Weber and the Rational Society

This article provides an overview of German sociologist Max Weber's (1864–1920) work on human rationality and social organization. In his study of social change, Weber identified two primary ideal types of societies, traditional and rational, the former based in value-rational (Wertrational) authority and the latter in rational-legal (Zweckrational) authority. Traditional societies, said Weber, are organized around the customary practices of a social collective that are handed down, reenacted, and reproduced, with minor deviations, from one generation to the next. Rational societies, in contrast, are organized around making reasonable choices among ends and between means to accomplish those ends. Rational social organization, for Weber, is a significant mark of modernity. Paradoxically, Weber both examined and contributed to the rise of modern, rational society. Moreover, Weber's methodological "value-free" approach to social science is relevant to contemporary discussions of professional versus public sociology.

Keywords Bureaucracy; Capitalism; Charismatic Authority; Customs; Ideal Type; Instrumental Rationality; Legitimate Authority; Modernity; Mores; Norms; Postmodernity; Rational Societies; Rationality; Rational-Legal Authority; Traditional Societies; Value-Free; Value Rationality; Value-Rational Authority

Weber & the Rational Society

Overview

German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), more than any other early sociological theorist, is associated with the term "rationality." The phrase "the rational society" is used to represent a trend in philosophical and social thought in which examination of humankind's place in the universe proceeded through contemplation and analysis of the human mind and the human ability to anticipate and form expectations about the future.

Philosophical, social, and religious thinkers had long contemplated the idea of rationality and the possibilities of a society organized according to reason as opposed to emotion, especially those emotions considered most dangerous and damaging to human interactions and interrelationships (see Becker, 1968; Levine, 1981; Latour, 1991; Genov, 1991; Shalin, 1992). Weber's thought was particularly influenced by the work of philosophers Immanuel Kant and G. F. W. Hegel (Levine, 1981). Like other social thinkers in the same time period, Weber concentrated his work on the social implications of the human faculty of reason, a concept that is more convoluted than casual inspection might reveal (Levine, 1981).

Considered a master in the application of the historico-comparative method, Weber made extensive use of this technique to conduct thorough investigations into the organization of human affairs. His studies concentrated not only on Western civilizations but also on the cultures and societies of the Eastern world (Mitchell, 1968). His works are extensive; the study and analysis of his work alone have provided a lifelong occupation for some more contemporary sociologists.

Weber is credited among sociologists with coining the term "ideal type," which is a theoretical construct consisting of a hypothetical set of characteristics or attributes. Weber provided a sophisticated explanation of the ideal type, making systematic use of this concept in the comparison of the social organization of human affairs in differing times, cultures, and civilizations (Mitchell, 1968). In his studies, he makes use of two now-well-recognized ideal types of social organization to examine social change: the traditional and rational. Traditional societies, posited Weber, are organized around immeasurable values situated in the customary practices of a social collective that are handed down, reenacted, and reproduced, with minor deviations, from one generation to the next. Rational societies, in contrast, are organized around making reasonable choices among ends and between means to accomplish those ends. Rational social organization, for Weber, is a significant mark of modernity.

In summarizing Weber's use of the traditional and rational ideal types of social organization, to say that one type is more rational or reasonable than the other would be a gross oversimplification. The two ideal types mentioned above carry labels in English that are somewhat misleading. All social collectives, traditional and modern, are gathered around the rational pursuit of ends or goals. Weber's concentration, rather, is upon differing modes of rationality and the quality and quantity of human social relationships and forms of social organization associated with each one.

Applications

Weber's Analysis of Rational Society

Modes of Rationality

In constructing his "ideal type" of modern, rational society, Weber distinguished between two primary modes of rationality based upon the ends or goals of human activity: value rationality (German: Wertrationalität) and purposive rationality (German: Zweckrationalität). Today, the latter is more often called instrumental rationality and is sometimes also called formal-procedural rationality (Levine, 1981; Woods, 2001; Parsons 2007). While we concentrate here on these two primary modes of rationality, we must keep in mind the compound nature of the concept of rationality; Weber recognized this, and his investigation and understanding of rationality was not limited to these two modes (see Levine, 1981; Genov, 1991).

