius Caesar and Marcus Crassus, was one of the three leading figures whose careers and ambitions coincided with the final downfall of the Republic.

Early Life

Little is known of the early years of Pompey the Great, or Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus. His family rose to prominence in Rome only during the second century b.c.e. and thus was not among the ancient patrician nobility. Pompey’s father, Pompeius Strabo, was an ambitious and successful general during the Social War (91-87 b.c.e.). As a result of his military success, Strabo extended his political influence, gaining many supporters, or clientela, whom he then used in advancing his own career.

The centuries-old Roman Republic was dominated by a number of ancient aristocratic families who ruled the state through the senate, with individuals from the plebeian class who had achieved wealth. This government had been under tension for some time, however, as it proved to be less and less suitable as Rome gained in territory. In the resulting political instability, victorious generals and their armies often played a prominent role. Strabo, like his contemporaries Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla, hoped to parlay his military conquests into ruling strength. Many were relieved when he died suddenly of a plague.

Pompey had served under his father during the Social War, but after the unpopular Strabo’s death, he had to forge new connections in order to advance his political career. When Sulla, victorious in the east, returned to Italy at the head of his army in 83 b.c.e., Pompey raised an army from his own clients and took Sulla’s part. After Sulla was elected dictator, Pompey divorced his first wife, Antistia, and married Sulla’s stepdaughter, Aemilia. Through Sulla’s influence, Pompey was given a military command to pursue opponents of the new regime. He did so, bloodily and efficiently, in Africa and Sicily.

After his victories, his troops hailed him imperator and magnus, but when Sulla attempted to retire Pompey, he resisted disbanding his army. He returned to Rome and demanded a triumph, a recognition of his military exploits. Sulla reluctantly granted his request, and by 80 Pompey had become one of the most significant figures in the unstable landscape of republican Rome.

Because of his handsome looks, his youth, and his military accomplishments, Pompey was compared by his contemporaries to Alexander the Great, the Macedonian king who had conquered Persia and much of the known world. However, Pompey’s wars and his political machinations were directed toward placing himself among the first citizens of the Roman Republic. He was obsessively concerned with his own dignity and honor but not with absolute power for its own sake, and although he was a military hero, he often resorted to charm and tact rather than the threat of force.

Life’s Work

From 80 b.c.e., when he was in his mid-twenties, until the end of his life, Pompey remained among the leading figures in the Republic. After Sulla resigned his dictatorship, there was another period of civil war, directed against Sulla’s system of reformed oligarchy. Pompey supported the government against attack in Italy, and then he was awarded an important military command in Spain. From 76 to 72, he pursued Quintus Sertorius, who had fled Rome during the events that had brought Sulla to power and had subsequently established control over much of Spain. Pompey succeeded militarily and also added to his influence by increasing the number of his personal supporters, or clients, in Spain.

Pompey returned to find Italy in the throes of a slave uprising led by a Thracian gladiator, Spartacus. The Third Servile War (73-71 b.c.e.) led to several defeats of the Roman armies until Crassus took charge. Although the war was almost over when he arrived, Pompey claimed to have attained the final victory, much to the disgust of Crassus. The two rivals were elected consuls in 70 despite Pompey’s youth and political inexperience; the exception was made because of his previous heroic accomplishments.

After Pompey’s year as consul, he stepped down, but he remained a major figure, one of the principes civitatis. Then, in 67, he was granted the authority to eliminate the threat posed by pirates to Mediterranean shipping, particularly to the grain supply necessary to Roman peace and survival. Although there was considerable senate opposition to giving such power to one individual, the price of bread dropped in Rome in anticipation of Pompey’s success. Beginning in the west, Pompey swept the pirates east, successfully ending the campaign in three months.

Using his still-increasing popularity and political influence, Pompey next obtained a military command against the continuing threat from Mithradates the Great, ruler of the eastern kingdom of Pontus. Again, his selection was controversial, partially because it would add to Pompey’s stature and power. Turning down a peace initiative by Mithradates, Pompey pursued him ruthlessly, forcing Mithradates to retreat into the Crimea region of the Black Sea. Pompey then successfully brought the kingdom of Armenia into the Roman orbit. With the threat from Pontus and Armenia ended, Pompey turned south, into Syria, ending the Seleucid kingdom, which had been founded in the aftermath of the conquests of Alexander. He conquered Jerusalem and created a client kingdom in Judaea, as he did elsewhere in the Middle East. By the time he returned to Rome in 62, Pompey had successfully extended the boundaries of the Roman Empire almost to the Euphrates River. He had emulated Alexander and had justly earned the title of Pompeius Magnus, Pompey the Great.

