Ukraine-Crimea Crisis 2014

Demographic differences within Ukraine—between the western part, which is more ethnically Ukrainian and, in the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, generally more pro-Europe, and the eastern part, which is more ethnically Russian and historically more pro-Russia—contributed to a series of political upheavals in 2014. These included a revolution that overthrew Ukraine's existing government, a Russian military occupation of Crimea, and the outbreak of a conflict in eastern Ukraine between government forces and pro-Russia separatists.

The upheaval began when President Yanukovych, who favored closer ties with Russia, was ousted after months of protests against his government. The Ukrainian parliament formed an interim government, but its legitimacy was not accepted by Russia or by the mostly Russian-speaking population of eastern Ukraine, leading to an international crisis. Pro-Russian separatists took action quickly, seizing control of government buildings in Crimea and later in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, with the support of unidentified paramilitaries allegedly backed by the Russian military who came to be known locally as "green men." The separatists demanded elections for independence and called on Russia for protection, and soon declared the independence of two breakaway states. Despite accusations from Ukraine and other countries, Russia initially denied sending special forces into Crimea and eastern Ukraine, though later admitted their involvement. Military analysts concluded Russia was pursuing a new kind of unconventional warfare, which combined special forces, subversion, disinformation, and espionage. The tactics used by separatists in Crimea and again in eastern Ukraine suggested that Russia had sharply improved its capabilities for aggressive intervention in neighboring countries. Compared to the Russian intervention in South Ossetia province in the Republic of Georgia in 2008, which was poorly supplied, the new methods appeared fully articulated, staffed, trained, and equipped. Former communist countries once part of the Soviet Union or under the Russian sphere of influence, especially Poland and the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, expressed concern about the ability of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to withstand Russian aggression.

Key Events

• November 21, 2013—President Yanukovych decides not to sign an agreement for closer economic relations with the European Union (EU), setting off months of protests in Kyiv. Protesters occupy government buildings.
• February 21, 2014—Yanukovych flees Kyiv after collapse of support in parliament.
• February 27, 2014—Pro-Russian protesters occupy government facilities in Crimea with support from unidentified gunmen wearing green camouflage. The "green men" are well equipped and well organized.
• March 24, 2014—Ukraine withdraws military forces from Crimea after the province votes to join the Russian Federation. Sanctions by the United States (US) and EU against Russians close to Russian president Vladimir Putin are in effect.
• April 7, 2014—Pro-Russian protesters occupy government buildings in major cities of eastern Ukraine, calling for a vote on independence. Green men from Crimea are identified at new protest sites by the Kyiv government.
• April 28, 2014—The US adds new targets for sanctions after Russia fails to abide by an April 17 agreement to help end the crisis in eastern Ukraine.
• February 24, 2022—After nearly eight years of occupying Crimea and supporting separatists in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region, Russia launches a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Status

By February 2022, Crimea remained part of Ukraine in a legal sense, but had been under Russian occupation for nearly eight years. After Russia illegally annexed the territory in early 2014, it gradually took measures to bring the territory under the Russian sphere of influence and integrate it with the rest of the Russian Federation. These included the construction of new infrastructure, including a bridge completed in 2018 linking Crimea with the Russian mainland, as well as administrative actions, such as the issuing of Russian passports to Crimean residents.

Russia's continued assertion of its presence in Crimea led to international condemnation, as well as sanctions against Russia. As a result, the region's economy, namely its thriving tourism sector, began to struggle. Crimea, for centuries an ethnically diverse region, also underwent a demographic shift during this time; the Russian government encouraged tens of thousands of ethnic Russians to settle in Crimea, and was accused of discriminating against the region's other major ethnic groups, namely Tatars and Ukrainians, many of whom chose to emigrate. Meanwhile, Russia continued to build up its military presence in the region, including a reinforcement of its Black Sea Fleet stationed in the port city of Sevastopol. Some of these Russian forces stationed in Crimea later participated in Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which brought the regional crisis into a dangerous new phase.

Background

Economic burdens weighed heavily on Ukraine in late 2013, when the split between the country's pro-Russia and pro-Europe factions widened. Corruption took a heavy toll, with oligarchs in control of public officials and organized crime. The shadow economy in Ukraine at this time was estimated by an academic study to be 44 percent of GDP (gross domestic product). Although Ukraine received bailout loans in 2008 and 2010, it failed to deliver on reforms required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Critically, the economy depended on energy subsidies from Russia. Consumers paid only a quarter of the real price for natural gas, which also fueled the east's heavy industries—coal mining, steel making, shipbuilding, and weapons manufacturing. Ukraine owed Russian conglomerate Gazprom almost $2 billion.

