Zhang Zhidong

Chinese scholar and administrator

• Born: September 2, 1837
• Birthplace: Nanpi, Chihli (now Hebei), China
• Died: October 4, 1909
• Place of death: Beijing, Chihli (now Hebei), China

Zhang Zhidong was a leading scholar-official in China during the last half-century of the Qing Dynasty. His educational, military, and economic reforms contributed greatly to the survival of China’s last imperial dynasty.

Early Life

Zhang Zhidong (tshang TSHEE-dahng) came from a gentry family of modest means. His father, Zhang Ying, provided him with a rigorous classical education, and Zhidong responded with diligence and precocity. At the age of thirteen, he passed the prefectural exam, becoming a sheng-yüan. At fifteen, Zhidong, in competition with almost ten thousand scholars, led the list of about one hundred who received the chü-jen degree in Chihli (Hebei) Province.

Zhang Zhidong delayed taking the metropolitan exam, deterred in part by his father’s death in 1855. In 1863, however, he passed the Beijing exam, becoming a chin-shih degree-holder and member of China’s upper gentry. His palace examination, though somewhat controversial, apparently pleased Cixi (Tz’u-hsi), the empress dowager, who appointed him to the Hanlin Academy in Beijing.

From 1867 to 1881, Zhang alternated between provincial posts in education in Hubei (Hupeh) and Sichuan (Szechwan), and positions at the Hanlin Academy. At the capital, he associated with a group of conservative Confucian scholars who called themselves the Qingliu, or purists. The Qingliu demanded that China adopt a militant stand against foreign encroachment and characterized the policies of moderating as constituting cowardly appeasement. Zhang was no better than any of the purists, however, in his constant efforts to please Cixi. He condoned her decision, in 1875, to defy Confucian tradition by breaking the normal line of succession and securing the throne for her nephew, Emperor Guangxu (Kuang-hsü). When a censor, Wu Kedu (Wu K’o-tu), committed suicide in 1879 to protest Cixi’s policies, Zhang wrote a lengthy memorial criticizing Wu and justifying the empress dowager’s actions.

Zhang’s memorials were usually less sycophantic and usually concerned foreign policy. He and the purists called for military action against Russia over the I-li and against France over the status of Annam. In the first instance, their bellicose posturing appeared to be effective, and Russia agreed to replace the earlier Treaty of Livadia (October, 1789) with the less favorable Treaty of St. Petersburg (February, 1881). Unfortunately, the purists, encouraged by their apparent success in I-li, prodded the throne into applying the same kind of threatening approach to France, which precipitated the Sino-French War (1883-1885). The fighting resulted in France’s destruction of the Chinese fleet and shipyards at Fuzhou (Foochow), and China reluctantly agreed to the unfavorable terms of the Li-Fournier Agreement (May, 1884).

Most of the purists were discredited for having pushed China into a losing war, and Zhang might have suffered a similar fate. Fortunately for him, he had already embarked upon a more substantive career than that of warmonger. The bitter experience of witnessing China’s ignominy during the Sino-French fiasco had radically altered Zhang’s perspectives on the West and on change, and he had become an energetic reformer.

Life’s Work

Earlier, while still basking in the success at I-li, Zhang received several rapid promotions and became governor of Shanxi (Shansi) Province in 1881. As governor, Zhang initiated numerous industrial and educational projects to help reduce the deplorable economic conditions in Shanxi. In 1884, during the Sino-French hostilities, the throne appointed Zhang viceroy of Liangkwang (Guangdong and Guangxi). At the conclusion of the war, the throne not only criticized Zhang for his earlier bellicosity but also praised him for having undertaken several positive measures, including the defense of Guangdong (Kwangtung). Zhang began to adopt the ideas of Feng Guifen (Feng Kuei-fen), who during the early 1860’s had popularized the concept of ziqiang, or self-strengthening.

To Zhang, strengthening China required the adoption of Western technology. He was, however, deeply concerned with the relationship between modernization and Westernization—the dilemma facing all Chinese reformers. His interest was not to alter China in a radical way but rather to save it by entertaining certain modifications. Thus, he insisted upon preserving Confucianism as the central core of Chinese culture. To this end, Zhang promoted the slogan that translates as “Chinese studies as the foundation, Western studies for their practicality.” This signified that modernization should not entail Westernization, because Chinese values were superior to those of the West.

Among Zhang’s many proposals was the construction of a railway line between Beijing and Hankou. The throne appointed Zhang viceroy of Hunan-Hubei in 1889, with instructions to oversee this project. Having earlier constructed a foundry in Guangdong. Zhang also undertook to establish the Hanyeping Iron and Steel works in Hanyang. Though small and wiry, Zhang was apparently tireless in his efforts to seek funds for these and other projects. His zeal, however, did not mean that he understood either the mechanics or the financial underpinnings of successful industrialization. When it became evident that he could not obtain the necessary capital for either of these projects, he turned them over to private corporations.

During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, when the viceroy of the Anhui-Jiangsu-Jiangsi area, Liu Kuni, was commanding troops, Zhang took over at Nanjing on an interim basis. In his efforts to prepare China for continued war, Zhang undertook the creation of a self-strengthening army, with German advisers and foreign weapons. Zhang turned over this modern force to Liu upon the latter’s return to Nanjing, but he re-created essentially the same type of units on his resumption of the viceroyalty post at Hanyang.

