Confrontation of witnesses
The "Confrontation of Witnesses" refers to the constitutional right of criminal defendants to face their accusers in court, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This provision ensures that defendants can confront witnesses against them, cross-examine them under oath, and receive a fair trial. Supreme Court interpretations have established that the prosecution cannot rely on video testimonies, written statements, or other forms of hearsay as evidence unless certain exceptions apply, emphasizing the importance of direct witness testimony in promoting reliability and fairness in legal proceedings.
The scope of this right includes some limitations; for instance, the courts have recognized circumstances where second-hand statements may be admitted if deemed reliable and necessary under specific conditions. Cases like *Crawford v. Washington* and *Michigan v. Bryant* illustrate the evolving nature of confrontation rights, particularly in balancing a defendant's rights with practical considerations such as witness availability and courtroom dynamics. Hence, while the confrontation clause is a crucial aspect of the justice system, its application is nuanced, reflecting both legal principles and the realities of courtroom situations.
Subject Terms
Confrontation of witnesses
Description: The right of criminal defendants to have the witnesses against them testify in open courtface to face with them and the fact-finderand to cross-examine those witnesses.
Relevant Amendment: Sixth
Significance: As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the provision prohibits the prosecution from using evidence such as video testimony, written statements, affidavits, transcripts, and second-hand accounts. Also banned are unreasonable limits on defense questioning of prosecution witnesses.
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment fosters reliability and fairness in federal and state prosecutions. It allows criminal defendants to confront witnesses against them in open court, under oath or affirmation, face to face, and to cross-examine these witnesses. The scope of its protectionswhich benefit criminal defendantshas been defined by Supreme Court decisions citing history, reason, and practicality.
Normally, words may not be reported by others or in writing—that is, the witness must appear—and may be cross-examined under the full panoply of courtroom safeguards. However, the defendants’ entitlements are qualified. For example, the separate, long-standing evidentiary rule against hearsay has numerous exceptions permitting second-hand or reported evidenceif they are deemed “firmly rooted” (rational and historically traditional)he Supreme Court has gradually been incorporating into the confrontation clauseas in White v. Illinois (1992) and Bourjailly v. United States (1987). Thus, excited utterances, statements to physicians, coconspirator statements during and furthering the conspiracy, and the like can be reported, though the person who spoke them is not at trial to be confronted. These sorts of statements are presumed to be especially reliable and necessary. In Idaho v. Wright (1990), the Court ruled some second-hand statements could be allowed if special facts demonstrated their reliability and necessity. In Ohio v. Roberts (1980), the Court ruled litigators must demonstrate the unavailability of the witness for appearance at trial before second-hand statements could be admitted as evidence.
Once witnesses are produced at trial, the defendants’ opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses may be confined within reasonable limits. In Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), the Court ruled, for example, the judge may apply normal exclusionary evidence rules, recognize privileges, or prohibit unduly prejudicial, harassing, time-consuming, or misleading questioning. If a witness becomes ill or dies after giving testimony but before full cross-examination, the testimony might still be allowed to stand. In Maryland v. Craig (1990), the Court determined if a specific child-witness will suffer trauma from confronting his or her accused molester, the child may testify on one-way closed-circuit television, despite some infringement of the face-to-face requirement, provided there is full opportunity to put questions to the witness and all parties can see the screen.
Thus, the rights conferred by the confrontation clause are not absolute but are qualified by countervailing concerns and may amount merely to a strong preference.
A 2011 case demonstrating this principle was Michigan v. Bryant. The case originated in 2001 after Michigan police responded to an incident where a victim named Anthony Covington was shot by Richard Bryant. Covington was mortally wounded but provided a statement to police identifying Bryant before he died. Covington could obviously not be present at trial, and as such, the opportunity for Bryant to confront his accuser was not possible. Bryant was later found guilty of murder. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated Bryant's conviction for violation of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.
The US Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 2010. In rendering its judgment in 2011, the court held Covington's statement to police was nontestimonial, and hence was admissible at trial. In determining the statement as nontestimonial, the Court looked at the emergency environment and Covington's medical condition. The court majority believed law enforcement officials rightly prioritized coordinating emergency medical care for Covington over assessing future litigation.
"Confrontation." Justia, 2024, law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-06/10-confrontation.html. Accessed 4 Sept. 2024.
Liptak, Adam. "Jury Can Hear Dying Man’s Words, Justices Say." New York Times, 28 Feb. 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/us/01scotus.html. Accessed 4 Sept. 2024.
"Michigan v. Bryant." Briefs Pro, 2024, briefspro.com/casebrief/michigan-v-bryant. Accessed 4 Sept. 2024.
"Right to Confront Witness." Legal Information Institute, Cornell University, 2024, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Right‗to‗confront‗witness. Accessed 4 Sept. 2024.