Support for closer economic ties with the European Union (EU) was strong in western Ukraine, despite EU requirements for transparency and painful fiscal reforms. When President Viktor Yanukovych, an easterner and ally of Russian president Vladimir Putin, announced he would not sign a proposed EU agreement, protests broke out in Kyiv and persisted for two and a half months. The turning point came on February 18, 2014, when security forces tried to clear Maidan square and ensuing violence left scores of people dead, including several by fire from police snipers. Yanukovych's support in parliament evaporated, and he fled. Parliament installed an interim government on February 22, with pro-European Olexander Turchynov as president, and scheduled elections for May 2014.

Annexation of Crimea

Response in the eastern provinces came swiftly. On February 23, 2014, protesters in Donetsk and Crimea denounced the new government as illegitimate and called for regional independence or annexation to Russia. In Sevastopol the next day, a crowd took over city government offices and appointed a pro-Russian mayor. On February 27, in Simferopol, the capital of Crimea, a band of gunmen led protesters into the provincial parliament building. Parliament then appointed a pro-Russian prime minister, replacing Anatolii Mohyliov, who had vowed to enforce Ukrainian law. On February 28, the Simferopol airport was seized by dozens of men who wore green camouflage uniforms but no unit badges or name tags; Ukraine alleged that these men were members of the Russian military. While the extent of Russian military activity in Crimea was initially uncertain, Putin later acknowledged that Russian troops reinforced security at naval facilities in Sevastopol. Other experts later verified the presence of Russian soldiers in Crimea wearing unmarked uniforms.

On March 6, 2014, the Crimean parliament passed a measure for joining the Russian Federation. Voters approved the measure in a March 16 referendum by a 97% majority. Russian prime minister Dmitri Medvedev visited Crimea two weeks later. He announced there would be across-the-board increases in salaries and pensions for teachers and other government workers, integrating them into the Russian system. Medvedev said he planned to create a special economic zone in Crimea with incentives to attract investment and new business. As Russia increased its foothold in Crimea's economy and government, it also continued to seize key Ukrainian military installations. Facing threats from Russia, as well as thousands of defections to the Russian military from its own ranks, the Ukrainian military withdrew from Crimea on March 24.

International reaction to Russia's involvement in Crimea came in the form of economic sanctions. On March 17, 2014, the United States and EU imposed travel bans and froze the financial assets of individual Russians who were close advisers of Putin or who facilitated Russian policy in Crimea. The EU targeted thirty-three individuals, some of whom also appeared on the US sanctions list. Prominent on the US list were Gennady Timchenko, a principal of the commodity trading firm Gunvor, in which Putin was thought to have substantial holdings, and Yuri Kovalchuk, a principal of Bank Rossiya, who acted as a personal banker for several top officials in Putin's government. Bank Rossiya, Russia's fifteenth largest bank, which was also included in US sanctions. In further actions, the Group of Eight (G8) nations decided on March 24 to exclude Russia from its proceedings—so the G8 became the G7. On March 27, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) passed a resolution calling Crimea's referendum illegal. The Security Council was not able to act on a similar resolution because of a veto by Russia.

Separatist Action in Eastern Ukraine

An estimated 40,000 Russian soldiers took up positions near the Ukrainian border in late February and March 2014. President Putin said he would defend ethnic Russians in Ukraine against oppression by the interim government in Kyiv, which he said had come to power illegally. In the weeks that followed, the interim government proceeded very carefully, so as not to provoke an invasion from Russia, while a separatist rebellion spread across the eastern provinces, namely in the Donbas region bordering Russia. On April 6, pro-Russian separatists stormed government buildings in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk, breaking into police armories. Within two weeks, another ten cities saw similar raids, which witnesses said were led by teams of military professionals wearing green camouflage—the unidentified fighters known as the "green men."

