Analysis: The Dred Scott Decision

Date: March 6, 1857

Authors: Taney, Chief Justice Roger B.; Curtis, Justice Benjamin R.

Genre: court opinion

Summary Overview

The majority opinion in Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford, written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, caused an uproar in the North because it was seen as giving the Southern slave owners everything they wanted: African Americans could not be citizens and Congress could not prevent slavery in federal territories. The outrage most Northerners felt regarding this decision, greatly increased their support for the new anti-slavery Republican Party, leading to the election of Abraham Lincoln as president in 1860. Thus this ruling was one of the major sectional political actions which created the conditions for the Civil War. The dissent by Justice Benjamin R. Curtis opposed virtually every aspect of the Court’s decision.

Document Analysis

When Dred Scott brought his appeal for freedom to the Supreme Court, it was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify how slavery fit into the complex federal system of government in the United States. The issue of slavery itself was mixed with the issues of states’ rights, property rights and what it meant to be a territory of the United States. Chief Justice Taney wrote a strong opinion against Dred Scott and limiting the federal government’s ability to restrict slavery, obtain territory, and to change anything from the time of the adoption of the Constitution. From his legal outlook, he reasoned that people of African descent could not become U.S. citizens and that Congress had very limited power in the territories acquired as a result of various treaties. Curtis, as one of two dissenters, wrote a strongly worded reaction to Taney, which rejected the line of reasoning and the conclusions which had been reached. While the logic needed by both men to reach their conclusions could might, in some instances, seem to be contorted, they both believed deeply that it was necessary to demonstrate a formidable foundation for the opinion which was being given. As such, the range of citations went well beyond legal precedents from American courts to the common law tradition inherited from the British.

The basic case was that, under a previous owner, Scott had been taken to Illinois and then to the Wisconsin Territory, both of which had laws against slavery. While in Wisconsin Territory, Scott had been allowed to marry, which in essence was a contractual agreement. Although Scott and his family had been taken back to Missouri, he filed suit for freedom based on having lived for several years in Wisconsin Territory and having made a legal contract during that period. In the majority opinion supported by seven of the justices, Chief Justice Taney initially asked the question “Has the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between the parties?” This is a basic question asked of many appeals which are directed to the Supreme Court, a question of jurisdiction. However, in answering this basic question, Taney went far beyond a simple answer. In making his determination, he focused on who was making the appeal. This was, in part, because the case had been taken to federal court because Dred Scott was in Missouri and Sanford had moved to New York, giving Scott the use of the clause in Article III of the Constitution that citizens of different states can file suit in federal court rather than in one of the states. Also, Taney seemed to focus on who was making the appeal because of previous legal opinions he had rendered regarding whether people of African descent could be United States citizens.

Sanford’s lawyer had argued that Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, and thus had no standing to file the suit, because his African ancestors “were brought into this country and sold as slaves.” While Scott accepted this, his attorney stated that it had no relevance to the case. In essence, this would be determined by the outcome of the case. If Scott was a slave, then he was not a citizen of Missouri. If Scott was not a slave, then he was a citizen of Missouri, since that was where he was residing. For Taney’s opinion to have any strength, he had to go beyond this type of semi-circular argument. It was from this that he focused on the citizenship of people of African descent. Since, according to Taney, all people from Africa who entered the United States did so as slaves, his ruling in this case would apply to all of them and their descendants. Taney claimed that since there were no free blacks when the Constitution was adopted, none of the provisions of the Constitution apply to them, except in the few instances where there were veiled references to slaves. His opinion included other historical facts of questionable accuracy. Taney asserted that during the founding of the republic, “the unhappy black race… were never thought of or spoken of except as property.” Similarly, the situation described by the famous phrases in the Declaration of Independence, “all men are created equal” and “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were seen by Taney as being “too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included.” Thus, as a class, people of African descent living in the United States were not citizens. They could not become citizens, because the Constitution reserved the right to make laws regarding the naturalization of citizens to Congress, but for a person to be naturalized, that person must have been a citizen of another country. States granting freedom to slaves could not make them citizens, because granting citizenship to non-natural born individuals is a federal power. Slaves could be granted freedom, but this did not give them citizenship, according to Taney. As such, Scott was not a citizen and the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear his suit.