In Rome, Pompey was awarded another triumph, during which he wore a cloak once worn by Alexander. By then, he was probably the richest individual in the Republic. His conquests in the east and his wealth, however, did not easily translate into political power. The senate, led by Cato the Censor, denied his demands for rewards for his soldiers and himself. To avoid even the appearance of wishing to assume dictatorial power, Pompey disbanded his armies on reaching Italy. He divorced his wife, Mucia, on grounds of adultery, and planned to marry Cato’s niece, but Cato refused to accept an alliance with someone he believed was a threat to the Republic. Pompey expected honors and respect, but his return was anticlimactic.

His failure to gain senate ratification of his proposals coincided with a demand by some of Crassus’s supporters for changes in the tax collection laws in the east. Pompey and Crassus had been rivals, but the senate’s opposition forced the two together. Caesar, returning from campaigning in Spain, desired both a triumph in Rome and to be elected consul; his ambitions were also blocked. To gain the support of Pompey and Crassus, Caesar promised both what they had failed to receive from the senate. By the end of 60, the somewhat misleadingly named First Triumvirate had come into being; formed for practical short-term goals, it was not intended to subvert the government of the Republic.

With Caesar as consul and with the public support of Pompey and Crassus, the desired legislation was passed. As a further reward, Caesar received a military command in Gaul. However, Pompey’s popularity declined. He had returned from Asia, expecting to be accepted as Rome’s principal citizen, but in order to achieve his other goals, he had been forced into an alliance with Caesar and Crassus, which cast doubt on Pompey’s republican patriotism. The alliance soon began to experience difficulties in Rome because of the ambitions of others, such as Clodius Pulcher. Although Pompey had to maintain the coalition for fear that his long-desired legislation might be reversed, Caesar, concerned about the possibility of Pompey’s abdication, forged a new bond between them; Caesar’s daughter, Julia, was married to Pompey.

Clodius soon became Pompey’s chief threat. Through his own clients and his ability to manipulate the city mobs, Clodius neutralized Pompey’s authority by threatening violence. Pompey’s successful solution to a grain shortage—perhaps the single greatest political issue in the lives of most Romans—restored much of his lost popularity by 57. When it appeared that the triumvirate might end, Pompey and Caesar met and renewed the alliance, with Pompey and Crassus becoming joint consuls for the second time in 55. They, in turn, ensured that Caesar’s command in Gaul would be extended for another five years. Only with bribery and violence, however, were Pompey and Crassus able to defeat their opponents in the senate.

As a reward, Crassus gained a military command in Syria in anticipation of a war against Parthia, which would add to his fame. In Rome, Pompey sponsored a large building program, culminating in the Theatrum Pompeii, Rome’s first stone-built theater. The traditionalists objected to still another departure from the republican past; again, it was rumored that Pompey wished to become dictator, and again he denied it.

By 53, the triumvirate had collapsed. Julia died in childbirth, removing one bond between Pompey and Caesar, and Crassus met death in his armies’ defeat by the Parthians at Carrhae. When Pompey married again, to Cornelia, daughter of Metellus Scipio, it was an alliance not with Caesar but with another ancient family. Renewed violence in Rome bolstered Pompey’s position as the only person with the necessary authority who might save the state, and even Cato, defender of the Republic, proposed that Pompey become sole consul in order to deal with the emergency.

In Gaul, Caesar desired a second consulship for himself, but he was unwilling to give up the military imperium to return to Rome in order to seek election. Pompey was not opposed to having Caesar stand for consul while still keeping his command in Gaul, but he supported legislation that might reduce the period Caesar could keep control of his province. Pompey stated that it was not directed against Caesar, but Pompey was still committed to maintaining his position as the first citizen. He had positioned himself so that Caesar depended on him for protection from the senate, and the senate depended on Pompey for protection from Caesar.

Pompey’s position between Caesar and the senate was inherently unstable. In the summer of 50, Pompey suffered a serious illness, and public prayers and declarations of sympathy and gratitude at his recovery indicated to Pompey that his support was both wide and deep. When in December it was rumored that Caesar had already invaded Italy, Pompey was given the command to mobilize the necessary legions and defend the Republic. He hoped that a show of strength would cause Caesar to back down, ensuring Pompey’s own position of superiority. Pompey became convinced that Caesar was a threat to Rome itself, but even then Pompey hoped to avoid war. Only pressure sufficient to stop Caesar, but not destroy him, would maintain Pompey’s own position.

