Outlines of Pyrrhonism by Sextus Empiricus

First transcribed:Pyrrōneiōn Hypotypōseōn, c. second century c.e. (also known as Pyrrhoniarum hypotyposes; English translation, 1591)

Type of Philosophy: Epistemology

Context

The writings of Sextus Empiricus are the only surviving texts that expound the view of the Pyrrhonian Skeptical movement of ancient times. The movement takes its name from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 367-275 b.c.e.), who doubted that there is any way by which one can attain knowledge. He urged that judgment be suspended as to whether any particular assertion is true or false. He argued that to suspend judgment leads to a state of indifference toward the world and to a kind of inner tranquillity that enables one to live at peace in a troubled world.

The actual school of Pyrrhonian thought began much later, in the first century b.c.e. It developed out of the radical Skepticism that had been prevalent in Plato’s Academy under Arcesilaus and Carneades. The Academic Skeptics developed a series of brilliant arguments to show that nothing can be known; they recommended that one live by probabilities. The Pyrrhonists regarded the Academics as too dogmatic, and the former maintained their doubts, even about the skeptical contention that nothing can be known. Starting with Aenesidemus, who had been a student at the Academy, the Pyrrhonian movement developed in Alexandria, primarily among medical doctors. Aenesidemus and his successors set forth a series of arguments against various dogmatic philosophies, including the Academic Skeptics. The arguments purported to show that every dogmatic attempt to gain knowledge leads to difficulties that cannot be resolved. Instead of seeking knowledge, one should suspend judgment, thus gaining peace of mind.

Sextus was one of the last leaders of the Pyrrhonian school. Besides the fact that he was a doctor and a teacher, practically nothing is known about him. His writings—probably copies of lectures—consist of compilations of the arguments that his predecessors had worked out on any and all subjects. The Outlines of Pyrrhonism is a summary of the Pyrrhonian position, whereas his other work, Pros Mathēmatikous (c. second century c.e., also known as Adversus mathematicos; Against the Mathematicians, is a much more detailed exposition of the arguments that the school had developed regarding each particular area in which other philosophers had claimed to have discovered true knowledge. Sextus’s writings are veritable storehouses of skeptical arguments designed to confound all other philosophers. Although very repetitious, they contain both good and bad arguments.

In the last chapter of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus explains the uneven character of his book in answering the question of why Skeptics sometimes propound arguments that lack persuasion. Skeptics, he writes, are lovers of humankind. They are seeking to cure an ailment called “self-conceit and rashness,” from which the dogmatic philosophers suffer. Just as doctors employ remedies of different strengths depending on the condition of the patient, Skeptics employ arguments of different strengths depending on how “sick” the dogmatic philosophers are. If the therapy can succeed with a weak argument, good. If the case is severe, a strong argument is needed. Hence, the Pyrrhonists offered a variety of arguments, good and bad, weak and strong, because their avowed aim was to cure dogmatists of the disease of supposing that they knew something.

The Outlines of Pyrrhonism begins by dividing philosophers into three groups: the dogmatists, such as Aristotle and Epicurus, who say that they have discovered the truth; those such as Carneades, who say it cannot be found; and the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, who keep seeking for it. The aim of the Pyrrhonian arguments is to cure people from holding either of the first two views. Sextus guards against being accused of “secret dogmatism” by saying that the statements in his work are not to be taken as positive assertions of what is true, but only as expressions of what appear to him to be matters of fact.

The Nature of Skepticism

Sextus describes Skepticism as the ability or mental attitude that opposes appearances, the objects of sense experience, to judgments that can be made about them, so that suspense of judgment is achieved and one neither affirms nor denies anything. This state is followed by the state of “quietude,” in which one is untroubled and tranquil. The various dogmatic schools of Hellenistic philosophy—the Stoic, the Epicurean, and the Academic—were all looking for peace of mind, and their theories of knowledge and of the real nature of the universe were intended to lead one to mental peace. The Skeptics contend that the dogmatists never achieve peace because they worry about never knowing whether their theories are true. However, Skeptics, who suspend judgment, achieve peace of mind because they escape such worry.

