Ethics After Babel by Jeffrey Stout
"Ethics After Babel" by Jeffrey Stout is a philosophical exploration that addresses the challenges posed by moral diversity in contemporary society. Stout engages with the ideas presented by Alasdair MacIntyre, who argued that modern moral discourse lacks coherence and that differing moral languages lead to intractable disagreements. In contrast to MacIntyre's bleak assessment, Stout seeks to highlight the potential for dialogue amid this pluralism. He questions whether moral diversity inevitably leads to nihilism or skepticism, asserting that it instead reflects the dynamic nature of human society, where various moral perspectives can coexist and contribute to discussions of the common good.
Stout emphasizes that religious ethics should not be overlooked in secular moral discourse, as it provides valuable insights into ethical discussions. He argues that moral disagreements are not inherently negative; rather, they can enrich social dialogue by weaving together different ethical traditions. Through the metaphor of the Tower of Babel, Stout illustrates how varied moral languages can coexist and how individuals can leverage these differences to foster a more inclusive understanding of morality. Ultimately, "Ethics After Babel" invites readers to appreciate the complexities of moral language and encourages a collaborative approach to ethical discourse.
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Ethics After Babel by Jeffrey Stout
First published: Boston: Beacon Press, 1988
Genre(s): Nonfiction
Subgenre(s): Theology
Core issue(s): Ethics; morality; reason; virtue; wisdom
Overview
In his provocative critique of moral diversity, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981), the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre declared that contemporary society had lost its moral center and was no longer able to offer rational justifications for moral actions. Moreover, he observed, moral disagreements could never be resolved, because the widely differing moral languages held by various individuals were simply incompatible. Such diversity in speaking ethically lay at the core of morality’s interminable debates about issues such as war and peace, social justice, and abortion.
MacIntyre’s book sparked tremendous debate among ethicists, philosophers, and theologians. Seven years after it appeared, Jeffrey Stout, a philosopher of religion at Princeton University, responded to MacIntyre and to society’s rampant moral relativism in Ethics After Babel. Although Stout disagreed with MacIntyre about the possibilities of returning to some ideal moral objectivity and moral unity, he took MacIntyre’s description of the contemporary moral scene as a starting point for his own work. Stout’s task was a fairly simple one: to acknowledge the discontent with moral relativism while at the same time drawing on the positive qualities of such relativism to foster dialogue about ethical issues.
His book is animated by several questions. Given the plurality of moral languages, does such diversity result in moral nihilism, moral skepticism, or moral relativism? Can such moral diversity foster a conception of the common good that enlivens, rather than quells, public discourse? In what ways can religious traditions and their ethics contribute to secular ethical traditions?
In part 1, Stout takes up the first question. If we cannot speak to each other about moral questions because we use different languages, does that mean that ethics offers us absolutely no possibility of achieving the truth or of justifying our actions? If no absolute moral principles exist, can we not say that there is no moral truth (nihilism)? If there are agreed-upon moral principles, can we not say that we have no justification for believing those (skepticism)? Does not each society have its own moral systems, and so can we not judge matters like right and wrong from one society to another or sometimes even within the same society (relativism)? Stout argues that moral diversity is not a compelling cause of nihilism because most people would not embrace such a position unless they felt compelled to do so. Moral diversity does not lead to skepticism or relativism, for Stout, because questions about our criteria for making moral decisions are not questions about moral truths. In addition, truth involves assertions that can be warranted by evidence. Far from leading to complete disenchantment with morality, the abundance of different moral languages represents the contingent character of human society and the numerous niches in which moral truths adapt, grow, and flourish.
Part 2 of Stout’s book examines the eclipse of religious ethics and explores the ways in which religious traditions might contribute to the conversation about ethics. Religious ethics is simply one of the many moral languages that populate contemporary society. Much of the history of ethics—including the thought of Plato, Immanuel Kant, and David Hume—presupposes religion as an element in moral discourse. Analytic philosophy, however, has swept religious ethics under the rug in an effort to focus on the language of morality. Stout argues that one cannot understand secular ethics without recognizing the role of religious ethics in morality and that religious traditions—even if we do not accept their ethical codes—can teach us lessons of moral value (love for neighbor, quest for social justice).
In part 3, Stout argues that moral diversity and disagreement are not inherently negative. He criticizes both liberals (who focus on the rights of individuals over and against the good of society as principles of morality) and communitarians (who focus on tolerance in society as the principle of morality) for their inability to listen to each other. Society requires many moral languages, because they are inextricably woven into our social practices and our institutions. Stout’s vision involves using the many and diverse threads of our social and ethical heritage and weaving them into a colorful quilt of social practices that address the moment in which we are living.
Christian Themes
Ethics After Babel uses the biblical story of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11) as a metaphor for talking about the cacophony of various moral languages. This biblical image serves Stout well in his descriptions of the moral diversity of contemporary society. Contemporary moral philosophers, politicians, and theologians tend to use moral language and privileged ethical codes that are particular to their experience and their institutions. Such conversations often exclude those who do not have access to this language or those who have access to it but are confused by it. Thus, a liberal or conservative politician who speaks about justice will be using a moral language very different from that of a biblical theologian who speaks about justice. The politician will describe justice as retribution and punishment, while the theologian will describe justice as fairness and equity.
Stout cannily argues that the lack of a shared moral language does not mean that we should give up on searching for moral truths in our society. Although he disagrees with them in various ways, Stout goes back to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther King, Jr., to demonstrate the ways that they were able to use various moral languages to make their points. For example, in his “I Have a Dream” speech (1963), King wove biblical language about a promised land of liberty and the language of freedom and equality from the Declaration of Independence into a pattern that stressed America’s moral dilemma and promise.
Following Augustine, Stout contends that we need to distribute our loves justly rather than making idols out of external objects. Unjust love extends value to objects in improper proportion. The good of human life can be achieved by distributing our love in proper proportions to objects worthy of our love. Such virtue, combined with the social practices of justice—including people of all races, genders, and religions—offers a vision of society in which each person’s or group’s moral language makes a difference. Stout strongly argues that the diversity of moral languages in contemporary society need not be a completely negative phenomenon but may instead be a fruitful and promising indication of the moral strengths of our society.
Sources for Further Study
Bosley, Richard. “Being Human and the Problem of Agency: Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents and Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation.” Religious Studies and Theology 23, no. 1 (2004): 143. Examines and criticizes Stout’s conflation of obedience to God’s will with ethical deliberation.
Dykstra, Craig, ed. “Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents: A Review Symposium.” Theology Today 46, no. 1 (April, 1989): 55-73. The best available response to Stout’s book by philosophers and theologians including Cornel West, George Lindbeck, and Sheila Briggs, accompanied by Stout’s response.
Hauerwas, Stanley. “Democratic Time: Lessons Learned from Yoder and Wolin.” CrossCurrents 55, no. 4 (Winter, 2006): 534-554. Theologian Hauerwas offers a critique of Stout’s view of democracy using the lenses of John Howard Yoder and Sheldon Wolin.
Placher, William C. “After Babel: The Virtues of Liberalism.” Christian Century 126, no. 24 (August 16-23, 1989): 753-755. Theologian Placher’s review praises Stout’s book for challenging Christian ethics to be more vital to society.