During 1895-1898, Zhang associated with many young zealous reformers, who ultimately became involved in the famous Hundred Days’ Reform during the summer of 1898. Prior to this abortive movement, Zhang published his famous Quan xue pian (exhortation to study). The reformers, reading their own convictions into this work, construed it as a rallying platform. For his part, Zhang, who had originally financed and sponsored many of the reformers, became alarmed by their misrepresentation of his ideas. He also disliked their leader, Kang Youwei (K’ang Yu-wei) for his constant representation of Confucius as a radical reformer.

As the reformers moved toward constitutional monarchy, Zhang, who distrusted participatory democracy, began to distance himself from them. When Cixi’s coup ended the Hundred Days’ Reform, Zhang was one of the first to call for the severe punishment of the reform leaders. He even refused to join Liu Kuni in memorializing the throne against the threatened deposition of the young emperor. Zhang emerged from this movement the object of suspicion and hatred, both by court conservatives and young reformers. Whatever remaining ties existed between Zhang and the new reformers ended in 1900, when Zhang arrested and executed twenty conspirators who had been plotting the overthrow of Cixi.

During the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900), Zhang joined a few other provincial leaders in guaranteeing the safety and property of foreigners in southern China. While he complied with orders from the court to send troops to the north, he kept his strongest units at home and sent untrained recruits to the capital. At the conclusion of the Boxer Rebellion, he and other moderate provincial officials requested that foreign powers not hold Cixi accountable for Boxer outrages. Zhang thus consolidated his position at the court and also endeared himself to many foreigners in China. He eventually made use of his ties to British representatives, asking them repeatedly to intercede on his behalf at the imperial court.

With the deaths of Li Hongzhang and Liu Kuni, in 1901 and 1902, respectively, Zhang became China’s senior statesman. Among many reform activities, he spearheaded a commission to study the future of the civil service examination system. Calling at first for their gradual abolition, Zhang suddenly suggested an immediate end to the exams and the creation of a national Confucian school system. Cixi complied with alacrity and on September 2, 1905, abolished the examination system, ending what was probably the most salient feature of China’s Confucian imperial system.

In the summer of 1907, Zhang came to the capital as a grand secretary, but the court also made him a grand councillor and directed him to head the Ministry of Education. By this time, however, he was beset both by infirmity and considerable doubts about the Qing Dynasty’s ability to survive. The death of Cixi in November, 1908, did little to improve his outlook. Zhang had come to accept the idea of a constitutional monarchy but was frustrated by what he construed as moral decay in China. On October 4, 1909, the same day he submitted a memorial eulogizing Cixi, he died, surrounded by friends and family.

Significance

An educational innovator who founded dozens of academies and modern schools and an initiator of numerous industrial and communications ventures, Zhang Zhidong unquestionably helped arrest the continued decline of the Qing Dynasty. Nevertheless, he embodied both the best and worst features of China’s traditional elite class. Honest to a fault, Zhang died a relatively poor man. However, his loyalty to a dynasty led him to tolerate the venality and corruption of Cixi, the empress dowager. He understood that China was weak and needed reform, but he also remained firmly convinced that China’s traditional value system should remain virtually intact.

In essence, Zhang failed to grasp the relationship between technological modernity and the sociocultural foundations that were necessary for such modernization. His formulas for self-strengthening proved to be bankrupt rationalizations that failed to acknowledge inherent weaknesses in China’s cultural tradition itself. His occasional opportunism was a reflection of the corrupt state of the Qing Dynasty, and, in the end, most of his projects served only to retard the process of dynastic deterioration. Zhang could neither save the dynasty nor conserve the Confucian tradition that he cherished. He died a famous and respected man but ultimately was a failed leader of a country that had become weaker during his own lifetime. Although he did not bear the principal responsibility for this decline, the empress dowager, the Qing Dynasty, and, in large measure, the unaltered Confucian tradition that he supported, all contributed to China’s decay.

Bibliography

Ayers, William. Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Although concentrating on Zhang’s role as an educational reformer, this well-documented work can serve as a biography of his life as well.

Bays, Daniel H. China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895-1909. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978. A thorough and analytical account of Zhang’s career during the last fifteen years of his life.

Cohen, Paul A., and John E. Schrecker, eds. Reform in Nineteenth Century China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. Numerous articles discuss Zhang’s association with the Qingliu reformers and his other activities. Most of the articles provide an excellent background for a study of Zhang.

Eastman, Lloyd E. Throne and Mandarins: China’s Search for a Policy During the Sino-French Controversy, 1880-1885. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. An excellent review of this period, with much discussion of Zhang and the purists.

Hummel, Arthur W., ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, 1644-1912. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-1944. Volume 1 contains a fairly detailed biography of Zhang that is still accurate and useful.

Levenson, Joseph R. Confucian China and Its Modern Fate. 3 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958-1965. In volume 1, the author discusses the conflict between continuity and change during the Qing Dynasty. Referring frequently to Zhang, the author gives a superb analysis of the dilemma facing Confucian reformers.

Powell, Ralph L. The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. Offers substantial coverage of Zhang’s military reforms and his efforts involving the self-strengthening army.

Wright, Mary C. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957. Although concentrating on the period prior to Zhang’s prominence, this classic is essential to understanding the struggle between conservatism and modernization in the late Qing Dynasty. The author frequently refers to Zhang’s ideas and actions.