Terminiello v. Chicago
Terminiello v. Chicago is a pivotal Supreme Court case addressing the boundaries of free speech and its limits in public discourse. The case involved a priest, Arthur Terminiello, who was convicted of disturbing the peace after delivering a speech that incited anger among a crowd outside his speaking venue. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision led by Justice William O. Douglas, overturned this conviction, arguing that the mere anger generated by Terminiello's speech did not constitute sufficient grounds for limiting free expression, especially in the absence of incitement to violence or clear and present danger.
This ruling emphasized the importance of protecting controversial speech under the First Amendment, even when it provokes strong emotional responses. The dissenting opinions raised concerns about the implications of safeguarding such speech, referencing previous cases that had established limitations on "fighting words." The case remains significant in discussions about the delicate balance between free speech rights and maintaining public order, illustrating the ongoing debate over the extent to which offensive or inflammatory speech should be protected in a democratic society.
Terminiello v. Chicago
Date: May 16, 1949
Citation: 337 U.S. 1
Issues: Freedom of speech; freedom of assembly
Significance: The Supreme Court strengthened freedom of speech rights when speakers draw hostile opposition.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority, overturning the conviction of a profascist, anti-Semitic priest named Terminiello who spoke to a sympathetic audience while a hostile crowd gathered outside. Terminiello was arrested for disturbing the peace. The local court convicted him by simply finding that his speech made the audience outside the hall angry. The Supreme Court found that the fact that his speech had angered a group was inadequate grounds for a conviction because it did not show that the speaker incited actions that were a clear and present danger. The case featured strong dissents by Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson and Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson, who argued that the case should have followed the fighting words limitation set out in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942). The strength of the dissents is significant because the Court’s 5-4 majority evaporated in similar cases such as Feiner v. New York (1951).
