American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut
American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut is a significant legal case that arose from an ordinance enacted by the Indianapolis-Marion County Council, which aimed to restrict materials depicting the sexual subordination of women. This ordinance defined pornography in a way that framed it as a form of injury to women, viewing it as a depiction of their dehumanization and sexual degradation. The case sparked intense debate regarding the intersection of pornography, sex discrimination, and free speech rights in the United States.
Proponents of the ordinance argued that it was necessary to combat sex discrimination, suggesting that pornography constituted a new category of unprotected speech. In contrast, opponents claimed that the ordinance was vague, lacking clarity on what it covered, and argued that it violated constitutional rights related to free speech and due process. The district court ultimately ruled against the ordinance, emphasizing the importance of free speech as a foundational principle that should not be compromised, even in the face of societal issues like discrimination. This case reflects the ongoing tensions between protecting individual rights and addressing social harms, particularly in the context of gender and expression.
American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
Decided: February 24, 1986
Significance: In this case the Supreme Court summarily affirmed an appellate court’s holding that an Indiana antipornography ordinance violated the First Amendment
The Hudnut decision involved an Indianapolis-Marion County ordinance that defined pornography not a causal factor that harmed women but as an injury per se. The ordinance defined pornography as “graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words” that dehumanized women as sexual objects, presented them in sexually degrading situations, showed them being sexually penetrated by objects or animals, or depicted them in other physically degrading situations in contexts that make the conditions sexual. After heated debate over the problems of pornography and sex discrimination in American society, the Indianapolis City-County Council enacted an ordinance that restricted the availability of materials depicting the sexual subordination of women.
A district court held that the state’s interest in eradicating sex discrimination was insufficiently compelling to outweigh the public interest in free speech. The court paid particular attention to obscenity as the category of speech most closely resembling pornography. Defenders of the ordinance contended that because pornography was a broader category than obscenity the court should recognize it as a new category of unprotected speech. They also argued that the ordinance regulated conduct and not speech, since—by their own definition—pornography was more than a mere expression of ideas. They saw it as unconstitutional sex-based discrimination.
Opponents of the ordinance contended that it failed to provide fair notice to residents of Indianapolis and those doing business there as to what it covered or exempted, and that it thereby violated the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. They also claimed that the ordinance had a “chilling effect” on the exercise of free speech rights and that its provision for cease and desist orders constituted an illegal prior restraint by allowing the government to act as a censor.
The district court ruled that it could not permit every group claiming to have been victimized by unfair expression special legislative exceptions to the First Amendment. Finally, the court suggested that while sociological patterns might need alteration, defendants should remember that free speech, “rather than being the enemy, is a long-tested and worthy ally,” that could be used to protect against tyranny.