Iraq Surge

Summary: In January 2007 President George W. Bush announced that an additional 20,000 combat troops, plus 10,000 support troops, for a total of 30,000 would be sent to Iraq to join the 132,000 American soldiers troops already there. This increase became known as "the surge" and immediately became part of an increasingly political debate over the Iraq war. It came two months after Democrats regained a majority in both houses of Congress and one month after the bipartisan Iraq Study Group recommended a series of steps designed to reduce the number of troops in Iraq. Over the next 20 months the number of military casualties and civilian deaths in Iraq decreased. Supporters of the Bush policy credited the surge; critics pointed to simultaneous factors, notably the rise of the "Awakening" militia movement opposed to Al Qaeda and a cease-fire by a radical Shiite militia. The surge also became an issue in the 2008 presidential campaign.

On January 11, 2007, President George W. Bush announced that he was increasing the number of U.S. combat troops in Iraq by 20,000, to be accompanied by 10,000 additional support troops. His speech came two months after Democrats regained majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives--an electoral victory widely credited to popular opposition to the Iraq war--and after a special study group recommended a gradual withdrawal from Iraq.

The Iraq "surge" in troop strength became both a military and a political issue. By mid-2008, 18 months after Bush's announcement, the number of both military and civilian casualties in Iraq was dramatically lower. In the 2008 presidential campaign between Republican Senator John McCain and Democratic Senator Barack Obama, the surge became a centerpiece of their debate over future U.S. policy in Iraq. McCain argued that the surge had largely succeeded in its objectives. Obama, a longtime critic of the war in Iraq, said that while the surge had succeeded, there were also other causes for the reduction in violence.

The debate over the effectiveness of the surge centered around three elements: the increase in American troops; the rise of the Awakening militia movement among Iraqi Sunni Muslims opposed to the influence of Al Qaeda; and a cease- fire announced in August 2007, and thereafter renewed by the Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia of about 60,000 led by the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

Defining the surge. In a speech on January 11, 2007, President Bush announced he was increasing the number of U.S. combat troops in Iraq by 20,000, plus another 10,000 support troops. His speech came two months after Democrats regained majorities in both the House and Senate in a mid-term election widely interpreted as a popular rejection of the Bush administration's Iraq policies. The speech came one month after publication of report by a bipartisan committee appointed to consider U.S. policy in the region. The very existence of the committee reflected frustration at the continuing high level of violence in Iraq more than three years after the initial U.S. invasion. The report recommended, among other things, a gradual reduction in U.S. forces and a greater reliance on the Iraqi government to establish order.

Inside Iraq at the beginning of 2007 there were five main armed forces:

• The U.S. military and its allies, such as Britain.
• The Iraqi government's army and police, controlled by the government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki, comprised of an alliance of Shiites and Kurds.
• Sectarian Shiite militias, notably the Mahdi Army, numbering around 60,000 in December 2006 and led by cleric Moqtada al- Sadr. A Pentagon report in November 2006 said the Mahdi Army was "currently having the greatest negative affect on the security situation in Iraq." Its forces were concentrated in Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad and in southern Iraq. The Mahdi Army was a rival to the Shiite Badr Organization (formerly known as the Badr Militia) loyal to Maliki.
• Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a radical Sunni rebel group comprising both Iraqis and foreign fighters dedicated to establishing a fundamentalist regime as well as to expelling foreign forces.
• The Awakening Councils, or neighborhood militias mainly comprising Sunnis led by tribal sheikhs, whose fighters were paid salaries of about $300 a month by the United States. These militias had arisen in 2005 in Anbar province in reaction against the excesses of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The first of these councils, headed by local tribal leaders, had emerged in 2005, and their numbers had grown steadily in 2006.

American officials in 2007 blamed the Mahdi Army and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia for the bulk of violence aimed at both civilians and organized armed forces in cities. This took the form of forcibly driving Sunnis out of Shiite neighborhoods by using terrorist bomb attacks in civilian areas such as outdoor markets, and attacks against U.S. forces and the Iraqi army and police. There were frequent allegations that Iraqi government forces failed to exercise an even-handed approach towards the Sunni and Shiite communities, and that the government was also fighting against the influence of the Mahdi Army among Shiites.

A series of satellite images of Baghdad, published in September 2008, showed that Sunni-occupied neighborhoods had begun emptying before the surge began and that this exodus was a major factor in reducing sectarian violence in the city.

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein in spring 2003 also sparked ancient rivalries between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites. Their clashes in the south, and with Kurds (mostly Sunni Muslims) in the north, approached the status of a civil war. At the same time the radical Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which recruited fighters from outside Iraq, was trying to establish a fundamentalist regime--and generating spontaneous opposition--among Sunnis while also directing attacks at U.S. soldiers.