If Skeptics suspend judgment about everything, how do they live? Sextus answers by declaring that Skeptics accept the world of sense experience undogmatically. It seems to Skeptics that they see certain things, have certain feelings, and so on, but they do not know whether such is really the case. They suspend judgment about all that is not immediately evident to them. Then, without judging, they follow nature and custom, so that—for example—when they seem to be hungry, they eat. They have peace of mind because they do not judge, and they are guided in their lives by their experience, their feelings, and the laws and customs of their society.

The Ten Tropes and More

To achieve this tranquillity, one must first achieve suspension of judgment. Skeptical arguments are offered by Sextus to encourage such suspension. He first offers the ten tropes, or arguments, of Aenesidemus, which show why we should suspend judgment about whether sense objects really are as they appear to be. (Sextus prefaces these and all the other arguments he sets forth with the disclaimer that he is not asserting dogmatically the exact number, nature, or truth of the arguments, but only that it seems to him that they are a set of arguments.) The ten tropes all deal with difficulties in ascertaining when features of our sense experience belong to real objects existing independently of our perceptions.

1. Sextus points out, different animals experience things differently according to the nature of their sense organs. We cannot tell which animal has the correct experience.

2. Humans experience the same object differently, and we have no basis for deciding which person has the correct experience.

3. The same object affects different senses in different ways. Honey is sweet to the tongue but sticky to the finger. We cannot tell which quality really belongs to the object.

4. Our impressions of things vary according to our state of mind or our condition.

5. Things appear different from different positions.

6. We never perceive objects individually, but only together with other objects, so that we never know what they are like by themselves.

7. Objects look different when decomposed or analyzed from how they appear when whole; we cannot judge which is their true nature.

8. Everything that we perceive is seen relative to its position in space and time, so we do not know what it is like out of position.

9. We regard things differently according to whether they occur frequently or rarely.

10. Because different nations and cultures have different laws and customs, we cannot judge what things are really right or wrong.

These ten tropes should lead us to suspend judgment because they show that our sense impressions vary and are different, and we have no means for deciding which are correct ones.

Sextus follows with five additional tropes, or reasons for suspending judgment, attributed to Agrippa, a Skeptic of a century earlier. These are more general reasons for doubting dogmatic contentions.

(1) First of all, there is interminable controversy about everything, so we cannot tell who is right.

(2) Every judgment must be proved if it is to be accepted as true; however, the proof will require a further proof, and so on ad infinitum.

(3) Any judgment is relative to the judge and may not be true of the thing itself.

(4) The dogmatists must assume something in order to make judgments, but we cannot tell if these assumptions or hypotheses are true.

(5) The only way to escape from the infinite regress of proofs of proofs, or from starting with some unwarranted hypothesis, is to employ a circular argument in which something that is to be proved is used as part of the proof itself.

Further sets of tropes are offered, including Aenesidemus’s arguments against any dogmatic theory of causation. Then the first book of Outlines of Pyrrhonism concludes with an explanation of Skeptical terminology (showing how the Skeptics can say what they do without making dogmatic assertions) and with a comparison of other Greek philosophies with Pyrrhonian Skepticism.

Knowledge

The second and third books of Outlines of Pyrrhonism show why Skeptics suspend judgment with regard to knowledge claims in various specific disciplines. The second book treats problems of logic and the theory of knowledge, while the third is a collection of arguments about theology, metaphysics, mathematics, physics, and ethics.

The second book presents the disturbing problem of whether Skeptics can deal with the arguments of the dogmatists without admitting that they, the Skeptics, know something, namely what the opponents are talking about. After contending that he deals only with what seems to be the dogmatists’ view, Sextus turns to what he regards as crucial to any theory of true knowledge, the question of whether there is any criterion for judging what is true. Philosophers disagree as to whether there is such a criterion. To settle the dispute, a criterion is needed, but it is not known whether one exists. Further, any proposed criterion of knowledge would have to be judged by another criterion to tell if it were a true one, and that criterion by still another, and so on.

