Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company is a significant Supreme Court case decided in 1989 that addressed the legality of race-based affirmative action programs in the context of public contracting. The case originated when the City Council of Richmond, Virginia, implemented a minority set-aside program requiring that 30 percent of city construction subcontracts be awarded to minority-owned businesses. The J. A. Croson Company, a contracting firm, challenged this program after its low bid was rejected in favor of a higher bid from a minority-owned firm, arguing that the set-aside violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating a racial classification.
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 ruling authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sided with Croson, asserting that state governments need to demonstrate a specific history of discrimination to justify such race-based measures. The ruling emphasized that while discrimination against minority contractors was recognized, it was primarily perpetrated by private firms rather than the city itself. Dissenting opinions, particularly from Justice Thurgood Marshall, contended that the court's narrow view overlooked systemic discrimination and argued for the validity of remedial measures like set-asides. This landmark decision has had lasting implications on the future of affirmative action programs, particularly regarding the constitutionality of racial quotas used to address past injustices.
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company
In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia, adopted a minority set-aside program for city contracting. Under the plan, 30 percent of all city construction subcontracts were to be granted to (or “set aside” for) minority-owned business enterprises. The J. A. Croson Company, a contracting firm which had been the low bidder on a city project, sued the city when its bid was rejected in favor of a higher bid submitted by a minority-owned firm. Croson’s position was that the minority set-aside violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a racial classification. Richmond argued that the minority set-aside was valid as an attempt to remedy past discriminations. An earlier case, Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), had approved a similar set-aside program for federal government contracts. The city pointed out that only 0.67 percent of its prime construction contracts had gone to minority firms between 1978 and 1983.
By a vote of 6 to 3 the Supreme Court decided for the Croson Company. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Justice O’Connor argued that the earlier federal case was not relevant because the federal government has legislative authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. State governments are limited by it. Race-conscious affirmative action programs are valid only where there is a showing of past discrimination by the state government itself. In the case of the Richmond statute, there was no such showing. It was undeniable that there had been discrimination against minority contractors, but that discrimination was by private firms, not by the city itself. While the city has the power to remedy private discriminations, she argued, it may not do so by setting up a quota system which is itself racially biased.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the major dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority’s view of the facts was too narrow. The extraordinary disparity between contracts let to minority and nonminority firms showed that there was systematic and pervasive discrimination which could be remedied in practice only by a set-aside or quota program of the kind passed in Richmond. He pointed out, as he had in earlier cases, the irony of a constitutional rule which forbids racial classifications for benign purposes, given the long history of constitutionally permitted racial classifications for discriminatory purposes. Justice Marshall insisted that the court should not scrutinize racial classifications strictly so long as the purpose of the classification is benign. Justices William J. Brennan and Harry A. Blackmun joined Marshall in his dissent.
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company cast doubt on the future of race-conscious programs designed to remedy past discriminations. At the very least it meant that racial quotas, however well-intentioned, were likely to be held unconstitutional.
Bibliography
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"City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company." Casebriefs. Casebriefs, 2015. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.
Cushman, Robert Fairchild, and Susan P. Koniak. Cases In Constitutional Law. 9th ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 2000. Print.
Lichtenstein, Stephen, and Margo E. K. Reder. “City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company: A Discussion of Its Impact on Affirmative Action Programs.” North Atlantic Regional Business Law Review 23 (1990): 79–104. Print.
"Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co." Oyez. Oyez, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.