Commerce Clause

Description: The clause in the United States (US) Constitution giving Congress the power to regulate trade among the states

Relevant amendment: Tenth

Significance: The Supreme Court has upheld congressional use of the Commerce Clause as justification for a broad range of federal legislation

Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress “shall have the power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” The part of this clause dealing with the states was extremely important in enabling the US to develop an effective, integrated economic system. Still, its influence reaches far beyond the realm of a narrow definition of commerce. The first Supreme Court case involving the Commerce Clause, Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), established that it applies to interstate commerce but not to commerce within one state. Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in the case broadly defined commerce as all commercial “intercourse,” not only the traffic of goods. In the late nineteenth century, the Commerce Clause was cited as justification for the congressional establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890). The ICC was set up in 1887 to regulate railroads, trucking, and telecommunications, while the Sherman Antitrust Act gave the federal government power to prohibit anticompetitive behavior and break up monopolies. All of these areas of regulation applied in some form to commerce between the states.

87321563-107615.jpg87321563-107521.jpg

In the early twentieth century, the federal government began using the Commerce Clause as the basis for national legislation involving crime, public safety, and morality, as in the Mann Act (1910), which prohibited human trafficking (especially in the form of prostitution) between the states, and the Automobile Theft Act of 1915, which made it a federal crime to drive a stolen car across state lines. Until the 1930s, the Supreme Court maintained a distinction between manufacturing and commerce, but in 1937 it began to interpret the Commerce Clause broadly enough to allow regulating the manufacture of goods intended for interstate transportation and sale. Since World War II, considerable federal legislation has been based on the Commerce Clause. One of its most remarkable uses was justifying civil rights legislation in the 1960s. In cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964), the Supreme Court held that, because racial discrimination hurts interstate commerce, Congress can pass and enforce antidiscrimination laws.

In the twenty-first century, cases involving the Commerce Clause have continued to focus on its interpretation and application. In National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023), the National Pork Producers Council argued that California’s Proposition 12, a law restricting the sale of pork in California unless it met specific animal welfare standards, violated the Commerce Clause because it reached out of state and placed burdens on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court upheld the law, arguing against the National Pork Producers Council, stating Proposition 12 did not purposefully discriminate against out-of-state economic interests.

Bibliography

Barnett, Randy E. "The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause." University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 68, no. 1, 2001, pp. 101–47.

Cornell Law School. "Commerce Clause - Legal Information Institute." Legal Information Institute, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce‗clause. Accessed 26 Aug. 2024.

Frazelle, Brian. "Big Business Loses Dormant Commerce Clause as Tool Against States." Bloomberg Law News, 19 May 2023, news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/big-business-loses-dormant-commerce-clause-as-tool-against-states. Accessed 26 Aug. 2024.

Killenbeck, Mark R. "A Prudent Regard to Our Own Good? The Commerce Clause, in Nation and States." Journal of Supreme Court History, vol. 38, no. 3, 2013, pp. 281–308.