Miranda rights

Description: A requirement that the police inform suspects of their right against self-incrimination and their right to counsel during custodial interrogation.

Relevant amendments: Fifth, Sixth

Significance: A 1966 Supreme Court ruling created the Miranda rights. In a number of cases after its initial ruling, the court clarified and refined its decision.

The Miranda rights were created by the Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Miranda, a suspect in a kidnapping and rape case, confessed after being interrogated for two hours. The confession was admitted in trial, and Miranda was convicted. The court overturned his conviction, ruling that the confession was inadmissible because the police failed to inform Miranda of his constitutional right to avoid self-incrimination and to obtain counsel before questioning him during a custodial investigation. The court established guidelines, known as the Miranda rights, for informing suspects of their Fifth Amendment rights.

The Miranda ruling has been continually reexamined since its inclusion in the US justice system. It left a number of unanswered questions, including how to determine whether the accused was, in fact, in custody (and therefore needed to be read their rights), whether the suspect’s statements were spontaneous or the product of an investigation (and needed to be preceded by the reading of rights), and whether the individual effectively waived their rights. Subsequent cases helped answer these questions and define when the practice of reading suspects their rights can be suspended, which is usually if the questioning is being conducted in certain contexts and if larger issues—notably public safety—are concerned.

A Question of Time and Place

In Orozco v. Texas (1969), the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s ruling that four police officers should have read the Miranda rights to a suspect before questioning began in the suspect’s bedroom at four o’clock in the morning. However, in Beckwith v. United States (1976), the court held that statements received by Internal Revenue Service agents during a noncoercive and noncustodial interview of a taxpayer under a criminal tax investigation conducted in a private residence did not require a reading of the Miranda rights, provided that the taxpayer was informed that they were free to leave the interview at any time.

In its 1966 ruling, the court stated that the reading of the rights is necessary only if the suspect is in custody or deprived of freedom in a significant way. In the case of Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), the suspect entered the police station after an officer told him that he would “like to discuss something with him.” It was made clear to the suspect that he was not under arrest. During his visit to the police station, the suspect confessed, and his confession was ruled admissible, despite the suspect not having been read his Miranda rights. The court, in North Carolina v. Butler (1979), stated that “the trial court must look at all the circumstances to determine if a valid waiver has been made. Although an express waiver is easier to establish, it is not a requirement.”

Still, many questions remained unanswered, and further interpretations of Miranda followed. In Smith v. Illinois (1984), the court declared that suspects taken into custody could invoke their Miranda rights very early in the process, even during the interrogator’s reading of their rights, effectively ending their questioning before it starts. In Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), the court determined that the Miranda rights must be read any time “in-custody” interrogation regarding a felony, misdemeanor, or minor offense takes place. However, it stated that routine questioning during traffic stops did not place enough pressure on detained people to necessitate officers’ warning them of their constitutional rights.

Some Exceptions

In New York v. Quarles (1984), the court ruled six to three that there is a “public safety” exception to the requirement that Miranda rights be read. In Quarles, police officers arrested a man they believed had just committed a rape. They asked the man where he had discarded a gun. The arrest took place in a supermarket, and the suspect was thought to have concealed the gun somewhere inside the supermarket. The gun was found and used as evidence. In such circumstances, the court declared, “The need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Quarles was a significant ruling, eroding Miranda’s influence. In 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation circulated an internal memo from the Justice Department encouraging agents to use "more extensive public safety interrogation without Miranda warnings" than normally allowed in cases involving suspected terrorists. After apprehending an injured Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the suspects involved in the 2013 bombings at the Boston Marathon, federal agents reportedly questioned him in his hospital room for approximately sixteen hours before reading him his Miranda rights. At that point, Tsarnaev stopped talking. Law-enforcement officers had once again invoked the public safety exception to obtain intelligence of any other potential terrorist plots or explosive devices. Even though there was already considerable evidence to make the case against Tsarnaev regardless of his statements, critics argued that the continued expansion of what was meant to be a limited exception was setting a dangerous precedent. Senators Lindsey Graham and John McCain called for suspected terrorists such as Tsarnaev to be treated like an enemy combatant, which would strip him of his Miranda rights as well as the right to counsel.

Other cases have also challenged the court’s interpretation of Miranda. In Oregon v. Elstead (1985), police officers received a voluntary admission of guilt from a suspect who had not yet been informed of his constitutional rights. The suspect made a second confession after he had been read his Miranda rights and had signed a waiver. Regarding the second confession, the court ruled that “the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require it to be suppressed solely because of the earlier voluntary but unwarned admission.” Furthermore, in Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990), the court decided that the routine questioning and videotaping of drivers suspected of driving under the influence was permissible even if the Miranda rights had not been recited.

In addition, the court held that reciting the Miranda rights is not required when the suspect gives a voluntary statement and is unaware that they are speaking to a law enforcement officer. In Illinois v. Perkins (1990), an undercover government agent was placed in a cell with Perkins, who was incarcerated on charges unrelated to the subject of the agent’s investigation. Perkins made statements that implicated him in the crime that the agent sought to solve, but he later claimed that the statements should have been inadmissible because he was not read his Miranda rights. However, even though Perkins was unaware that his cellmate was a government agent, his statements—which led to his arrest—were deemed admissible.

The extent of constitutional rights associated with the Miranda rights came under renewed consideration during the court's hearing of the 2022 case Vega v. Tekoh. In a 5–4 decision, the court ruled that the Miranda rights did not extend a constitutional right to sue a police officer for failing to read a suspect their Miranda rights. Terence Tekoh, charged with sexual assault, had filed a damages lawsuit against Los Angeles sheriff Carlos Vega, who, he claimed, had not read him his Miranda rights before extracting a confession that was then admitted into his trial. The majority court opinion argued that Section 1983, the federal remedial legislation granting the ability to sue public officials for violation of an individual's civil rights, could not be invoked in such cases because Miranda violations are not automatically Fifth Amendment violations. While some praised the ruling of Vega v. Tekoh for allowing police officers to conduct crucial interrogations without fear of retribution, others argued that it was a dangerous rights limitation.

Bibliography

Bazelon, Emily. "Why Should I Care That No One's Reading Dzhokhar Tsarnaev His Miranda Rights?" Slate, 19 Apr. 2013, slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/04/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-and-miranda-rights-the-public-safety-exception-and-terrorism-cases.html. Accessed 8 Oct. 2024.

Freidell, Ron. Miranda Law: The Right to Remain Silent. Benchmark Books, 2005.

"Miranda v Arizona (1966)." Florida Supreme Court, 8 June 2023, supremecourt.flcourts.gov/Library-Archives/Historical-Documents-Rare-Books/Miranda-v-Arizona-1966. Accessed 8 Oct. 2024.

Savage, Charlie. "Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for Terror Suspects." The New York Times, 24 Mar. 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda.html. Accessed 8 Oct. 2024.

Sneed, Tierney, and Ariane de Vogue. "Supreme Court Limits Ability to Enforce Miranda Rights." CNN, 23 June 2022, www.cnn.com/2022/06/23/politics/supreme-court-miranda-rights/index.html. Accessed 8 Oct. 2024.

Weinreb, Lloyd L. Leading Constitutional Cases on Criminal Justice. Foundation, 1996.

White, Welsh S. Miranda’s Waning Protections: Police Interrogation Practices after Dickerson. U of Michigan P, 2010.