If the dogmatic philosophers insist that humanity is the judge or criterion of true knowledge, then a problem exists: whether all people or only some are judges of truth. If all, then another criterion is needed to settle disputes among people. If only some, then a criterion is needed to tell which people are proper judges and under what conditions. The Stoics, for example, claim that the wise person, the sage, is the judge. However, by what standards can one tell who is the sage and whether what the person says is true? Other philosophers say that the criteria are the faculties of sense and reason. However, under what conditions are they the criteria? By what standards shall we judge? Also, whose sense and reason are standards?

It is not even obvious that anything true exists. Therefore, if somebody asserts that truth exists, he will not be believed unless he offers proof. However, is the proof true? Further proof has to be offered. However, is that true? Unless some criterion of truth can be established, we cannot tell. However, how can we ever determine if the criterion is the true one?

Further, one can ask, what sort of truths are they—apparent or nonapparent? Because there is disagreement about everything (and Sextus appeals to the fact that there have been philosophers who disputed everything), it is not obvious that something is true. If truths are not apparent, some standard is needed for ascertaining what is true, but all the aforementioned difficulties arise when one attempts to apply a standard of truth.

Signs

Philosophers, especially the Stoics, maintain that they can gain true knowledge by means of signs or inferences that connect what is obvious or evident with that which is not. What is nonevident, Sextus says, falls into one of three categories: the temporarily nonevident, such as that which is on the other side of the wall one is facing; the naturally nonevident, those things that can never under any circumstances be perceived, such as the pores in the skin, but that can be inferred from what is evident; and finally, the absolutely nonevident, whatever can never be known at all, such as whether the number of stars is odd or even. There is a type of sign, called the suggestive sign, which connects what is obvious, our immediate experience, with what is temporarily nonevident. Smoke suggests that there is a fire. Skeptics, like anyone else, accept suggestive signs and act by them, because this is the natural way of relating present experience to possible future experience. However, suggestive signs do not provide true knowledge, only predictions or expectations about the future course of events.

Philosophers hope to gain true knowledge by means of another kind of sign, the indicative sign. This is defined as “an antecedent judgment in a valid hypothetical syllogism which serves to reveal the consequent.” In a syllogism of the form “If A, then B; A, therefore B,” A is an indicative sign if it, itself, is evident, if it reveals that B, which is naturally nonevident, is true, and if the syllogism is valid. Sextus offers many arguments against the existence of indicative signs, including the contention that one can determine if a hypothetical syllogism is valid only if one knows whether the consequent is true or false. The consequent in this case is a statement about what is naturally nonevident, which can be revealed only by an indicative sign. Hence, one is always involved in circular reasoning because it requires knowing what is naturally nonevident to tell if an indicative sign actually exists, and one can tell what is naturally nonevident only by means of indicative signs.

Demonstrative reasoning consists of using signs to reveal conclusions. Hence, similar doubts can be cast as to whether anything at all can be demonstrated or proved. Sextus offers many arguments to show that nothing can be proved, and then, to avoid establishing the negative conclusion, he offers evidence to show that something can be proved. Therefore, one has to suspend judgment on the question.

A very brief criticism is leveled against induction, pointing out that if a general conclusion is drawn from some particular instances, it may be disproved by other cases. If generalizations can properly be made only after a review of all particular cases, it is obviously impossible to survey all of the data, and hence, to generalize.

Religion, Metaphysics, and the Sciences

The third book of Outlines of Pyrrhonism rapidly surveys the various sciences from theology and metaphysics to mathematics, physics, and ethics, and indicates that in each of these areas the fundamental concepts are meaningless, that the basic principles are open to question, and that, as a result, one must suspend judgment about whether anything can be known in any of these areas.

Though Skeptics accept the customs of their society and hence its religious views, undogmatically, Sextus points out that the arguments for the existence of God and for atheism are inconclusive, and that the conceptions of God offered by various philosophers are conflicting and often inconsistent in themselves. Further, various problems, such as the problem of evil, cast doubt on the claim that a good, all-knowing deity exists.

