Steel mill closure
A steel mill closure typically refers to the shutdown of steel production facilities, which can have significant economic and social implications. These closures often arise from factors such as market fluctuations, labor disputes, and regulatory changes. The impact of such closures extends beyond the companies involved, affecting workers, local communities, and the broader economy due to the essential role of steel in various industries, including construction and defense.
In historical contexts, like during the Korean War era, steel mill closures became particularly contentious when labor negotiations failed, leading to strikes that threatened national production and security. Government intervention, such as temporary seizures of mills, has occasionally been employed to mitigate these disruptions, highlighting the tension between labor rights and national interests.
Legal challenges often follow such actions, as seen in landmark cases that define the boundaries of executive power in relation to labor and economic stability. Overall, steel mill closures serve as a lens through which the complexities of labor relations, economic policy, and governmental authority can be examined, reflecting diverse perspectives on industrial management and worker rights.
Steel mill closure
The Event President Harry S. Truman’s executive order to seize and operate U.S. steel mills to avert an imminent strike during the Korean War
Date April 8, 1952
The closure of the steel mills by President Harry S. Truman led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that the Constitution did not permit the president to take over privately owned businesses without congressional approval.
After the U.S. entered the Korean War in June of 1950, the consumer price index jumped 5 percent within six months. In an attempt to restrain inflation, President Harry S. Truman established regulatory boards to administer wage hikes and price ceilings. Because of wartime demands, the steel companies enjoyed large increases in profits. In November, 1951, the United Steelworkers union, which represented 650,000 workers, called for a large boost in wages, but the companies refused to agree unless they could pass the costs on to consumers. In March of 1952, the Wage Stabilization Board gave its approval for a modest wage boost, but the Office of Price Stabilization rejected the companies’ demands for a comparable increase in prices. Negotiations ended in a deadlock, and the union set a strike deadline for April 8.
It was widely recognized that a stoppage of steel production would do great harm to both the economy and the war effort. Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett warned that any curtailment in the production of weapons would “endanger the lives of our fighting men.” Under the Taft-Hartley Act, Truman had the authority to order a continuation of negotiations for eighty days, but he concluded that such a “cooling-off period” would only postpone the problem. Believing that the workers deserved a pay increase, moreover, he insisted that it would be unfair to force them to work another eighty days with no change in pay. From his perspective, the large steel corporations were using the war as a leverage to gain excessive profits. In addition, labor unions despised the Taft-Harley Act, and Truman did not want to irritate the unions during an election year.
Seizure of the Mills
Truman viewed seizure of the mills as a temporary last resort. On April 8, 1952, only hours before the scheduled strike, he issued Executive Order 10340, which directed Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to take over the steel plants and to maintain full production. In a radio and television speech that evening, Truman warned that a prolonged shutdown of the steel mills would halt defense production and noted that the military did not have a stockpile of the kinds of steel needed to fight the war. Truman also sent a message to Congress requesting new legislation to deal with the matter and offering to cooperate with Congress in finding a solution.
As head of state and commander in chief of the military, President Truman believed that he possessed the inherent powers to take over private property temporarily during a national emergency. He knew that President Abraham Lincoln, during the Civil War, had suspended the right to habeas corpus, even though the Constitution explicitly delegated this power to Congress. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation (1936) , had recognized the president’s broad discretionary prerogatives in the domain of foreign affairs and national security. Historians have found evidence, moreover, that Chief Justice Fred Vinson confidentially advised Truman that he had the legal authority to seize the mills in the absence of congressional legislation.
At midnight, the secretary of commerce took legal command of some eighty-eight steel mills across the country. The only visible change was that the U.S. flag flew over each of the mills. No changes were made in workers and operating managers of the mills. To Truman’s dismay, most newspapers and magazines, including Time and Newsweek, denounced his action and accused him of usurping congressional powers. In a radio and television speech, the head of Inland Steel, Clarence Randall, described the seizure as an “evil deed” that had no precedent in history.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The steel companies sued to regain control of their property. After a federal district judge quickly ruled that the seizure was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court announced that it would review the case. Truman told Charles Sawyer that he would be shocked and disturbed if the Court affirmed the lower court ruling. In the oral arguments before the Court, John W. Davis represented the companies, while Solicitor General Philip Perlman defended the government’s policy.
On June 2, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Youngstown v. Sawyer, striking down the executive order as inconsistent with the separation-of-powers principle of the Constitution. Speaking for a 6-3 majority, Justice Hugo Black argued that the president’s powers to issue such an order “must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” He observed that Congress, when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act, had specifically rejected an amendment to authorize governmental seizures in emergencies. In an often-quoted concurring opinion, Justice Robert Jackson wrote: “When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” In an angry dissent, Chief Justice Vinson insisted that the president had the power to protect national security and noted that the seizure was “temporary in character” and subject to congressional disapproval.
Impact
The Youngstown decision is the only instance in U.S. history that the Supreme Court has struck down an executive order as unconstitutional. Youngstown limited but did not entirely repudiate the doctrine of inherent executive discretion in the name of national security. Although it left many unanswered questions about the extent of presidential prerogatives, it was an important precedent suggesting that future Courts, if called on to decide the constitutionality of an executive order, would take into account both the explicit and implicit will of Congress. Several scholars of constitutional law have argued that the widespread condemnation of Truman’s policy significantly influenced the outcome of the Court’s decision.
Subsequent Events
Following the Court’s decision, the steelworkers’ union began a strike that dragged on for fifty-four days—the most costly steel strike in U.S. history. In a message to Congress on June 10, Truman asked for legislation to end the strike. The Senate rejected his proposal and voted a resolution that advised utilization of the Taft-Hartley Act. Ignoring the resolution, Truman met personally with the head of U.S. Steel on July 24, and the two men agreed on a compromise settlement
Bibliography
Cooper, Philip. By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Explores the historical uses of executive orders.
McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Includes an interesting summary of the controversy with many colorful quotations.
Marcus, Maeva. Truman and the Steel Seizure Case. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. A legal analysis that emphasizes the limited nature of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Mayer, Kenneth. With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. An important legal analysis of executive orders throughout U.S. history.