Damadola Missile Strike

Summary: Missiles from American drone aircraft were fired at houses in Bajaur, Pakistan, in the belief that senior members of Al Qaeda were present. Five children were among the civilians who died as a result of the attack, but no Al Qaeda members were there. (Later reports indicated Al Qaeda leaders had left the targeted houses before the raid.) The incident created a serious backlash against the United States and against the government of President Pervez Musharraf.

What: On Jan. 12, 2006, U.S. missiles fired from a drone aircraft strike three houses in Bajaur, Pakistan where senior Al Qaeda members are believed to be.

Who: The attack was aimed at Osama bin Laden's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahri, who was believed to be attending an Al Qaeda meeting in the village. After several days, it became clear that Zawahri had not been hit, but a number of civilians, including 5 children, had been killed when the missiles hit their homes.

Significance: The government of Pervez Musharraf moved quickly to disavow advance knowledge of the attack, and to convince its citizens that it was in no way complicit in the incident. Al Qaeda took the opportunity to thumb its nose at the failure of the U.S. to harm Zawahri, and made the most of the propaganda value of the civilian casualties. In some ways, the U.S. is still laboring under the backlash the incident created.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan covering the remote and rugged mountains along the nation's northwestern border with Afghanistan constitute a unique challenge in the war on terrorism. Since 2002 the U.S. has essentially been in the position of watching helplessly as displaced Taliban leadership and senior Al Qaeda members have taken haven in the area, sheltered by local tribal leaders.

Training camps have been established, and young militants from throughout the Muslim world flowed in to prepare for jihad. By the end of 2006 the estimated number of foreign fighters in the area was in the thousands and constantly increasing. Intelligence officials believe that 80-90% of the jihadists are hardened terrorist operatives and fugitives. For the United States the situation greatly complicates execution of an effective anti-terror campaign in adjoining Afghanistan.

The Pakistani and U.S. governments have long struggled to find an effective way of disrupting this activity. President Musharraf was already on very shaky political ground, as his strategic decision to cooperate with the U.S. in the war on terror was highly unpopular. Domestic unrest was constantly being fomented by clerics. At the Red Mosque in Islamabad, for instance, clerics advocated government by Shari'a (Islamic holy law) and called for jihad. In 2005-06, they called for Musharraf's assassination. Both the United States and Pakistan feared that the populace would not stand for allowing U.S. military activity within Pakistan's borders, and Washington could not afford to push the issue, as it might result in the replacement of Musharraf with a hostile government. Under the circumstances, the U.S. was reduced to keeping an eye on activities in the border areas.

In late 2005, analysts believe, U.S. intelligence picked up indications of a plan for a senior Al Qaeda gathering in the northern Pakistan. Some experts concluded that couriers returning to the area after delivering Al Qaeda videotapes to Al Jazeera may have unwittingly led trackers to safe houses.

By early January 2006, the C.I.A. was confident that it had pinpointed the house and time when Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahri was planning to convene a meeting. On the night of Jan. 12, 2006, believing al-Zawahri to be present, an American Predator drone aircraft fired missiles into three houses in the village of Damadola, located in Bajaur district, a mountainous tribal area north of Peshawar that borders one of the most inaccessible areas of Afghanistan's provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, where American troops are based.

The U.S. military denied involvement in the strike, and the Pakistani government quickly condemned the operation, issuing a statement assuring its citizens that it would "not allow such incidents to occur." In the following days, it became clear that 18 people had been killed in the attack, including five children, but al-Zawahri was not among the dead. It was later discovered that he had indeed eaten dinner at one of the targeted houses, but had left two hours before the strike.

One month later, it was announced that five Al Qaeda militants had been killed in the attack, including the son-in-law of al-Zawahri, Abdul al-Maghribi, who at the time was in charge of the group's media operations. In a February 2006 meeting with tribal leaders, Musharraf declared: "Five foreigners were killed in the U.S. attack. One of them was a close relative of Ayman al-Zawahri and the other man was wanted by the U.S. and had a (US$) five million reward on his head."

The names of two of the other reported victims named were eventually announced as Midhat Mursi, Egyptian bomb expert, who has a $5 million bounty on his head, and Abu Obaidah al-Misri, al-Qaeda's head of operations in Kunar province.

Zawahri quickly recorded a video denouncing the attack and sneering at the U.S. failure and calling President Bush a "butcher " and "a curse on your own nation."

The civilian deaths in the strike only deepened the Pakistani people's opposition to the possibility of allowing U.S. military activity within its borders, a position that is still hampering meaningful progress in disrupting Al Qaeda's activities.

Timeline:

  • 2005: Intelligence indicates the location of a meeting of senior Al Qaeda being planned by Ayman al-Zawahri.
  • Jan. 12, 2006: Missiles are fired from an American drone aircraft into three houses in Damadola in the belief that al-Zawahri is present.
  • Jan. 14, 2006: It becomes clear that al-Zawahri is not among the 18 dead. There is a great outcry over the civilians killed, among whom there are 5 children.
  • Feb. 2006: Confirmation that Zawahri had indeed eaten dinner in one of the targeted houses, but had left the scene two hours before the attack. He appears on a videotape taunting the U.S. for its failure.

Bibliography

"Ayman al-Zawahiri." Background Information Summaries. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=19131211&site=isc-live

"Pakistan." Background Information Summaries. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=23950985&site=isc-live

"Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)." Background Information Summaries. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=23950988&site=isc-live

Hirsh, Michael, et al. "Predatory and Prey." Newsweek. 147:5 (Jan. 30, 2006) 4p. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=19483389&site=isc-live

Kronstadt, K. Alan. "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: RL33498" Congressional Research Service: Report. (Aug. 24,, 2007) 50p. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=26450777&site=isc-live