With regard to metaphysics and physics, the basic notions such as “cause,” “matter,” and “body” contain difficulties. We cannot even be sure that anything causes anything else or that bodies exist. We seem to have no way of gaining indisputable knowledge in this area. Arguments such as those of Zeno of Elea, of the fifth century b.c.e., indicate that paradoxical conclusions can be drawn about the nature of bodies, motion, and so on. There are also paradoxes with regard to mathematics, such as the odd argument Sextus offers to show that six equals fifteen. The whole equals the sum of its parts, and the parts of six are five, four, three, two, and one. Therefore, six equals fifteen.

The disagreements among philosophers and mathematicians and the various paradoxical arguments, whether valid or not, that had been developed in ancient times suffice to raise doubts as to whether anything can be known about the world or about mathematics. Hence, we must again suspend judgment.

Ethics

When Sextus turns to ethical matters, he points out that philosophers disagree about what is good and bad. There is not even adequate evidence that anything really good or bad exists. The variety of beliefs and opinions about what is good and bad in the various known cultures leads one to suspend judgment about whether there are any objective moral values in the world. (Sextus even points out that some people and some societies condone incest and cannibalism. Who can say that they are wrong?) Skeptics live undogmatically, not judging whether things are good or bad, but living according to the dictates of nature and society. Skeptics, like others, may suffer from physical pains, but they will avoid the additional mental suffering that results from judging that pains are bad or evil.

The writings of Sextus seem to have had little or no influence in their own time and to have been practically unknown during the Middle Ages. Their rediscovery in the Renaissance greatly influenced many modern thinkers from Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, onward, for Sextus’s writings proved to be a treasure house of argumentation on all sorts of subjects. Philosophers such as Pierre Gassendi, George Berkeley, and David Hume, among others, used arguments from Sextus in setting forth their own theories. Pierre Bayle contended that modern philosophy began when arguments of Sextus were introduced on the philosophical scene. The arguments of the Skeptics continue to stimulate twentieth century minds caught between the power of faith and the faith in power.

Principal Ideas Advanced

•Skeptical arguments are designed to cure dogmatists of the disease of supposing that knowledge is possible.

•The Skeptic relies on appearances and avoids the error of passing judgment.

•To suppose that it is possible to judge truth and falsity is to ignore the relativity of perception and judgment.

Bibliography

Barnes, Johnathan. The Toils of Scepticism. Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1990. This is a technical but clear and engaging exposition of Pyrrhonian Skepticism by one of the foremost Oxford philosophers. Includes bibliographical references.

Hookway, Christopher. Scepticism. London: Routledge, 1990. Chapters 1 and 2 give a general account of Pyrrhonian Skepticism through the view of Sextus Empiricus. The rest of this book contains a detailed account of the influence of skepticism in various areas of modern philosophy.

Popkin, Richard H. The History of Scepticism: From Erasmus to Spinoza. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979. This is an excellent, readable, and informed historical treatment of Sextus and Pyrrhonian influences on the foundation of modern Western philosophy. In chapter 2, Popkin presents a clear and accessible account of the revival of skepticism in Europe in the sixteenth century.

Schmitt, C. B. “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times.” In The Skeptical Tradition, edited by Myles Burnyeat. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. This article gives a thorough account of the accidental rediscovery of Sextus’s two books and their effect on the modern philosophy of the West. Chapters 2-9 of this book are basically devoted to discussions of ancient and Pyrrhonian Skepticism, and chapters 10 to 17 are excellent expositions of modern skepticism as a byproduct of its ancient Hellenistic prototype.

Sharples, Robert W. Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1996. Accessible reading on history and the principles of Sextus’s Pyrrhonism. The chapters on stoicism and Epicureanism are quite helpful in understanding Sextus’s arguments, for they are directed partially against these Hellenistic philosophies.

Zeller, Eduard. The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Translated from the German by Oswald J. Reichel. New York: Russell and Russell, 1962. Chapters 22 and 23 describe in a clear and detailed manner the Pyrrhonian and the Academic versions of ancient Skepticism.