Calder v. Bull
Calder v. Bull is a significant Supreme Court case addressing the interpretation of ex post facto laws. Originating from a probate trial in Connecticut, the case involved litigants Calder and his wife, who argued that a legislative resolution granting a new hearing constituted an ex post facto law, which is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the term "ex post facto" specifically pertains to retroactive criminal laws, not to civil laws, thus clarifying the scope of constitutional protections. The decision, rendered with a 4-0 vote, was notable for its diverse opinions, where Justice Samuel Chase emphasized limits on legislative power, while Justice James Iredell underscored the role of the judiciary in striking down unconstitutional statutes. This case set important precedents for future judicial review and interpretations of legislative authority. The principles discussed in Calder v. Bull continue to resonate in discussions surrounding natural law and substantive due process in American jurisprudence.
Calder v. Bull
Date: August 8, 1798
Citation: 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 368
Issues: Ex post facto laws; judicial review; natural law
Significance: While ruling that the ex post facto limitation did not apply to civil laws, the Supreme Court justices debated the concepts of judicial review and natural law.
The Connecticut legislature passed a resolution that granted a new hearing in a probate trial. The disappointed litigants, Calder and his wife, contended that the resolution was an ex post facto law, which was prohibited to the states by the U.S. Constitution. By a 4-0 vote, the Supreme Court concluded that the term “ex post facto” applied only to retroactive criminal laws and not to laws dealing with civil matters. After much controversy, the Court reaffirmed this definition in Collins v. Youngblood (1990).
In Calder, the justices wrote seriatim opinions, discussing possible ways to decide the case. Justice Samuel Chase denied the “omnipotence” of the legislatures and asserted that “the very nature of our free Republican governments” will override and invalidate laws contrary to fundamental principles of “reason and justice.” Justice James Iredell answered that judges did not have any right to invalidate a statute simply because they might consider it “contrary to the principles of natural justice,” but he explicitly recognized the duty of the Court to strike down legislative acts that violate the Constitution. Beginning in the 1820’s, the Court has assumed the validity of Iredell’s theoretical perspective, but the natural law approach has sometimes reappeared, most often in the form of substantive due process.