Wagon Box Battle

Date: August 2, 1867

Place: Wyoming

Tribe affected: Sioux

Significance: This last major conflict of the Bozeman Trail wars marked the turning point in the U.S. Army’s superiority over the Indian forces with the introduction of the breech-loading Springfield rifle

At the Fort Laramie Council of 1866, a delegation of Brule and Oglala Sioux headed by Red Cloud refused federal demands to allow the improvement and fortification of the Bozeman Trail. The Sioux’s insistence that trespasses into their lands were unallowable led to numerous conflicts, including the Wagon Box Battle.

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In late July, 1867, following the annual Sun Dance, a number of bands (mostly of Oglala Sioux and Northern Cheyenne) gathered at the Little Bighorn River, determined to destroy the army posts along the Bozeman Trail and push the white tide back. Their strategy was to send five hundred to eight hundred warriors, mostly Cheyenne, against Fort C. F. Smith, while another thousand to fifteen hundred accompanied Red Cloud to Fort Phil Kearny. On August 2, Red Cloud’s warriors attacked a detachment of thirty troopers from Fort Phil Kearny, under Captain James N. Powell, who were detailed to guard wood choppers who were harvesting logs for building and fuel. The wagon boxes had been removed from their gears and corralled on a small open plain at the foot of the Bighorn Mountains near Big Piney Creek, a small tributary of the Powder River in Northern Wyoming. That morning, while the majority of troopers were lounging about, Red Cloud’s Sioux attacked. The troopers, each with the new breech-loading Springfield and sufficient ammunition, secured themselves within the corralled wagons. The Sioux first seized the mule herd, then turned their attentions to the troopers. The warriors alternated sniper fire with massed charges that carried almost to the wagon corral before being rebuffed. The Indians’ intent, believing the troopers were armed only with muzzle loaders, was to cause the soldiers to expel their rifles and then rush in before they could reload—a tactic which had worked well at the Fetterman Massacre. The Sioux were continually turned back, however, by the rapid firepower of the new breech loaders.

Their first advance came from the north, with the warriors on foot, as they were for all the other charges. (Some warriors on horseback circled the wagons and rained arrows onto the troopers.) Many arrows which dropped into the corral had burning pitch tied to them; the pitch ignited the loose hay and dried manure, creating flame and smudge which burned throughout the fight. The fires, mingled with the rifle smoke, hampered the troopers’ vision and caused many to suffer intensely from thirst. In addition, the soldiers had little cover and no entrenchments from which to fight. The battle lasted roughly five hours before a relief force from Fort Phil Kearny reached them and sent the Sioux fleeing with howitzer fire. The army lost only six dead and six wounded. The Sioux’s losses were much heavier, with estimates varying from four hundred to a thousand (about four hundred seems the most plausible figure). Sioux warriors traditionally removed fallen warriors from the field of battle. The fight had a debilitating effect on the Sioux and on Red Cloud himself, who witnessed the battle from a nearby hillside. He was said to have claimed that he lost the flower of his nation in the fight.