The Tasks of Philosophy by Alasdair MacIntyre

First published: Vol. 1 in Selected Essays. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006

Genre(s): Nonfiction

Subgenre(s): Essays

Core issue(s): Ethics; knowledge; reason

Overview

Through essays written from 1972 to 2002, Alasdair MacIntyre provides an overview of his philosophical project with particular applications of his version of Thomistic philosophy to modern issues. In MacIntyre’s view, the philosophies of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Greek philosopher Aristotle depict philosophical discourse as occurring within the context of a tradition. Thus, philosophy is a craft in that it requires a teacher who can provide an understanding of the principles and purposes (ends) of the craft and yet also allows the student to move beyond the teacher’s understanding of those principles and purposes.

MacIntyre emphasizes that each person exists within the context of a particular tradition or culture. Moreover, a person’s ability to understand others and to be understood is provided by tradition and culture in the form of a dramatic narrative. The dramatic narrative, by providing a background and structure, organizes thought such that it can be rational and comprehensible. It provides the philosopher with particular theses and arguments that circumscribe the scope of possible rational discourse within the tradition. Thus, the dramatic narrative both makes rational inquiry possible and, at the same time, limits the extent of that inquiry.

At times, however, an individual enters into an epistemological crisis because the dramatic narrative is insufficient. This insufficiency can be discovered because of conflicts inherent in the tradition or because of an encounter with rival traditions. This results in a breakdown in the relationship between what seems to be true and what is true. Progress within a particular tradition is characterized by the ability to identify, solve, and explain problems and difficulties within the tradition. If these problems result in a sustained incoherence in the tradition, it becomes more likely that an individual will begin to doubt the sufficiency of the tradition. Having made this realization, the inquirer must either stagnate, defending the deficiencies of his own viewpoint against the attacks of rival viewpoints, or else attempt to engage the imagination to understand a rival view from the standpoint of that rival. To the extent an individual is able to make this imaginative leap, it becomes possible to reexamine one’s original tradition in light of the rival tradition, in hopes that the rival tradition will provide a more coherent understanding of truth, including an explanation for why the original tradition failed in precisely the ways that it failed.

True reconciliation occurs through the creation of a new narrative that enables individuals to understand both how they could have intelligibly believed the earlier narrative and how they were misled. This process, while leading to a more adequate narrative, does not lead to a philosophy that is not subject to further questioning. In other words, it does not lead to absolute truth. However, it also should not result in relativism.

To understand the problem with relativism, it is important to distinguish between truth and rational justification. Individuals who hold to a particular moral viewpoint necessarily distinguish between these two concepts, whereas a relativist necessarily conflates them. Truth is the telos or final end of all philosophical and moral inquiry. Rational justifications are intended to provide support for belief in a particular moral view. The practice of rational justification aims at a progress toward truth that is characterized as a movement from what is local, partial, and one-sided toward conformity of the intellect with truth. This possibility of progress, however, presupposes the possibility that the particular rational justification will be found insufficient and will be revised. Thus, any recognition of the changeability of rational justifications cannot serve as a basis for accepting relativism. This would not be the case if rational justification was essentially synonymous with the truth at which it aims.

This understanding of rational justifications as necessarily rooted in traditions and of truth as the final end of all theoretical inquiry is of fundamental importance for recognizing how MacIntyre’s thought stands in relation to modern and contemporary philosophy. Modern or Enlightenment thought, following French philosopher René Descartes, attempts to avoid the danger of skepticism by attempting to doubt everything that need not be accepted by every person in every place or time. It claims not only that we can provide a foundation for philosophy but also that we can provide this foundation independent of any final end. MacIntyre, following the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and his successors, contends that no such skepticism is possible and that, to the extent that it is possible, it leads to madness and unintelligibility. Skepticism asks certain questions, and radical doubt makes it increasingly difficult to even understand the questions that are being asked.

In addition, Enlightenment thought fails because it presupposes that it is possible to have first principles independent of a final end. MacIntyre points out that it is only because there is a final end that it is possible to understand anything in the way of first principles. In other words, the process of inquiry and the existence of humans as creatures that enquire presupposes that there is truth toward which such inquiry can aim. This acceptance of first principles and final ends, however, distinguishes MacIntyre not only from Enlightenment thought but also from contemporary philosophy. While MacIntyre generally accepts Nietzsche’s critique of the Enlightenment conception of rationality, he rejects Nietzsche’s failure to recognize that final ends are necessary to provide a coherent theory of truth and rational discourse.

Christian Themes

Questions concerning the relationship between philosophy and Christian belief are perennial, and MacIntyre’s attempt to revive the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition of virtue-based ethics is an important contribution to discussions that have become mired in the debates between Enlightenment thought and the followers of Nietzsche. In the final essay of the book, however, MacIntyre addresses an issue of particular interest to the Christian philosopher.

In the 1998 encyclical Fides et ratio (on the relationship between faith and reason), Pope John Paul II presupposes that truth is a good and is the good of the human intellect. This presupposition, in turn, requires a rejection of certain philosophical theses such as relativism. At the same time, he states that philosophy must remain autonomous and that if it did not proceed according to its own principles and methods, it would be of little use. MacIntyre argues that this conjunction of attitudes has led to a caricature of the encyclical as promoting free inquiry only as long as that free inquiry comes to the conclusions already predetermined by Christian faith.

Building on the Thomistic tradition, MacIntyre emphasizes that the Christian understanding of rational inquiry is closely connected to the Christian understanding of human nature. It is not enough to recognize that truth is the final end of rational inquiry, but it is also important to acknowledge the significance of the nature of human beings as creatures who engage in rational inquiry, as creatures who are truth seekers. Philosophy, MacIntyre explains, seeks rational answers to questions posed by human beings. This seeking, moreover, is an essential part of the nature of all humans. As a result, it is precisely because of the encyclical’s commitment to truth as the good of the human intellect that it acknowledges the independence of philosophy. It is only through philosophy’s independence that reason is capable of making the unforced assent to truth that is essential to rational inquiry. Divine revelation, while it does provide answers and it does help illuminate false reasoning, does not end rational inquiry. Instead, it provides additional resources and goals for inquiry.

Sources for Further Study

MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 2d ed. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. The landmark book in which MacIntyre analyzes the decay of modern thought and its inability to provide any unifying framework for reconciling rival views and philosophies.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Focuses on the nature of the conflict between current types of moral inquiry and how to bring them into dialogue.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. A discussion of the development of Western moral philosophy, focusing on the ways in which different conceptions of justice and rationality interacted.

Murphy, Mark C., ed. Alasdair MacIntyre. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. A helpful collection of essays discussing MacIntyre’s work. Essays include discussions of the relationship between history and philosophy, the significance of tradition, and MacIntyre’s impact on the social sciences, moral philosophy, and political philosophy.

Rowland, Tracey. Culture and the Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II. New York: Routledge, 2003. Drawing heavily from MacIntyre, attempts to provide a theological analysis of culture and particularly of modern culture.