Accomplices and accessories
Accomplices and accessories refer to individuals who contribute to the commission of a crime in various capacities, influencing their legal liability based on their involvement. Traditionally in common law, individuals were categorized as "accessories before the fact," "principals," or "accessories after the fact," depending on whether they aided the crime before, during, or after its commission. In modern U.S. law, these distinctions have largely been simplified into three main classifications: principals, who execute the crime; accomplices, who assist during the crime; and accessories, who provide aid after the crime is committed.
The actions that constitute complicity can include encouraging, facilitating, or providing resources for the crime, such as acting as a lookout or supplying weapons. Importantly, mere presence at a crime scene does not automatically result in liability unless there’s a legal obligation to act. The intent behind these actions is crucial; accomplices must have a specific intent to aid or abet the criminal act. Accessories typically face less severe penalties, as their involvement is often limited to post-crime activities, such as helping the perpetrator evade justice. Understanding these roles is essential for grasping how legal systems assign responsibility within criminal enterprises.
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Accomplices and accessories
SIGNIFICANCE: The doctrine of complicity explains circumstances under which those who associate with criminal ventures incur liability for the wrongful acts of others before, during, and after crimes are committed.
In common-law tradition, people who acted before crimes were committed were known as “accessories before the fact.” Those who acted during commission of the crimes were considered in common law “principals in the second”; those who carried out the actual crimes were considered “principals in the first”; and those who aided after the crimes were committed were called “accessories after the fact.” Most modern U.S. statutes have merged these classifications into three categories: People who carry out the crimes are “principals”; those who act before and during the crimes are “accomplices”; and those who act after the fact are “accessories.”
The actus reus of accomplices constitutes any acts that assist or encourage commission of crimes. In essence, any affirmative acts that enhance the commission of a crime constitute the guilty act in complicity. These acts may comprise, but are not limited to, serving as getaway drivers, acting as lookouts, providing weapons or know-how, and luring victims to the perpetrators. A person’s mere presence at a crime scene or flight from a crime scene does not in itself constitute accomplice liability unless there is a legal duty to act. Words that tacitly approve and reinforce the criminal venture may constitute the guilty act in complicity.
Although there is some disagreement in the criminal justice system as to whether the mens rea of accomplices constitute recklessness and negligence, there is consensus on the view that accomplices should possess the specific intent to commit acts that satisfy aiding and abetting someone to commit a crime. In United States v. Peoni (1938), U.S. circuit court judge Learned Hand noted that a person must associate with the criminal enterprise and actively “participate in it” in an effort to help “make it succeed.” Further, besides the intended crime, the guilty intent may be imputed as well for crimes that accomplices could have reasonably foreseen may result from their aiding and abetting one crime.
To incur liability following crimes, most states require that accessories know that the crimes have been committed, that those persons whom accessories assist have committed the crimes, and that the accessories themselves have rendered aid so that the perpetrators could elude justice. Liability for accessories is usually less severe than that for accomplices, and it is based on acts such as providing safe haven, destroying evidence, or assisting in escape.
Bibliography
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