Value rationality directs human activity toward the realization of immeasurable but overarching principles or beliefs. Human interactions and interrelationships under value rationality are guided and patterned by customs and norms that have developed and persisted over time in pursuit of these overarching principles or beliefs. Religious, ethical, and even artistic or aesthetic pursuits are guided by such principles or values. Such principles are considered ultimate ends that must guide individual and collective behavior, regardless of the consequences (Mitchell, 1968).

Formal-procedural or instrumental rationality, in contrast, is directed more toward specific, measurable outcomes or consequences rather than immeasurable, overarching principles or values. Value rationality is considered more substantial, in that the principles or values are the substance or foundation of the reasons for action, having some intrinsic or internal meaning, often attributed to human affectivity or emotionality. Instrumental rationality is more formalized than value rationality in dictating behavior, with deliberative, written codes for human interaction as external guides for human conduct (Mitchell, 1968). It is the later mode of rationality, Weber observed, that predominates in modern society.

Rationality & Authority

Authority is granted to an individual, or groups or classes of individuals, by the very act of submission to authority. When individuals submit to the authority of others, that authority is legitimate; that is, the authority exercised is recognized as proper or correct on the basis of some commonly held social agreement, whether implicit or explicit. Thus, for example, those of the Catholic faith submit to the authority of the Pope, peoples of a nation submit to the authority of their leader, and children submit to the authority of their parents.

In his research, Weber paid particular attention to the differing bases of legitimate authority, relating these bases to differing modes of rationality. Through a detailed historical investigation and analysis of legal systems, both Western and Eastern, and the changes in those systems over time, Weber concluded that authority in modern society is increasingly granted on the basis of formal, written, codified law. Moreover, legitimate rational-legal authority, based in instrumental rationality, is vested not in individuals but in offices described in codified rules or laws, in which specific duties, responsibilities, and powers are detailed. Authority is intimately connected with an individual's social position and economic means. The transition away from traditional value-rational authority toward instrumental-rational bases of authority brought a pronounced change in everyday social life.

Rationality & Economics

Weber paid special attention to the organization of human affairs under differing forms of economic exchange throughout his work. Capitalism, especially the form of capitalism seen in the Western world, was of particular interest. He noted the complexity of modern Western capitalism, in which profit-seeking enterprises were founded on contractual jointly held interests, or corporations, mediated by monetary valuation of interests through organizations such as stock and monetary exchanges (Levine, 1981; Jagd, 2002).

The facet of modern, Western capitalism that most interested Weber was its Geist (spirit), the attitudes and beliefs that led modern capitalists to endlessly pursue the accumulation of capital far beyond a mere interest in providing for economic necessities of the present and near future. Modern Western capitalists, noted Weber, are not motivated by a desire to acquire new territories with their accompanying natural resources. Capitalists are no longer adventurers on missions to conquer new worlds, which was the prevailing form of capitalistic acquisitiveness in earlier times. Modern Western capitalists seek ever-expanding authority to control capital assets through trade, usury (the lending of money for interest fees), and innovation in bringing new products to market as well as conquering new consumer markets for products (Mitchell, 1968; Campbell, 1987).

This new spirit of capitalism, concluded Weber, was as much a break from past economic organizations as was Protestant Christianity from Roman or Orthodox religious organizations. In fact, Weber noted, the rise of the new capitalism was concurrent with the rise of Protestantism, both of which shared some common attitudes, such as asceticism, orderliness, efficiency, and individualism (Mitchell, 1968).

Rationality & Bureaucracy

Weber contended that social organization in modern society, operating under instrumental rationality, becomes increasingly legalistic and bureaucratic. In a bureaucracy, work is divided into bureaus, offices, or departments based on specific functions and hierarchical positions of authority. Those holding such positions of authority exercise that authority on the basis of written rules or laws. The positions are hierarchic in that more authority is granted to specific positions, such that the organization of authority can be detailed in ever-decreasing ranks or grades.

