Speech and debate clause and the Supreme Court
The Speech and Debate Clause, found in Article I, Section 6 of the U.S. Constitution, was established to protect members of Congress from arrest and civil lawsuits while participating in legislative activities. This clause ensures that legislators can engage in debates and official functions without fear of external pressures, reflecting the Framers' intent to foster a robust legislative process, free from interference. Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted this clause through various cases, delineating the scope of its protections.
For instance, in *Kilbourn v. Thompson* (1881), the Court broadly defined protected actions as those related to congressional business. However, subsequent rulings, such as in *United States v. Brewster* (1972) and *Hutchinson v. Proxmire* (1979), clarified that criminal actions and political speech outside of official duties are not covered by the clause. Notably, the *Gravel v. United States* (1972) case examined the boundaries of the clause in relation to classified documents, affirming protections for legislative discussions but not for subsequent private actions. Overall, the Supreme Court's interpretations have shaped a nuanced understanding of the Speech and Debate Clause, balancing legislative freedom with accountability.
Speech and debate clause and the Supreme Court
Description: Article I, section 6 of the U.S. Constitution grants both civil and criminal immunity to all members of Congress during the performance of their official legislative duties.
Significance: The speech and debate clause ensures the independence of legislators and the integrity of the legislative process by protecting legislators against executive or judicial harassment. The Supreme Court’s role is to determine the extent of protection offered by the clause.
Wishing to avoid problems such as those between the British parliament and the crown, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution wanted members of Congress to participate in legislative debates and other official activities without fear of arrest or civil lawsuits. The speech and debate clause, Article I, section 6, of the U.S. Constitution, covers not only words spoken during congressional debates but also any actions required to conduct official legislative business. Protection extends to words spoken during committee hearings, speeches printed in the Congressional Record (whether delivered or not), and information obtained by congressional staff.
In Kilbourn v. Thompson (1881), the Court read the clause broadly, defining protected actions as “things generally done in a [congressional] session by one of its members in relation to the business before it.” In the 1970s, in a series of decisions, the Court further refined the meaning of the clause. In United States v. Brewster (1972), the Court stated that bribery was not protected because this action goes beyond a legislator’s official legislative duties. Therefore, criminal actions that are merely peripherally related to some legislative function are not protected. In Doe v. McMillan (1973), the Court limited the clause’s coverage to only those documents disseminated within Congress. Thus private publications by members of Congress are not covered by the clause. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979), the Court stated that members could be liable for statements made during political rather than legislative actions, including views expressed in press releases and newsletters and in speeches delivered outside Congress.
Gravel v. United States (1972) arose when Senator Mike Gravel read to his subcommittee extended portions of classified documents concerning the U.S. government’s conduct of the Vietnam War (later called the Pentagon Papers). Senator Gravel opposed the Vietnam War and believed that the public needed to know the government’s true evaluation of its war efforts. The Court stated that Senator Gravel’s comments at the committee hearing were protected but not his efforts to get a private publisher to reprint the Pentagon Papers. The Court also extended the clause’s coverage to the senator’s staff in this case. The Court, however, also stated that congressional contacts with the executive branch were political activities, not official legislative actions, and therefore were not protected by the clause. The Court stated, “While the Speech or Debate Clause recognizes speech, voting and other legislative acts as exempt from liability that otherwise might attach, it does not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative acts.” In this way, the Court further defined the boundaries of the clause’s coverage.
Bibliography
Fisher, Louis. American Constitutional Law. 12th ed., Carolina Academic Press, 2019. CAP Press, cap-press.com/pdf/9781531009502.pdf. Accessed 31 Mar. 2023.
Katzmann, Robert A. Courts and Congress. Brookings Institution Press, 1997.