Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of the State of Oregon et al. v. Smith
"Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of the State of Oregon et al. v. Smith" is a significant U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 1990 that addressed the intersection of religious freedom and state drug laws. The case arose when two members of the Native American Church, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were terminated from their jobs for using peyote in religious ceremonies. After being denied unemployment benefits based on Oregon's law against misconduct, they challenged the decision, arguing it infringed upon their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion.
Initially, lower courts sided with Smith and Black, but the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the state did not have to create a religious exemption for drug laws that are generally applicable and neutral. The majority opinion, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, asserted that the government could enforce valid laws without needing to accommodate religious practices, even if it resulted in an adverse impact on minority religions. This ruling sparked significant backlash from religious groups and civil liberties advocates, leading to the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, which sought to reinforce protections for religious practices against government interference. The case remains a pivotal reference point in discussions about the limits of religious freedom in the context of state laws.
Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of the State of Oregon et al. v. Smith
In this April 17, 1990, decision, the US Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the free exercise clause, allowing Oregon to apply its drug laws to prohibit Native Americans from using peyote in religious ceremonies. Alfred Smith and Galen Black, two members of the Native American Church, were fired from their jobs in a drug rehabilitation clinic after their employer discovered that they used the hallucinogenic drug peyote during religious rituals. They applied for unemployment compensation, but Oregon’s Department of Human Resources denied their claims based on a state law that disqualified employees who were discharged for work-related “misconduct.” A state appellate court and the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the denial of benefits was a violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Oregon appealed to the US Supreme Court, contending that Smith’s free exercise of religion had to be balanced by the state’s interest in preventing the use of harmful drugs. The Supreme Court’s first judgment was to remand the case to the Oregon Supreme Court to decide whether state law made an exception for the religious use of peyote. Oregon’s court responded that state law provided no exception and that the only issue was the religious freedom of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court accepted the case for a second time.
The Supreme Court’s major precedent, Sherbert v. Verner (1963), suggested that Oregon could prevail only if it could defend its policy with the “compelling state interest” test combined with the “least restrictive alternative” test. From this perspective, it appeared difficult for Oregon to justify the refusal of unemployment benefits to Smith and Black. The Court had upheld the Sherbert tests in at least seven cases since 1963.
In the Smith case, however, the Court voted six to three that Oregon had no constitutional obligation to make a religious exception for illegal drugs, provided that the law was reasonable, neutral, and generally applicable to all persons. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that in enforcing valid criminal laws not specifically directed at religious acts, government had no obligation to make a religious exemption. Such matters were generally left to the legislature’s discretion, even if an “unfortunate consequence” was an incidental burden on unpopular religious practices. The three dissenting justices maintained that Oregon had not shown a compelling state interest to refuse to allow peyote for religious usage.
The Smith decision appeared to limit the extent to which religious minorities might claim constitutional protection for unpopular practices. Religious leaders and civil libertarians were outraged at the ruling, and Congress responded to the anti-Smith movement by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, which was designed to restore both the compelling state interest test and the least restrictive means test against any incidental burden on religious practice.
Bibliography
Hertzke, Allen D. Religious Freedom in America: Constitutional Roots and Contemporary Challenges. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2015. Print.
Kurst-Swanger, Karel. Worship and Sin: An Exploration of Religion-Related Crime in the United States. New York: Lang, 2008. Digital file.
Maroukis, Thomas Constantine. The Peyote Road: Religious Freedom and the Native American Church. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2010. Print.
Stewart, Omer C. Peyote Religion: A History. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1987. Print.
Wunder, John R. Native American Cultural and Religious Freedoms. New York: Garland, 1999. Print.