The trend in business and governance to organize on the basis of rational-legal authority, dividing work according to written rules and laws, had implications for everyday modern life that went far beyond the offices of business corporations and the halls of legislation. The marketplace, the workplace, the home—every dimension of social life resounded with hallmarks of instrumental-rational authority and the codified division of labor (Levine, 1981).

The Iron Cage

Max Weber's depiction of rational society is so detailed and accurate that it sometimes seems as though he invented modern rationality and bureaucracy. The picture painted by Weber in his conclusions about modern society often seems bleak and confining; modern instrumental-rational society, with its bureaucratic tendencies, seemed to constitute an "iron cage" in which humankind had become trapped on a modern treadmill (Mitzman, 1970):

The supreme irony for Weber was that human beings had escaped bondage to magic, ignorance, naivety, hunger, and disease by basing their life on science and methodical effort, only to risk the destruction of all meaningful social existence…. For Weber, the values of the past were lost forever… and a meaningful present was becoming less and less possible as the relentless march of bureaucratization turned means into ends and placed life in a never-to-be-achieved set of abstractions—progress, perfectibility, equality, happiness, and the like (Rossides, 1998, p. 194).

Modern society, concluded Weber, had become over-reliant on instrumental rationality. If this trend continues, the outlook for individual freedom looks bleak. For within this modern, instrumentally rational structure, the majority of humankind is bereft of authority, becoming mere cogs in the wheel of the machinery of bureaucracy.

To concentrate solely on Weber's view of bureaucracy and rational-legal authority is to miss the importance of his work taken as a whole, in which charismatic and traditional authority, based in value rationality, play a significant part. Students of Weber's work must admit, as does Weber himself, that value rationality continues to have a place in individual minds and in social contexts, although the extent and pervasiveness of that role are matters for empirical investigation (Woods, 2001; Parsons, 2007; Turner, 2007).

Some contemporary sociologists speculate that Weber's background may have lent a dark, foreboding flavor to some of his writings (Levine, 1991). Certainly, during the time of his writings, the German state was experiencing widespread social discord. Some of Weber's writings and activities, especially after World War I, have been interpreted in a more positive light, indicating that his view of modern society was less dour than earlier interpreters of his work led us to believe. However, if we concentrate solely on Weber's personal psychology, we miss the detailed, exacting nature of his work and its strengths, as well as any methodological weaknesses.

Reflexivity: Rational Society

Rationality Extended

Paradoxically, Weber himself contributed to the growth of modern rationality in his work on methods in the social sciences. Weber insisted that social research must be value free; value rationality is a topic for research, not a method of conducting research. His writings detailing the rigorous nature of the manner in which social scientists must detail, classify, and elaborate theoretical constructs remain influential in social science (Jacobs, 1990; Turner, 2007). Obviously, in outlining such rules for social research, Weber appeals to and promotes a type of instrumental rationality.

There are few aspects of social life today that have not been studied in the light of Weber's concepts of differing modes of rationality and bases of authority. By connecting these concepts with those of status, class, political party affiliation, and political power, Weber paved the way for social science discussions and applied analysis of social organization and socioeconomic status in the modern world (Levine, 1981). The area of sociological inquiry known as organizational sociology owes much to Weber's study of bureaucratic authority and the organization of work in modern society (Scott, 2004).

Many contemporary sociologists, when studying his theoretical work or applying his concepts and methods, focus extensively on Weber's interest in the modern capitalist business enterprise; his investigations of other aspects of social life are sometimes cast as ancillary to his interest in modern business practices and the mutual shaping of these practices and modern human interactions and interrelations. Nevertheless, his studies of religion and political organization are profound and still actively applied today.

Though one of Weber's primary interests in the study of religion was the differences between religious authority, which he saw as largely traditional and value-rational, and bureaucratic business authority, which he considered to be modern and instrumental-rational, his detailing of the organization of religious life is still studied, and his theories, methods, and observations are cited as seminal in the field of religious studies (see, for example, Sniith, 1998; Erdélyi, 2007; Takahashi, 2007; Hess, 2007). Moreover, while Weber tends to look at the ways in which religious values and attitudes mingle with and affect business values and attitudes, most notably in his studies of effects of Protestantism on capitalism, his studies on bureaucratic business organization can also be applied to contemporary religious organizations (Cornwell, 2007), which, today, are generally shaped much more by business practices than by religious considerations.

