Awakening Councils
Awakening Councils were local militias in Iraq, predominantly composed of Sunni members and organized along tribal lines. Established around 2005, these councils emerged in response to the growing influence of Al Qaeda in Iraq, with tribal leaders seeking permission from U.S. forces to form neighborhood patrols for self-defense. The U.S. armed and financed these militias, which played a significant role in reducing violence in the country, particularly noted for their impact in Anbar province and surrounding areas. By early 2008, estimates indicated there were between 80,000 and 100,000 fighters involved in the councils.
Despite their contributions to security, the Awakening Councils faced significant challenges. Tensions arose with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, which viewed them as a potential threat. As the U.S. began to withdraw, many members of the councils found themselves without promised jobs or integration into the official security forces, leading to increased instability. The failure to secure employment options resulted in some former members joining extremist groups like the Islamic State, highlighting the complex and often precarious role of the Awakening Councils in Iraq's post-conflict landscape.
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Awakening Councils
Summary: Awakening Councils were local Iraqi militias, about 80 percent of whose members were Sunnis. They were organized along tribal lines and are armed and financed by the United States to counter the influence of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The Councils generally operated out of a neighborhood office, with the local sheik controlling its activities. They were one of the factors credited for a decline in violence in Iraq. The Awakening militias first emerged in 2005 when sheiks in Iraq's western Anbar province approached the US Army for permission to patrol their own neighborhoods to combat the impact of Al Qaeda on their social structures. The militias grew in number and spread elsewhere in Iraq. The total number of fighters in Awakening Councils was estimated at around 80,000 in January 2008. Iraq's Shiite-dominated government objected to the militias, saying they could pose a future threat to the authority of the central government in Baghdad. By March 2008, several militia leaders had raised the prospect of abandoning their alliance with the Americans and going back to fighting both the United States and Iraqi armed forces. In the summer of 2008, the Baghdad government launched several crackdowns on militia activities. While some American officials credit the militias with reducing attacks on US troops, critics of the policy warned that funding the militias could set the stage for future civil conflict. Though Awakening Councils improved security in Iraq, they also empowered dubious characters at the local level, and the Iraqi government developed a distaste for them. Tensions increased when the government could not provide the promised government jobs for the over 90,000 members. As members of the Awakening Councils faced unemployment, they were often left with joining the Islamic State as their only other option. The failure of the Iraqi government to successfully integrate members of the Awakening Councils following the US withdrawal led to increased instability.
What: Awakening Councils were neighborhood-based, mostly Sunni, militias organized along tribal lines and reporting to local sheiks. Members of the militias were paid salaries and armed by the United States. In mid-2008, the number of Awakening militiamen was estimated to be 80,000-100,000; about 80 percent were Sunnis. Having started in predominantly Sunni Anbar province in western Iraq, the militias spread to areas near Baghdad, where members of at least six Awakening units participated in neighborhood patrols. In 2007, Awakening Councils received credit for helping reduce the level of violence in Iraq, including attacks on American soldiers. In the first quarter of 2008, tensions rose between the Awakening Councils, the United States armed forces, and the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. In August 2008, the Baghdad government began cracking down on Awakening militias. At the same time, militiamen complained that the government had failed to fulfill promises to integrate the militias into the official police and armed forces. This inability to secure employment led many members of Awakening Councils to defect to the Islamic State and increased the instability of Iraq following the withdrawal of US forces.
Origins: The first Awakening Council was formed in the summer of 2005 when leaders of the Abu Mahal tribe in Anbar province near the Syrian border approached American Army officials and asked permission to form their own neighborhood patrol to defend against attacks from Sunni militants sympathetic to Al Qaeda. The tribe was being routed out of its traditional area by a competing tribe that had struck an alliance with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. At the same time, a high level of violence in Anbar was putting strong pressure on the United States. Even though some Abu Mahal members had previously fought against the Americans, US commanders agreed to help the tribe by providing weapons and financing the militia, the funding to be controlled by the sheiks. The movement spread quickly to other tribal leaders.
