Battle of Dien Bien Phu
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, fought from November 1953 to May 1954, was a crucial military engagement during the First Indochina War between French colonial forces and the Viet Minh, a Communist-led group. The French aimed to lure the Viet Minh into a conventional battle where their technological superiority could prevail, establishing a base at Dien Bien Phu, which was strategically chosen for its isolation and supposed defensibility. However, Viet Minh General Vo Nguyen Giap mobilized a force of around 60,000 troops, cleverly bringing in artillery and launching a protracted siege that severely disrupted French supply lines.
By March 1954, artillery bombardments had compromised the French position, leading to the eventual overrun of their defenses. The battle culminated on May 7, 1954, with a significant defeat for the French, resulting in nearly 2,300 fatalities and the capture of surviving soldiers. The outcome marked a pivotal change in the dynamics of Vietnam's struggle for independence and had far-reaching implications for international relations, as it set the stage for the division of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference. This event catalyzed U.S. involvement in the region, as fears of communism spreading led to support for anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam. The battle thus stands as a significant episode in both Vietnamese history and the broader Cold War context.
Battle of Dien Bien Phu
Type of action: Ground battle in Indochina War
Date: March 13-May 7, 1954
Location: Northwest Vietnam, near Laotian border
Combatants: Viet Minh vs. French
Principal commanders: Viet Minh, General Vo Nguyen Giap (1911- ); French, General Henri Navarre (1898–1983)
Result: Viet Minh victory; France departs Vietnam, which is partitioned into North and South Vietnam at the 1954 Geneva Conference
Late in 1953, the French sought to end the struggle they had entered into eight years earlier with the Communist-led Viet Minh by drawing Viet Minh general Vo Nguyen Giap’s forces into a conventional battle in which superior technology would prove decisive and break the back of the guerrillas. General Henri Navarre picked Dien Bien Phu because there were no roads into the valley base camp, where his 16,000 soldiers could be protected and supplied by air. The surrounding mountainous terrain would presumably prevent the Viet Minh from amassing artillery or other sophisticated weaponry. Beginning in November, 1953, in the mountains around Dien Bien Phu, Giap began to assemble some 60,000 troops who had brought disassembled artillery parts with them. In March, 1954, Giap began the final assault on the French outpost with artillery fire that severely damaged the airfield, thus preventing easy resupply, while the Viet Minh destroyed French planes in Haiphong that had parachuted in supplies. The arriving monsoons effectively prevented the use of tanks. Without food or ammunition, one French unit after another was overrun or surrendered, the main base capitulating on May 7. Nearly 2,300 French soldiers died in the battle, and approximately 5,200 suffered wounds; the survivors were placed in Viet Minh prison camps.
Significance
Dien Bien Phu marked a major turning point in Vietnamese, French, U.S., and Cold War history. The defeat of colonial French forces at that isolated mountainous site by the Communist-led Viet Minh established that organization’s standing as the principal contender for political control of Vietnam once the French departed. Meanwhile, the Geneva Conference, which opened the day after France’s surrender at Dien Bien Phu, divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel, granting the Viet Minh political power in the north and Bao Dai, the last emperor of the Nguyen Dynasty, control in the south. As Bao Dai was commonly viewed as a lackey of the French and a weak leader who could not prevent a Viet Minh conquest of the south, the United States entered the conflict to balance the assistance Ho Chi Minh’s Hanoi regime received from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The United States supported the newly appointed premier of the Saigon government, Ngo Dinh Diem, as the most viable alternative capable of checking Viet Minh activities in the south and containing communism.
Resources
Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1967.
Kaplan, Lawrence S., et al., eds. Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-AmericanRelations, 1954–1955. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1990.
Nordell, John R. The Undetected Enemy: French and American Miscalculations at Dien Bien Phu. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995.
Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
Vietnam: A Television History. Documentary. New York: Sony Corporation, 1985.
Vo Nguyen Giap. Dien Bien Phu. 6th ed. Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 1999.