Bowsher v. Synar
Bowsher v. Synar is a landmark Supreme Court case from 1986 that addresses the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. In response to ongoing budget deficits, Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which set limits on budget deficits and allowed the comptroller general to direct the president on budget cuts if Congress failed to act. This delegation of authority was challenged by Representative Mike Synar and others, who argued it was unconstitutional.
In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Congress could not delegate powers to the comptroller general that properly belonged to the president, emphasizing the principle of separation of powers. The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, clarified that the comptroller general, being an agent of Congress, could not perform executive functions. However, the ruling allowed for Congress to retain the ability to manage budgets through a joint resolution, subject to presidential veto, maintaining a balance within the governmental framework. This case highlights fundamental principles of American governance and the importance of maintaining distinct roles for each branch of government.
Bowsher v. Synar
Date: July 7, 1986
Citation: 478 U.S. 714
Issue: Separation of powers
Significance: The Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for Congress to invest one of its own legislative officers with powers belonging to the executive branch.
Faced with continuing budget deficits, Congress set annual ceilings for deficits in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. If Congress failed to make the necessary budget cuts, the statute authorized the comptroller general to instruct the president concerning where to make the reductions. Representative Mike Synar and eleven other members of Congress challenged the constitutionality of the statute in the Supreme Court.
Speaking for a 7-2 majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that Congress could not delegate the comptroller general with powers to make decisions properly belonging to the president. Because the comptroller general was an agent of Congress and independent of the executive departments, the statute encroached on the president’s duty to execute the laws. Thus, Burger’s opinion relied on the relatively narrow principle of separation of powers and avoided the much broader nondelegation doctrine, which would have had great implications for the modern administrative state. Burger approved of the fallback provision of the 1985 statute, which allowed Congress to make the final budget decision by joint resolution, subject to presidential veto.