Encheiridion by Epictetus

First published: c. 138 c.e. (English translation, 1567)

Type of work: Philosophy

The Work:

The Encheiridion, or “manual,” is a collection of short essays representing the principal teachings of the Greek philosopher Epictetus. Born as a slave in Phrygia (now Turkey), Epictetus was brought to Rome by his master, who was an influential freedman of the Roman emperor Nero. Epictetus was permitted to study under the famous philosopher Musonius Rufus. After he obtained his freedom, he began to lecture informally on philosophy at Rome, where, however, he found few followers. Later, when Greek philosophers were exiled from Rome by Emperor Domitian, Epictetus traveled to Nicopolis in Greece and established a school that attracted large numbers of students. Like Socrates, Epictetus wrote nothing himself, but a devoted student, Flavius Arrian, transcribed his brilliant lectures and gave them the title Discourses; a considerable portion of this work survives. Arrian made a short selection of these lectures and published them separately as the Encheiridion. These two works, the only surviving examples of academic teaching by a Stoic philosopher, had enormous influence on the later development of this school of philosophy. Moreover, the Encheiridion, with its convenient distillation of the philosopher’s powerful ethical message, left its mark on the thought of a wide range of later readers who include Marcus Aurelius, Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, Matthew Arnold, and Adam Smith.

Epictetus propounded the philosophy of Stoicism, which is named for the stoa or portico in ancient Athens where the earliest representatives of this school congregated. A chief objective of Stoicism is to secure happiness by overcoming the confusion caused by the emotions and to demonstrate the liberating powers of reason. The earlier Stoics also frequently engaged in academic disputes about physics, logic, and epistemology. By contrast, Epictetus cultivated a kind of popular philosophical sermon called the diatribe. His message was directed primarily not at specialists but at students of philosophy, though in fact most of these students were, like Arrian, from aristocratic families. Accordingly, the Encheiridion in its fifty-three short chapters seeks to encourage, to exhort, even to convert readers to the philosopher’s life. Some scholars have emphasized Epictetus’s beginnings as a slave and the influence of that experience on his teaching. Indeed, while the Encheiridion’s emphasis on the liberating power of reason is consistent with the writings of other Stoics, the personal style of the diatribe frequently suggests that the author was familiar with the realities of enslavement. Another striking difference between Epictetus and earlier Stoics is the religious tone in his work. Because he viewed reason as an aspect of the universe and of the divine, Epictetus demands a virtual conversion to philosophy. He goes far beyond philosophical predecessors in expecting his readers not merely to study philosophy but to ensure that each step taken in life is in harmony with divine reason.

The Encheiridion opens with a discussion of this important theme of the liberating power of reason, which allows people to differentiate between those aspects of life that can and those that cannot be controlled. Human attitudes, choices, desires, and aversions can be controlled through the exercise of reason; possessions, bodies, and lives cannot. True happiness can be secured only by abandoning the frustrating pursuit of or flight from the uncontrollable things. Control of desire and of aversion is key to the philosophy of Epictetus. Reason will tell people, for example, that if a piece of pottery they admire breaks, that pottery was merely something subject to breakage. Similarly, if a beloved child or spouse dies, reason will remind individuals that the loved ones were mortal and were subject to death. People seek to avoid what they think is harmful, but reason reveals that this perception actually resides in the human being, not in the thing itself. Epictetus applies the same analysis to the petty annoyances of life as to the fear of death: Whatever cannot be controlled should not be seen as dreadful. A famous dictum of Epictetus offers a summation of his teaching: “It is not things that disturb human beings, but their attitudes toward things.”

The Encheiridion cites numerous everyday examples—repetition was a characteristic technique of the philosophical diatribe—to reinforce its message. Reason dictates that to take pride in a fine stallion one owns is, in fact, to take pride in what is not truly one’s own and can be taken away. Disease or a handicap may be impediments to the body, but they need not be impediments to moral choice or to the exercise of reason. In a memorable comparison, Epictetus stresses that all the pleasures of life should be seen as merely given on loan. On a sea voyage, if people wander away from the ship at a port of call, captivated by the attractions of the unfamiliar place, they must be prepared to abandon everything and return to the ship when the captain calls. It is so in life, where, when the time comes, people must be prepared to leave behind spouse and child and all material things. Accordingly, Epictetus advises people to say of something not, “I have lost it,” but rather, “I have returned it.” Whatever takes away what was possessed should be seen as the instrument by which the Giver takes back what is given.

With his primarily aristocratic audience in mind, Epictetus addresses himself to the concerns of youthful ambition. By not striving for wealth or fame, people may indeed end up with fewer external things than could have been possible, but through the exercise of reason and moral choice, they will gain freedom and true happiness. The aspiring philosopher, attempting to maintain the proper attitude toward external things, may appear ridiculous and clumsy. (Epictetus’s vivid depiction of the ridicule the aspirant can expect may reflect his own early experience of teaching at Rome.) Nevertheless, despite this opposition, the philosopher will know how to live properly. Just as when delicacies are passed around at a feast and polite guests wait patiently until the dish comes their way (or not, as the case may be), so the philosopher will accept with equanimity what is given (or not given) in life. Like Heracleitos or Diogenes, the true philosopher may even take less than is given, as he attaches less importance to externals than do others.