Pompey proved to be wrong on two counts: Caesar reacted more quickly than was anticipated, invading Italy in early January, 49, and Pompey’s support was less than expected. In reaction to Caesar’s invasion, Pompey abandoned Rome. He had not been given supreme power and continued to face the possibility of senate opposition. Both Caesar and Pompey probably wished to avoid war, but the senate, particularly Cato and his faction, opposed any compromise. In March, 49, Pompey left Italy for the east, and public opinion began to turn against him. Caesar wisely pursued a policy of clemency, and some began to claim that Pompey had intended all along to establish a dictatorship on the model of Sulla.

Pompey and a majority of the senate retreated to Greece. When Caesar later arrived in Greece, Pompey had three options: He could return to Italy ahead of Caesar, he could retreat and allow Caesar to exhaust his resources, or he could fight a pitched battle. Pompey’s supporters demanded a confrontation, and on August 9, 48, both sides met at Pharsalus, where Caesar was victorious. Pompey fled to Egypt, but on the day he landed, September 28, 48, the day before his fifty-eighth birthday, he was stabbed to death. His head was presented to Caesar, and his ashes were returned to Italy.

Significance

Two sons of Pompey the Great continued the struggle against Caesar. After Pompey’s murder, they retreated first to Africa and then to Spain, where they had much success in an area of their father’s earlier conquests. The elder, Gnaeus, however, met defeat at the hands of Caesar in 45 and was executed. The younger, Sextus, continued the family’s battles and survived Caesar’s assassination in 44. During the conflicts of the next decade, Sextus took sides against Caesar’s heir, Augustus, and was eventually executed in 36.

The verdict on Pompey’s career is divided between claims that both Caesar and Pompey sought the same thing—supreme power—and arguments that Pompey was the last of the republicans, a man who gave his life for the ideals of ancient Rome. Perhaps the best estimate is that Pompey was a man of his own time, reflecting the ambiguous politics of the late Republic, when the institutions of the past no longer proved entirely adequate. Following the example of his father and others, he used his military conquests to influence politics. He wished to be honored as the premier citizen of Rome, but it is doubtful that he ever intended to replace the senate as the governing body of the Republic. Still, Pompey’s personality, his ambitions, his conquests, and his ultimate position in Roman society undoubtedly played a part in the fall of the Republic.

Bibliography

Greenhalgh, Peter. Pompey: The Roman Alexander. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981. This work carries the subject’s biography to the formation of the triple alliance among Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus. The story is presented in a theatrical style, as the author is writing for the general reader.

Greenhalgh, Peter. Pompey: The Republican Prince. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1982. The second and concluding volume of the author’s study of Pompey. Like its predecessor, it is written in dramatic form and is especially strong on Pompey’s military conquests as well as on the pageant and spectacle of Rome.

Gruen, Erich S. The Last Generation of the Roman Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. An important revisionist study. The author’s thesis is that there was nothing inevitable about the end of the Roman Republic and that there was no predestined decline that led to the triumph of Caesar. Instead, Gruen focuses on the continuity and the traditions of the earlier Republic, which were still viable during Pompey’s era.

Leach, John. Pompey the Great. Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm, 1986. This brief biography praises Pompey’s military abilities and accomplishments. The author also admires Pompey’s political talents. Leach supposes that if Pompey had defeated Caesar, he would have more likely pursued the later path of Augustus, as princeps, instead of Caesar’s more dangerous road to the dictatorship.

Scullard, H. H. From the Gracchi to Nero. Reprint. New York: Routledge, 1988. One of the standard works on the late Republic and the principate through Nero, this volume is scholarly but well written and includes considerable information on Pompey and his peers. The author’s judgment of Pompey is that he excelled on the battlefield but lacked forcefulness in the political arena, always preferring glory to power.

Seager, Robin. Pompey: A Political Biography. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. One of many biographies of Pompey, it is both brief and scholarly and concentrates primarily on the political and constitutional issues of the late Republic rather than on Pompey’s activities and conquests in Spain and in the east.

Syme, Ronald. The Roman Revolution. Reprint. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. The author of this classic work on Roman history places the actions and activities of Pompey, Caesar, and Augustus in the wider context of Roman politics, including family, clan, and faction.