Diamond v. Chakrabarty
Diamond v. Chakrabarty is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 1980 that addressed the patentability of living organisms, specifically a genetically engineered bacterium developed by microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty. Initially, Chakrabarty's patent application was denied based on the long-standing policy of excluding living organisms from patent protection. However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in a narrow 5-4 decision that living organisms could be patented if they are novel and genetically altered by human ingenuity.
The Court concluded that Chakrabarty's bacterium, which could break down hydrocarbons, was a product of human intervention and thus met the criteria for patentability. This decision opened the door for biotechnology companies to patent their innovations, spurring advancements in genetic engineering. While the ruling raised ethical questions regarding the implications of patenting life forms, the Court maintained that regulatory oversight of biotechnology development fell to Congress and the executive branch. Ultimately, the case expanded the scope of patentable materials to include genetically modified organisms, influencing future legal interpretations surrounding the patenting of genetic sequences and biotechnological innovations.
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Subject Terms
Diamond v. Chakrabarty
The Case: U.S. Supreme Court ruling on genetic engineering
Date: Decided on June 16, 1980
The Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty was pivotal, as the Court determined that genetically engineered microorganisms are patentable products of human ingenuity.
In 1972 Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist at the General Electric Research and Development Center in Schenectady, New York, attempted to patent a genetically engineered bacterium that could decompose compounds such as camphor and octane in crude oil. Chakrabarty’s patent application was initially rejected because the patent office had a long history of excluding living organisms from patent protection. Chakrabarty, through General Electric, successfully appealed this decision. In 1979 the acting commissioner of patents and trademarks appealed the reversal. The case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on March 17, 1980.
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled that living things are patentable if they represent novel, genetically altered variants of naturally occurring organisms. The majority decision held that Chakrabarty’s organism is manufactured since he had inserted new genetic information into it and that the organism is new because a similar organism is unlikely to occur in nature without human intervention. The organism thus falls within the meaning of the patent statute: It is a product of human ingenuity with a distinctive name, character, and use. The minority opinion held that previous congressional acts that specifically excluded living organisms from patent protection were clearly intended to apply in this case.
This decision let emerging biotechnology companies get patent protection for their living products and allowed them potentially to capitalize on the revolution in genetic engineering. The justices of the Supreme Court realized the ramifications of their decision in terms of its impact on the ethics of patenting living things and its potential to accelerate the release of possibly harmful genetically engineered organisms. However, the basis of their decision was fundamentally narrow: Did Chakrabarty’s work constitute patentable material? The Court held that the further development of biotechnology or its restrictions is a congressional and executive concern, not a judicial one.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty did not greatly influence the extent to which genetically altered organisms have been released into the environment; rather, public opposition to the release of genetically engineered organisms has played the dominant role in this area. Instead, the lasting impact of the Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty lies in its extension of the definition of patentable products to compounds or organisms that exist in nature but can be further manipulated by biotechnological means. This had been true only for certain hybrid plants developed through the use of conventional breeding techniques. Furthermore, the decision became the judicial basis for later decisions regarding attempts to patent genetic sequences that may be common to living organisms but require human ingenuity if they are to be extracted, sequenced, replicated, and reinserted into new organisms with their properties intact.
Bibliography
Resnik, David B. Owning the Genome: A Moral Analysis of DNA Patenting. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.
Rimmer, Matthew. Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: Biological Inventions. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2008.