Wisconsin v. Mitchell
"Wisconsin v. Mitchell" is a significant Supreme Court case that addresses the intersection of hate crime legislation and First Amendment rights. In 1989, Todd Mitchell and a group of young individuals attacked a white boy following a discussion about racial themes in the film "Mississippi Burning." Mitchell was initially sentenced to two years for aggravated assault, but due to Wisconsin's hate crime statute, his punishment was increased to four years. The case raised critical questions about whether this statute infringed upon free speech protections. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that it did not, emphasizing that the law targeted conduct rather than speech itself. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist articulated that while individuals are entitled to express bigoted views, the statute specifically penalizes violent actions, which are not protected under free expression. This case illustrates the complexities of balancing free speech with the need to address hate-motivated violence and underscores the legal limitations placed on speech that incites harmful conduct.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell
Date: June 11, 1993
Citation: 509 U.S. 476
Issue: Freedom of speech
Significance: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law that increased the sentence for a crime in which the defendant intentionally selected the victim on the basis of race, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or similar characteristics.
In 1989 Todd Mitchell and several other young African Americans were discussing the white racism depicted in the film Mississippi Burning, and they became so angry that they attacked a white boy, leaving him unconscious for four days. Mitchell was convicted of aggravated assault, a crime for which Wisconsin law assigned a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. However, because the state’s hate crime statute allowed for an enhanced punishment, Mitchell was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.
The main question before the Supreme Court was whether the hate crime statute violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. The justices unanimously agreed that it did not. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the statute simply punished overt conduct and that violence had never been protected by the concepts of symbolic speech and expressive conduct. Under the statute, moreover, motive plays the same role as it does under antidiscrimination laws, which had survived constitutional challenge. Recognizing that people have a right to “bigoted speech,” Rehnquist rejected the argument that the statute might have a chilling effect on such expressions, because only those persons contemplating acts of violence would need to worry about whether their speech might be used as evidence under the statute.