Politics, the means by which social power (under the auspices of instrumental, rational-legal authority) is gained and maintained, and governance are also greatly affected by business practices. The affairs of both politics and governance are increasingly arranged along lines Weber would have recognized as the rational organization of work in business bureaucracy. Contemporary discussions abound in studies of democracy and freedom in which Weber's theories, methods, and observations play a central role (Schluchter, 1983; Race, 2003; Steffek, 2003; Lachelier, 2006; Faught, 2007; Llanque, 2007; Shaw, 2008).

While studies of Weber's work most often focus on his explorations of modern instrumental rationality and its effect on economy and society, Weber's systematic examination of tradition is often overlooked. Perhaps more than any other sociologist, Edward Shils takes Weber's work on tradition as important, though incomplete, expounding and expanding the traditional ideal type and showing the continuing relevance of tradition and value rationality in modern society (1981).

Since Weber's time, social sciences generally and economics in particular have further developed elaborate models of rationality that far surpass the fundamental typology used by Weber. However, Weber notes that he intended to develop not an economic theory but a social theory of rationality (Levine, 1981; Jadg, 2002; Turner, 2007). Sociologists such as James S. Coleman (1990) later developed and extended the theory, classification, and mathematical modeling of rational action.

Viewpoints

Weber Critiqued

Weber's exhaustive studies of Eastern cultures, relying upon the available literature and data of his time, leave him less vulnerable to charges of Eurocentrism than other European social scientists, but not immune. The literature and data of his time were generally written or collected by Europeans, themselves open to charges of Eurocentrism. Essentially, the claim of Eurocentrism is that the work of European theorists is flawed by assumptions based in and largely unique to European culture.

Weber's work is most susceptible to charges of inadequate detailing and definition of the differing senses in which he makes use of the term "rationality" (Levine, 1981; Jadg, 2002). When differences in language and differing approaches to translation of his work from the original German into other languages are considered, the seriousness of some of these charges are reduced. Nonetheless, Weber may have overly relied on the Weltanschuung (world view) of his time and culture in his development of his concepts of rationality (Levine, 1981; Turner, 2007).

Rationality Renounced

There are few social scientists who reject the efficacy of Weber's work as a penetrating social history of his time. There are more than a few, however, who reject the idea of modern rationality itself. While Weber, personally, thought that society could best be explained by the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of individuals, his work became identified with later extensions of his ideas that attempt to present rationality and rational authority as a more broadly explanatory theory of social relationships. This was particularly the case with the work of Talcott Parsons on his general theory of action, which is based in large part on his interpretation of Weber's thought (1937).

Weber's examination of modern, rational society became synonymous with the very idea of a rational society, organized according to reason. The iconoclastic cold, calculating bureaucrat, who justifies his own actions on the basis of written rules and laws in apparent disregard of the plight of individuals, looms large in the minds of those who criticize modern, rational society or the notion of a general theory of social action. Included among those are a number of sociologists who posit that society and social theory have entered an era of postmodernity and either reject rationality as an explanation for contemporary social action or reject any approach to social theory not based in localized observation. Ironically, Weber himself would likely agree with the latter position.

Perhaps the most important challenge to Weber's legacy is aimed not at Weber's observations regarding the mutual shaping of the attitudes and beliefs of individuals and socially recognized authority but at his insistence that sociology must be "value free." This challenge within sociology echoes a larger challenge to the idea that science in general is conducted in the sterile, value-free manner in which it is often presented to the public (Fuller, 1989). This discussion in sociology has centered on the idea that sociology should be "public sociology" (Clawson et al., 2007), that is, sociological research should be conducted in the public interest. In some ways, this is a moot debate, as Scheiring points out, in that the very idea of the study of society is of benefit to the public (2007). However, the debate does bring up interesting questions about both the professional conduct of sociology and its contemporary relevance as a field of inquiry. It is a debate that Max Weber would have joined with enthusiasm.