In some respects, the Stoic attitude toward strong human emotions may seem brutal or simplistic. Epictetus warns his readers not to be moved too much by the apparent misfortune of another who has lost property or a child, because this event is no more than that, an apparent misfortune. All the same, the philosopher does recommend the expression of sympathy in moderation. Superstitious fear caused by an evil omen will yield to reason, which says, “Every omen is favorable, if I wish it so.” Envy and jealousy are similarly vanquished by a sense of proportion and an understanding of what is, and is not, under control. The philosopher will understand that anger and irritation arise not from events themselves but from the human attitude toward events. Epictetus subjects friendship and patriotism to the same analysis. To the objection that without power or wealth people must abandon their friends, Epictetus answers that friends who require others to have what they have risk losing their moral purpose and are not true friends. Stoicism found great favor among the Romans because it did not preach a withdrawal from politics as the Epicureans did. At the same time, Epictetus urges that such service should be undertaken only to the extent that it does not compromise an individual’s moral purpose.

Another central idea that Epictetus weaves into his work is the Stoic command to “follow Nature,” that is, to learn to accept whatever happens as part of the natural order and not as misfortune. When a slave breaks one of the host’s drinking cups, remarks Epictetus, all the guests say, “It happens.” All people should say the same when their own cup is broken or even when their child dies. Nature is not evil, and the philosopher’s moral purpose must be brought into harmony with it. Epictetus even analyzes social relationships in this way. A son who complains of a bad father was, after all, just “given” this father by nature; he should consider not what the father does, but what he himself should do to bring his own life in harmony with nature. Living according to nature will even bring an individual into a proper relationship with the gods, for by accepting whatever happens that individual acknowledges his or her just and proper governance of the universe.

In later chapters, the Encheiridion moves from these lofty thoughts to seemingly more trivial ones, such as how the philosopher should speak and behave in company, what kinds of entertainment to avoid, and how food, drink, and sex fit into the philosopher’s lifestyle. These admonitions, which form a sizable proportion of this short work, are intended to cover the range of roles that the individual, like an actor, may be compelled to play in life. The metaphor of acting is conscious. As in learning a role for the theater, preparation for the philosophical life can be arduous, as difficult as becoming a master of rhetoric or competing at Olympia. Rather than specify each and every human situation, Epictetus offers what could be viewed as a simple rule of thumb: In a moment of perplexity, the philosopher might ask, “What would Socrates or Zeno do in this circumstance?” Epictetus clearly assigns great importance to showing others how to act by example, not merely by lecturing them. He notes that Socrates was eager to be a philosopher, but not at all eager to be recognized as one.

The Encheiridion exercised an enormous influence over later thinkers. Intended by Arrian as a useful epitome of his master’s teaching, for some the manual came to represent pagan philosophy generally. Freethinkers such as Baruch Spinoza eagerly embraced a moral system that depends only vaguely on divine sanction, whereas Christian thinkers detected fascinating intimations of divine revelation in the writings of this Greek slave. In fact, the Encheiridion had the distinction of being the only pagan work adopted by early Christianity as a religious text. Paraphrases were prepared for use by monastic orders, with only slight alteration of the text. Later readers saw other merits and defects in the work. Blaise Pascal fulminated against the arrogance of Epictetus. Frederick the Great slept with a copy of the Encheiridion under his pillow. Matthew Arnold saw in Epictetus and his spiritual descendant, Marcus Aurelius, “the great masters of morals.” It is arguable that no single book, except the New Testament, has provided so many with spiritual sustenance, solace, and sanity as the Encheiridion of Epictetus.

Bibliography

Arnold, E. V. Roman Stoicism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. A valuable work on the development of Stoicism during the Roman Empire. Notable for its careful choice of citations in recounting Epictetus’s philosophy.

Epictetus. The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments. Edited and translated by W. S. Oldfather. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925-1928. Standard edition of the complete works with Greek text and facing translation. Translation is very literal and therefore useful to consult for difficult passages. Contains a somewhat dated but still important introduction, as well as extensive English indexes.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. Epictetus’ “Handbook” and the “Tablet of Cebes”: Guides to Stoic Living. Edited and translated by Keith Seddon. New York: Routledge, 2005. A new translation of Encheiridion with extensive commentary on the work, as well as a lengthy introduction providing information on Epictetus’s life and writings, Stoicism, and the key concepts in his philosophy. Includes a glossary of key Greek and English terms.

Long, A. A. Hellenistic Philosophy. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974. Chapter 4 provides background absolutely essential to understanding the philosophy of Epictetus. Provides an accurate sketch of the main tenets of Greek Stoicism that were modified by Epictetus.

Scaltsas, Theodore, and Andrew S. Mason, eds. The Philosophy of Epictetus. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Collection of essays examining various aspects of Epictetus’s philosophy, including his Stoicism and ideas about cynicism, the self, and morality.

Stadter, Philip A. Arrian of Nicomedia. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. An interesting study of Arrian, who edited Epictetus’s works but was also a biographer of Alexander the Great. Deals with problems of the transcription of Epictetus’s lectures and provides insights into the period in which he lived.

Stephens, William O. Stoic Ethics: Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom. London: Continuum, 2007. A study of Epictetus’s moral philosophy, focusing on his conception of happiness.