Speculation about these paramilitaries covered a range of possibilities. Witnesses agreed the gunmen spoke Russian and acted like Russians, but the fighters provided little information when talking with local citizens or journalists. One theory held they were former members of the Russian military who had joined a nationalist militia in Ukraine. On April 16, 2014, the Ukrainian government released photographs showing that the paramilitaries in Donetsk province carried the same gear as those in Crimea. The photos also identified several individuals who had been previously photographed among Russian soldiers in other settings. The Ukrainian government named one of these men as Igor Ivanovich Strelkov, a known intelligence operative for the Russian military. While Russia denied sending special operations advisers into eastern Ukraine, analysts believed events in the region showed a new doctrine and level of preparedness for stealth warfare, in which Russian advisers supported local clients with planning, command and control, weapons, money, and political discipline.

In April and May 2014, separatists in the Donbas declared the independence of two breakway states known as the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). Attempts by the Ukrainian government to defeat pro-Russian separatists met with mixed results. While the Ukrainian military was able to retake some territory claimed by the LPR and DPR, it was unable to dislodge the separatists from key cities, leading to a stalemate. In subsequent years, the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and separatists in the eastern Donbas region came to somewhat overshadow the occupation of Crimea. According to the UN, an estimated 14,000 people had been killed in the conflict in the Donbas by the end of 2021, including many civilians. During that time, Russia instituted increasingly harsh media censorship in Crimea, and also was accused of persecuting the region's Tatar and Ukrainian ethnic minorities.

Diplomacy and Implications for NATO

On April 17, 2014, representatives from the EU, Russia, Ukraine, and US met to discuss ways to avoid violence in the eastern provinces. Russia advocated a federalist solution, under which the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk could choose their own economic and foreign policies. In the meantime, Russia agreed to encourage the separatists to disarm and relinquish control of public buildings. On April 25, US Secretary of State John Kerry asserted that Russia had not lived up to its promise. Three days later, the US expanded its sanctions against key players in Russian policy, citing seven new individuals and seventeen companies. At the end of April, the EU prepared to expand its sanctions as well. However, there was little support for measures beyond the new sanctions. Because of substantial trade with Russia—$370 billion in 2012—EU nations could suffer economically from broader measures. In 2012, US-Russian trade was $26 billion.

At the end of April 2014, Putin acknowledged that sanctions were having an effect on the Russian economy. Interest rates rose as capital fled the country, and Standard and Poor's lowered its rating of Russian government bonds. Putin insisted, however, that Russia would continue its policy of protecting ethnic Russians in Ukraine and supporting a peaceful end to the crisis.

For countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the mobilization of Russian troops on Ukraine's border sounded a note of alarm. Poland and the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia registered the greatest concern, since they also share borders with Russia and have significant numbers of ethnic Russians within their populations. Although Ukraine was not a NATO member, the crisis exposed a weak state of readiness in the alliance. After the fall of the Soviet Union, participation by NATO members gave way to other priorities. The Baltic republics joined NATO in 2005, but no plan of defense was established for them until 2009, after the Russian incursion into the Republic of Georgia's province of South Ossetia. In 2014, spending by the US accounted for 75 % of NATO resources. Members are supposed to maintain their defense spending at a minimum of 2% of GDP, but several countries—including Germany, Europe's largest economy—had fallen short. As an assurance of the NATO commitment to their defense, the US posted hundreds of soldiers to various locations in Poland and the Baltic republics, including 150 paratroopers to Lithuania.

Later Developments and Significance

The occupation of Crimea, along with the conflict in the Donbas, remained a major source of tension between Ukraine and Russia for the remainder of the 2010s. Multiple attempts at ceasefires and resolution, including the 2014 and 2015 peace agreements known as the Minsk Accords, failed to stop fighting in the Donbas, and many sanctions against Russia and pro-Russian elements in Crimea remained in place.

By the early 2020s, amid heightened tensions between Russia and Ukraine, the status of Crimea remained uncertain. Ukraine continued to assert that Crimea was its own sovereign territory, a claim most other nations recognized, but the area remained occupied by the Russian military; meanwhile, by the end of 2021, the Russian military had begun to mass soldiers and equipment on its border with Ukraine. The future of Crimea became even more uncertain after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, escalating the long-simmering conflict between the two countries into open warfare and creating instability throughout the region. Among other demands, Putin named Ukrainian recognition of Crimea as Russian territory as one of several conditions required to stop the war. This invasion prompted new rounds of sanctions against Russia from the US and its NATO allies, and also led many countries to affirm their support of Ukraine and commitment to NATO.

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