United States v. Eichman
United States v. Eichman is a significant Supreme Court case that addressed the constitutionality of the 1989 Flag Protection Act, which aimed to prohibit flag desecration, particularly through burning. This case emerged in the context of prior rulings, specifically Texas v. Johnson, where the Court had already deemed a Texas statute prohibiting flag burning unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision, ruled that the Flag Protection Act was also unconstitutional, emphasizing that laws targeting flag desecration inherently suppress the expression of ideas associated with such acts. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. articulated views suggesting that any law against flag desecration would likely be viewed as governmental disapproval of the messages tied to that form of symbolic speech. Dissenting justices argued that alternative forms of expression remained available to demonstrators and that prohibiting flag desecration did not significantly infringe upon First Amendment rights. Overall, the case underscores the complex interplay between freedom of speech and national symbols, illustrating the ongoing debate around expressive conduct and governmental regulation.
United States v. Eichman
Date: June 11, 1990
Citation: 496 U.S. 310
Issues: Symbolic speech; flag desecration
Significance: The Supreme Court reaffirmed its 1989 decision that flag burning was a constitutionally protected form of free speech.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 majority, struck down the 1989 Flag Protection Act, which Congress passed to void the Court’s ruling in Texas v. Johnson (1989), which overturned a Texas flag burning statute. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in the opinion for the Court, suggested that the justices would probably regard virtually any law directed at forms of flag desecration as unconstitutional because such laws would inevitably imply governmental disapproval of the message inherent in flag burning.
In Johnson, the Court declared a Texas statute unconstitutional because it explicitly stated that the desecration must be done to “offend” someone. This provision flew in the face of the cardinal tenet of allowable time, place, and manner regulations, namely, that they may not be used by officials who do not like the ideas expressed. Congress sought to circumvent the Johnson holding by carefully avoiding the expression of ideas question, but the Court found that the government’s purpose was clearly the suppression of ideas and, therefore, that the strict scrutiny test needed to be applied to the congressional enactment. The Court found the 1989 federal law could not pass such a strict test. Justices William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, arguing that there were so many ways that demonstrators could exercise their First Amendment rights that laws preventing flag desecration were not a real infringement on their rights.