Brandenburg v. Ohio
Brandenburg v. Ohio is a landmark Supreme Court case that significantly impacted the interpretation of free speech under the First Amendment. The case arose when Clarence Brandenburg, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, was convicted of violating a criminal syndicalism statute after he appeared on television advocating for racial strife while brandishing a shotgun. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the state could not punish mere advocacy of the overthrow of the government, establishing that the government must prove that speech is likely to incite imminent lawless action in order to be deemed unprotected. This decision overturned previous rulings and clarified the "clear and present danger" test that had been used inconsistently in earlier cases. By emphasizing the importance of protecting free speech, even when it is controversial or unpopular, Brandenburg v. Ohio strengthened the legal framework surrounding individual expression in the United States. This ruling has implications for the protection of various forms of speech, illustrating the balance between societal safety and the fundamental right to express dissenting opinions.
Brandenburg v. Ohio
Date: February 27, 1969
Citation: 395 U.S. 444
Issues: Freedoms of speech and assembly
Significance: The Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a man under a criminal syndicalism statute, ruling that the advocacy of illegal action could be punished only if it was likely to produce imminent lawless action.
Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan member, was convicted of violating a criminal syndicalism statute for appearing in a television report brandishing a shotgun and advocating racial strife. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous unsigned per curiam decision, found it unconstitutional for a state to impose a criminal syndicalist statute punishing the mere advocacy of the overthrow of the U.S. government.
This ruling overturned Whitney v. California (1927), in which the Court had upheld a similar statute, and brought an end to fifty years of largely futile efforts to make the vague clear and present danger test of Schenck v. United States (1919) work in varying circumstances. At times, this test allowed the government to prosecute for speech that demonstrated a bad tendency or, as in Dennis v. United States (1951), for plans to publish unpopular views. By insisting that the government must demonstrate that the action was likely to incite imminent lawless action before prosecuting, the Court provided a much more concrete test that substantially strengthened free speech and validated the imminence test suggested in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919).