Growth and Impact: By 2008, Awakening Councils had become an increasingly important element in the American counter-insurgency strategy of arming and financing Iraqis to oppose the influence of outsiders such as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The Councils were listed as one of three elements in reducing the level of killing in Iraq in the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008. (The other two were an increase in American troop levels--"the surge"--and a cease-fire by the Shiite Mahdi Army militia.) The Awakening movement was also credited with reducing the influence of Al Qaeda among Sunnis. Critics of the movement, including officials of the Baghdad government, objected that the Awakening Councils represented a third branch of organized fighters in Iraq, alongside the Iraqi Army and Shiite militias (notably the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization) that could play a key role in possible future conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis. They argued Awakening Councils provided increased security, but empowered questionable characters at the local level.
Councils Under Attack: Members of the Councils came under attack by Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. In September 2007, a suicide bomber killed Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, also known as Abu Risha, the Awakening's charismatic leader, only days after he had met with President Bush. In late December 2007, Osama bin Laden specifically denounced members of the Awakening militias. In January 2008, at least 100 members of Awakening militias were assassinated, according to Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani. The killings included several sheiks who were prominent in encouraging tribal members to join Awakening militias. (In some cases, tribal loyalties trump religious identification; some tribes include both Sunnis and Shiites, which largely accounts for the Shiite membership in Awakening militias.) Most of the killings took place around Baghdad and Baquba, the capital of Diyala province northeast of Baghdad, both of which have mixed Sunni and Shiite populations. Most of the killings were blamed on Al Qaeda. The assassinations followed a statement by Osama bin Laden in an audiotape released at the end of December 2007 in which he called members of the Awakening militias "traitors" and "infidels." Some of the murders were blamed on members of the Shiite Mahdi Army, a militia led by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, and on the Badr Organization, the military arm of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a leading Shiite political party, even though both those groups had declared cease-fires. Some rogue members of the Shiite militias may have been prompted to attack Sunnis by the Quds Force, a branch of Iran's Revolutionary Guard.
Problems for the Awakening: In February and March 2008, signs of serious stress appeared among various independent Awakening Councils. Some leaders complained that their men had come under attack by US armed forces. Others complained that their members had not been paid their salaries as promised. In some cases, Awakening militiamen ceased their patrols during this time. Leaders of some Awakening militias threatened to go back to fighting the Americans and the Shiite-dominated government Army and police--in some cases, using arms supplied by the United States.
In February 2008, some Awakening Council members staged a demonstration against the police chief of Diyala province, General Ghanim al-Qureyshi, accusing him of targeting Sunnis. Awakening Council leaders complained that their members were still denied the opportunity to join the Iraqi Army, an institution once dominated by Sunnis but which, since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, has been increasingly dominated by Shiites.
In August 2008, Awakening leaders in Diyala Province, west of Baghdad, said the government had a list of 650 Awakening militiamen wanted for arrest. Leaders also complained that the government failed to fulfill promises of offering jobs in the police or Army to Awakening members.
Prognosis: For the United States, the Awakening Council movement played a positive role in a counter-insurgency strategy designed to enlist Iraqis in the fight against outside influences, particularly Al Qaeda and Iran, and to suppress attacks on American forces. Many Awakening militiamen were thought to have once participated in the anti-American insurgency in cooperation with Al Qaeda. Iraq's interior minister Bolani was quoted by the New York Times in late January as saying: "Al Qaeda is trying to assassinate all the Awakening members that support the government, but I believe that criminal militias are also doing this." The Times also quoted Iraqi officials as saying Al Qaeda was simultaneously trying to discourage Sunni Arabs from joining Awakening militias and infiltrating the militias to discredit them in the eyes of the government and Shiite militias.
The Iraqi government promised to integrate about one-fifth of the Awakening militiamen into the regular Iraqi Army and police force, and to provide employment to others. That process was slow and incomplete, and some Awakening militiamen became disenchanted and turned back to attacking the government and the United States forces that armed and financed the Awakening Councils in the first place. Many also were lured into joining the Islamic State. The widespread sectarian conflict that continued in Iraq following US withdrawal and the inability of the country to stabilize was partially blamed on the government’s failure to fulfill its promise to former Awakening members.
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