Columbus Board of Education v. Penick
"Columbus Board of Education v. Penick" was a significant Supreme Court case decided in 1979 that addressed issues of school desegregation in Columbus, Ohio. The Court ruled in a 7-2 decision that school boards have a continuing obligation to dismantle segregated school systems, even if the segregation was a result of innocent behavior rather than intentional discrimination. This case reaffirmed principles established in earlier rulings, particularly emphasizing that any substantial evidence of purposeful segregation within a school district creates a presumption of systemic discrimination. The ruling highlighted the idea that the legacy of segregation requires ongoing efforts to promote integration, irrespective of the circumstances that led to the current state of the schools. The dissenting opinions, particularly from Justices Powell and Rehnquist, raised concerns about the implications of federal intervention in local educational matters and questioned the validity of distinguishing between de facto and de jure segregation. Overall, this case contributed to the ongoing dialogue about the challenges and responsibilities of school districts in achieving genuine desegregation and equitable education for all students.
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick
Date: July 2, 1979
Citation: 443 U.S. 449
Issue: School integration and busing
Significance: The Supreme Court supported the use of a districtwide urban desegregation plan at a time when many observers thought the Court was unwilling to uphold the use of busing to correct de facto school segregation.
By 1979 the Supreme Court appeared no longer willing to impose large, complicated school desegregation plans involving busing on urban districts as the result of Milliken v. Bradley (1974) and Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler (1976). However, in a 7-2 vote, the Court supported such a system in Columbus, Ohio. It reaffirmed the basic principles it announced in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971). The Court insisted that purposeful segregation in a substantial portion of a metropolitan school district created a strong presumption that the board or system had practiced systemwide segregation or tolerated its existence, thereby mandating widespread extraordinary relief. It ruled that as long as a system seemed infected with segregative intent when Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was decided, that school board remained under an obligation to dismantle the segregated system if it had not already done so. This was true even if innocent behavior had produced segregated results. In dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., restated his belief that the de facto/de jure distinction made no sense, and Justice William H. Rehnquist objected to making an improper intrusion into local education decision making.
