McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission is a significant Supreme Court case that addressed the constitutionality of aggregate limits on individual campaign contributions. Under the Federal Election Campaign Act and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, there were restrictions on the total amount of money an individual could donate to multiple federal candidates, political parties, and political action committees (PACs) over an election cycle. In 2012, businessman Shaun McCutcheon challenged these aggregate limits after finding them restrictive, even though he complied with individual contribution limits. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down the aggregate limits, ruling that they violated the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and association. The majority opinion argued that such limits unnecessarily curtailed an individual's ability to influence the political process and did not effectively serve the stated goal of preventing corruption. The ruling was met with mixed reactions; while some viewed it as a triumph for free speech, others expressed concern over the potential for increased corruption in political funding. This case, alongside previous rulings, has contributed to a landscape where individual donors can significantly impact political campaigns through increased contributions.
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission
Date: April 2, 2014
Citation: 572 US ‗‗‗ 2014
Issue: Monetary limits on individual campaign contributions
Significance: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that monetary limits on campaign contributions by individual citizens to candidates and political party committees were violations of the First Amendment.
Background
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA, amended in 1974 and 1976) and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, 2002) placed limits on the aggregate amounts of money that individuals could contribute to multiple federal candidates for office, political party committees, and noncandidate political action committees (PACs). Taken together, the laws limited the total amount any single donor could give to candidates, party committees, and PACs over the course of an election cycle. They created two types of contribution limits. First, base limits set a maximum amount an individual may give to a single candidate or committee. Aggregate limits restricted how much money an individual could give overall to all candidates or committees.
In 2012 an Alabama businessman named Shaun McCutcheon contributed to sixteen federal candidates, which was in accordance with the limits set by the laws. He complied with the base limit in each case. But aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to an additional twelve candidates and to several PACs. At the time, FECA specified an aggregate limit for a two-year election cycle of $46,300 for all candidates and $70,800 to all party committees and noncandidate PACs. The base limit for a single candidate was $2,500 for a single election or $5,000 for a primary and general election. An individual could also contribute $30,800 per year to a national party committee and $5,000 per year to a PAC. The limits were designed to prevent both the appearance and reality of corruption.
The Republican National Committee joined McCutcheon in his complaint that the aggregate limits violated the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of association laid down in the First Amendment. McCutcheon filed suit against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in federal district court, arguing that aggregate limits were no longer needed because base limits imposed since 1976 prevented transfers of large sums to candidates.
The district court rejected McCutcheon’s argument, and he appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Oral arguments were heard on October 8, 2013. The question was: Is the two-year aggregate campaign contribution limit constitutional under the First Amendment?
Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court by a 5–4 majority struck down aggregate limits on the amount any individual donor can give to candidates, party committees, and PACs in an election cycle. The Court held that these limits unconstitutionally violate the First Amendment. The Court also argued that allowing access and influence to donors is an important democratic right, and that monetary donors have a right to influence elected officials, just as any constituent has that right.
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion for the majority, arguing that the aggregate limit did not address the issues raised by BCRA while unconstitutionally limiting the democratic process. In short, the aggregate limits do little to prevent corruption, which is the stated objective of BCRA. Because it does not answer this compelling interest of the government, it runs afoul of the First Amendment.
The aggregate limit also creates a maximum number of candidates who can receive specific amounts from a single donor. The Court reasoned that this could force the donor to choose which causes or candidates he or she would try to advance, even though he or she might prefer to support more candidates than the law allowed. The majority argued that trying to prevent corruption is legitimate only if it does not unnecessarily curtail an individual’s freedom of speech, and in this case the aggregate limit does not succeed. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in his opinion,
- An aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees an individual may support through contributions is not a "modest restraint" at all. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.
Chief Justice Roberts went on to argue as highly implausible the possibility that an individual donor might "contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political party." He maintained that current laws would make such contributions unlikely because making the donations would be cumbersome, thanks to base-limit regulations.
Chief Justice Roberts was joined in his opinion by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred but wrote his own opinion in which he argued that base limits should also have been rejected as violations of the First Amendment.
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a lengthy dissent in which he was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Breyer argued that the majority opinion destroyed campaign finance laws and would thus cause great harm to the democratic process. The dissent centered on the influence of money on politics, arguing that the majority opinion defined corruption too narrowly.
Impact
The ruling was intensely controversial. Free-speech advocates from both sides of the political divide considered it a victory for First Amendment rights. Opponents of the ruling predicted that it would increase the corrupting influence of money in politics, particularly by increasing the power and importance of very wealthy individual donors. Even though limits on contributions to individual candidates were retained, the decision enabled individual donors to control political campaigns and candidates.
In concert with the 2010 Citizens United and 2011 SpeechNow rulings, McCutcheon has been characterized as the last ruling to open unlimited spending by individuals on political campaigns. In aggregate the rulings allowed unlimited contributions to "super PACs" that support individual candidates.
Bibliography
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