Rummel v. Estelle
"Rummel v. Estelle" is a significant U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 1973 that addressed the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences for repeat offenders under Texas law. The case involved William Rummel, who was sentenced to life in prison for a third felony conviction, despite the nature of his crimes being relatively minor. The Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision led by Justice William H. Rehnquist, held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment did not apply to noncapital cases like Rummel's. Justice Rehnquist argued that the state’s recidivist statute served important goals, such as deterring repeat offenses and protecting society by isolating habitual criminals, while also allowing for the possibility of parole.
In dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. contended that prior Supreme Court rulings should extend the principle of proportionality to noncapital cases, suggesting that the sentence imposed on Rummel was excessively harsh given the nature of his crimes. This case highlights ongoing debates about the balance between punishment, rehabilitation, and public safety in the justice system, particularly regarding the treatment of repeat offenders. The differing opinions reflect broader discussions about the implications of mandatory sentencing laws and their alignment with constitutional protections against disproportionate punishment.
Rummel v. Estelle
Date: March 18, 1980
Citation: 445 U.S. 263
Issue: Cruel and unusual punishment
Significance: The Supreme Court held that sentencing a man to life imprisonment for three fraudulent offenses, involving a total of $229, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
In 1973 William Rummel was convicted of receiving $121 under false pretenses. Twice before, Rummel had been convicted of similar crimes. Texas had a recidivist statute that required a mandatory life sentence for a person’s third felony conviction. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice William H. Rehnquist insisted that the doctrine of Eighth Amendment proportionality applied only to cases involving the death penalty. He found that the Texas statute had two legitimate goals: to deter repeat offenders and to isolate recidivist offenders from society for as long as deemed necessary. Also, he noted that the statute allowed for the possibility of parole.

![Justice William Rehnquist. By Robert S. Oakes (http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3b07880) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons 95330299-92439.jpg](https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/img/embimages/ers/sp/embedded/95330299-92439.jpg?ephost1=dGJyMNHX8kSepq84xNvgOLCmsE2epq5Srqa4SK6WxWXS)
In dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., argued that Weems v. United States (1910) and Robinson v. California (1962) should be interpreted as precedents for applying the principle of proportionality to noncapital cases. Powell later wrote the majority opinion in Solem v. Helm (1983), in which the Court used the disproportionate principle to overturn a sentence for life imprisonment, without possibility for parole, for three relatively minor nonviolent crimes.