The entire increase in troop strength announced by President Bush in January was not complete until June 2007. The previous month, May 2007, had seen the third highest number of U.S. casualties in the war: 126. This number declined steadily through 2007: 101 in June, 80 in July, down to 23 in December 2007. In the first eight months of 2007, casualties continued to decline, with some exceptional months, to 13 in July 2008.

Simultaneous developments

Mahdi Army ceasefire. In February 2007 cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army to observe a ceasefire for six months. In August 2007 he renewed the ceasefire for a further six months. In August 2008 Sadr announced plans to disarm the Mahdi Army and to convert it into a political and social services organization similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon, leaving only a small core of armed fighters for self-defense. According to a report in the Wall Street Journal, Sadr's organization would in the future be focused on its Shiite religious orientation rather than on combating the U.S. military, and would concentrate on education, religion, and social justice. (See separate Background Information Summary on the Mahdi Army in this database.)

Awakening Councils. As early as 2005 tribal leaders in Anbar province, in western Iraq, had approached U.S. military commanders with a request for weapons and funding to enable them to counter Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which had imposed strict, fundamentalist rules on tribes where they predominated. Funding the resulting local militias, which came to be called Awakening Councils, was originally undertaken by local U.S. commanders--over the strong objections of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice--and evolved into a Pentagon strategy to combat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Anecdotal evidence suggested that many members of the Awakening Councils, who were paid salaries of about $300 per month and supplied with weapons, had formerly been allied with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. About 80% of Awakening Council fighters were Sunnis. Critics of the program--including members of the Iraqi government--objected that the Pentagon was arming and financing a potential future fighting force that could turn against the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki. Nevertheless, in 2007 and 2008 the Awakening Councils patrolled local areas of Iraq, including neighborhoods in Baghdad, acting like an arm of the national police, but reporting to local sheikhs who met with U.S. commanders.

"Clear, Hold, Build." On March 20, 2006, the White House issued a statement describing a new strategy for fighting insurgents: "clear, hold, build." Previously American troops were concentrated in large bases outside Baghdad. They conducted routine missions, consisting of entering problematic areas, clearing out the guerrillas, then returning to base. Under "clear, hold, build," American fighters established small garrisons in specific districts where they fought the insurgents, then remained to assure that the militiamen did not return. For the remaining nine months of 2006, U.S. fatality figures in Iraq did not reflect any impact of the new strategy.

General David Petraeus. In January 2007 President Bush named David Petraeus to be in charge of U.S. forces in Iraq. Petraeus had authored a new Army field manual on anti-insurgency operations, published in December 2006, which concentrated on protecting the civilian population as a key condition for stability--a strategy sometimes abbreviated as "clear, hold, build."

Domestic Political Debate. Alongside events in Iraq a domestic political debate over Iraq policy gained momentum during 2007 and 2008. Democrats who won majorities in both houses of Congress took their victories as evidence of popular discontent with the Iraq war and opposed Bush's policy, announced in January 2007, to increase the number of troops stationed in Iraq, rather than begin withdrawing American forces. Republicans in general defended Bush's policies. Republican Senator John McCain defended the surge and credited it with the decline in casualties. Democratic Senator Barack Obama advocated a specific timeline for withdrawal of most combat troops by mid-2010. McCain argued that the surge was proof that U.S. military action could be effective and result in a victory. Obama argued that Iraqis needed to take responsibility for their own security and would only be persuaded to do so after they saw a deadline for the American presence.

Simultaneously with the fighting in Iraq, the Afghan Taliban began scoring major gains in 2008, leading some critics to urge that American troops be diverted from Iraq to Afghanistan, partly to pursue the original Al Qaeda leaders thought to be hiding in northern Pakistan near the Afghan border. Defenders of the surge said gains in Iraq were vulnerable to reversal and opposed a major troop withdrawal.

Bibliography

Dehghanpisheh, Babak, et al. "Scions of the Surge." Newsweek 151:12 (March 24, 2008) 7p.

"Fact Sheet: Strategy for Victory: Clear, Hold, and Build." The White House, March 20, 2006. Text online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060320-6.html

Katel, Peter. "New Strategy in Iraq/The Issues." CQ Researcher. 17:8 (February 23, 2007) 7p. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=24434298&site=isc-live

McCausland, Jeffrey D. "Iraq after the "Surge." American Foreign Policy Interests. 30:1 (January-February 2008) 8p. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=29377222&site=isc-live

Petraeus, David H. and James F. Amos. "Counterinsurgency" (Army field manual). December 2006. Online at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

"Study of Satellite Imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad." Science Daily. September 22, 2008. Online at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/09/080919074830.htm