Ferguson v. Skrupa
**Overview of Ferguson v. Skrupa**
Ferguson v. Skrupa is a significant Supreme Court case from 1963 that addressed the constitutionality of a Kansas law restricting debt adjustment services to licensed lawyers. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous 9-0 ruling, upheld the Kansas statute, reflecting the Court's deference to state legislatures regarding economic regulations. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for the majority, emphasized the importance of allowing states to determine the "wisdom and utility" of their regulations, dismissing the need for a rational justification for the law under the doctrine of substantive due process. In a concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan II acknowledged the law’s rational relation to a constitutionally permissible goal, highlighting differing views on substantive due process between the justices. This case serves as a pivotal moment in the ongoing discourse about the balance between regulatory authority and individual rights, and it foreshadows greater conflicts over these issues in later landmark cases. The differing perspectives of Justices Black and Harlan illustrate the complexity of legal interpretations surrounding economic regulation.
Ferguson v. Skrupa
Date: April 22, 1963
Citation: 372 U.S. 726
Issue: Regulation of business
Significance: In upholding a state regulation, the Supreme Court declared that the concept of substantive due process had been repudiated.
This case involved a Kansas statute that prohibited anyone except lawyers from engaging in the business of debt adjustment. By a 9-0 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas law. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black took the opportunity to express his strong animosity to the earlier practice of overturning such regulations with the doctrine of substantive due process. Without inquiring whether there was any rational justification for the law, Black declared that it was entirely up to the state legislature to decide on the “wisdom and utility” of economic regulations. Justice John M. Harlan II, concurring in the result, wrote that the law had a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective. It was clear that Black and Harlan disagreed about substantive due process, but their differences would become much more pronounced in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965).