Terms & Concepts

Bureaucracy: The organization of work by division into bureaus, offices, or departments based on specific functions and hierarchical authority.

Capitalism: An economic system in which the means of production and distribution of goods and services are privately owned and operated for the benefit of the owners.

Charismatic Authority: Authority based in some personal, desirable, attractive characteristics of an individual in pursuit of value-rational ends.

Customs: Practices that reflect cultural values.

Ideal Type: A theoretical construct consisting of a hypothetical set of characteristics or attributes

Instrumental Rationality: Human reasoning based in weighing and measuring both ends and means to determine which ends are most likely achievable and which means are most instrumental to achieving the various ends. Also called purposive or formal-procedural rationality. German: Zweckrationalität.

Legitimate Authority: Authority that is legitimated by the very act of submission. Human reasoning that leads to submission to authority may be based in value or instrumental rationality.

Modernity: An era in social history characterized by growth in bureaucratic work organization, technological industrial production, market capitalism, and consumerism in rational pursuit of the ideological end of social progress.

Mores: Standards of moral social behavior, religiously or ethically acceptable.

Norms: Widely accepted standards of behavior in a specified society.

Postmodernity: The condition of being postmodern. Postmodern social thought is based in the critique or outright rejection of modernity, often used to indicate social processes associated with the increasing growth of non-factory (postindustrial) systems of economic productivity.

Rational Societies: Social organization based in instrumental, rational-legal authority.

Rationality: Human reasoning that can be recognized by other humans as being directed toward socially acceptable or legitimate ends or goals.

Rational-Legal Authority: Authority based in instrumental rationality derived from written rules or laws.

Traditional Societies: Social organizations based in value-rational authority.

Value-Free: Human activity, particularly scientific research, that is not directed toward overarching principles or beliefs having some intrinsic or internal meaning for the actor(s).

Value Rationality: Human reasoning based in immeasurable value placed on the realization of overarching principles or beliefs with some intrinsic or internal meaning that forms the substance or foundation of the reasons for action. German: Wertrationalität.

Value-Rational Authority: Authority-based value rationality derived from customs, norms, and mores that have developed and persisted over time in pursuit of overarching principles or beliefs.

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Woods, P. (2001). Values-intuitive rational action: The dynamic relationship of instrumental rationality and values insights as a form of social action. British Journal of Sociology, 52 , 687-70. Retrieved August 31, 2008 from EBSCO online database SocINDEX with Full Text: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=5692226&site=ehost-live

Suggested Reading

Collins, R. (1986). Weberian sociological theory. London: Cambridge University Press.

Eliaeson, S. (2012). Value orientation and the secularization of post-Enlightenment social science. History of the Human Sciences, 25, 3–31. Retrieved November 1, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=77683823&site=ehost-live

Schluchter, W. (1996). Paradoxes of Modernity: Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Shils, E. (1975). Center and periphery: Essays in macrosociology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Spragens, T. (1990). Reason and democracy. Durham, NC:Duke University Press.

Weber, M. (1958). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Parsons, T. (translator). New York, NY: Charles Scribner's & Sons.

Weber, M. (1947). Max Weber: The theory of social and economic organization. Parsons, T. (ed.) & Henderson, A. (translator). New York, NY: The Free Press.

Essay by Mary E. Lee, PhD

Mary Lee received her MA in sociology from University of Texas at Arlington in 1986 and her doctorate from Texas A&M University in 1993. Since receiving her first graduate degree, she has held several positions in state government and has taught undergraduate sociology in several universities and one community college. She has published several peer-reviewed articles and acted as coeditor for one book and as guest editor for one peer-reviewed journal. Most recently, in 2008, she became, for the second time, a 5-year cancer survivor. She continues to work as an independent scholar, despite her lack of independent means. Her interests include social theory, inequality, and social studies of science and technology.