Going beyond this issue, Taney sought to bring consistency to federal laws regulating slavery in various territories. Since Scott was basing his appeal for freedom upon the several years he spent at Fort Snelling in Wisconsin Territory (in what is now Minnesota), Taney ruled upon the law which made this territory a non-slave area, the Missouri Compromise. He ruled that Congress did not have the authority to restrict slavery in any federal territory, with the exception of the Northwest Territory. Because Fort Snelling was/is on the west bank of the Mississippi River, it was part of the Louisiana Purchase, not the Northwest Territory. As Taney ruled, the Northwest Territory was an exception because it had been created during the Articles of Confederation with a no slavery clause in its organizational structure. The Northwest Territory being from the pre-Constitutional period, it was legal for the government to enforce the no slavery provisions of the law. However, after the creation of the Constitution of the United States, territory could only be acquired which would become new states. The Northwest Territory Ordinance only applied to territory already in the possession of the United States. Thus, territory acquired after 1789, was land in which future states would develop and the national government was only a caretaker. Taney wrote that Congress did have some power to make rules and regulations for the territories, but as if the territory were a colony. Laws were for “the interests of the whole people of the Union.” Since the Constitution and federal law allowed people to take personal property with them when they entered a territory, slaves, as personal property, should be allowed without exception in land acquired after the ratification of the Constitution. Following this logic, Taney ruled the Missouri Compromise, and any other similar law, unconstitutional. Again, this took away any basis which Scott might have had to seek his and his family’s freedom.

Justice Curtis, writing a dissenting opinion, not only disagreed with the ruling made by Taney, but with many of his assumptions as well. The result was a legal opinion which attacked virtually everything Taney had written. On the major ruling issued by Taney that individuals of African descent could not be citizens of the United States, Curtis was in total disagreement. As to the argument made by Sanford’s lawyer and agreed to by Taney, Curtis rejected the idea that because Scott’s ancestors were brought to the United States as slaves, this meant that Scott was a slave. Curtis wrote about Scott, “I cannot, therefore, treat this plea as containing an averment that the plaintiff himself was a slave.” To Curtis, even if Scott had been born a slave, this did not mean that he necessarily was still a slave. While Curtis did not attempt to refute Taney’s assertion that only people of those races which were represented among American citizens when the Constitution was adopted could be citizens of the United States, he refuted what Taney claimed had been the case. Curtis listed five states, and quoted from their legal documents, in which he knew for certain there had been free men of African descent with the rights of full citizenship at the time of the Constitution was adopted. Since they were citizens under the Constitution, Curtis asserted that it was possible for other free people of African descent to also be citizens. The Constitution, according to Curtis, was not “exclusively for the white race.” The fact that there was not equality of rights (such as voting) between the sexes or among people of various races, to Curtis, did not negate the fact that all could be citizens of the United States. Curtis further added, “color is not a necessary qualification for citizenship under the Constitution of the United States.” Because of these, and other arguments, put forward by Curtis, he stated that Taney’s majority opinion was totally wrong. Thus, Curtis accepted as fact that Scott had standing to file the case and the Circuit Court had jurisdiction.

As regarded whether or not a slave being taken to reside in a free state or territory made that slave free, Curtis referred to British, French, and American precedents. Basically, there had been several cases in which a slave became free because of residency in a free state or territory. As to applicable federal laws, Curtis wrote that it was clear Congress wanted to keep slavery out of the northern section of the Louisiana Purchase, which meant that “the state of involuntary servitude of a slave, coming into the Territory with his master, should cease to exist.” Obviously, Taney’s assertion that the law, the Missouri Compromise, was unconstitutional would undercut Curtis’s assertion if Taney were correct. However, Curtis argued that the Northwest Territory Ordinance was not an exception but a precedent for the administration of future territories. In addition, Curtis stated that the national government acted in place of a state government in territories prior to those territories being admitted as states. Thus, for Curtis, state powers were assumed by the national government until statehood was granted. The Missouri Compromise, and any similar laws, were constitutional in Curtis’s mind.

The final point for Curtis was the marriage of Dred Scott to Harriet Robinson in the Wisconsin Territory. The fact that their owner at that time, John Emerson, consented to the marriage and that it was performed in Wisconsin made a difference to Curtis. He asserted that marriage is a legal contract, with certain rights and obligations, which conflicted with the status of a slave. Curtis stated that Emerson did not have the right to do anything to overturn the contract of marriage. This meant, to Curtis, that in giving his consent to the marriage, and allowing it to happen, it was “an effectual act of emancipation.” The free status applied to the couple and to their children. While a dissenting opinion has not rule of law, Curtis recommended the case be sent back to the lower court for a new trial.

Bibliography

Graber, Mark A. Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. Print.

Humanities Computing. American History: From Revolution to Reconstruction and Beyond. Groningen, the Netherlands: University of Groningen, 2012. Web. 6 Oct. 2013.

Missouri Digital Heritage. Missouri’s Dred Scott Case, 1846–1857. Jefferson City: Missouri State Archives, 2013. Web. 6 Oct. 2013.