Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft
Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LAAR) are a category of military aircraft designed for light attack missions and reconnaissance tasks, particularly in unconventional warfare settings. The concept was initiated by the U.S. Air Force in 2009, driven by operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that highlighted the need for smaller, slower, and more cost-effective aircraft capable of loitering over areas of interest without extensive support. Traditional high-performance jets were deemed expensive and faced rapid wear when used for these roles.
LAAR aircraft are intended to operate in environments where conventional fast jets might be too costly or impractical, as they can help conduct targeted strikes and gather intelligence. Despite initial plans to procure a fleet of 100 aircraft, budget constraints and shifts in military priorities led to a significant reduction, with only five aircraft ultimately purchased for training purposes. Over the years, various efforts to revive or adapt the program, including potential collaboration with U.S. Special Operations Command, have met with limited success.
As global dynamics evolve, light attack aircraft may find niche markets, especially in less developed nations, while the U.S. considers their utility domestically in scenarios like disaster response. However, the future remains uncertain, particularly with the rising capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that may fulfill similar roles.
Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft
Summary: The US Air Force (USAF) conceived the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program in 2009, following US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that had demonstrated a need for incorporating smaller, lighter, slower-moving aircraft into the military arsenal. None of the planes in the current fleet were purpose-built for independently finding, tracking, and attacking ground targets, although some Air Force planes were capable of doing the job. However, such missions generally required support aircraft, formerly known as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and now called Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C).
In addition, no other manned aircraft offered the amount of "loiter time"the amount of time an aircraft can circle an area without returning to base to refuelthat unconventional warfare requires. This posed a number of challenges, including expense, mission coordination, less-than-optimal response time to gather intelligence about the location of targets, and increased "wear and tear" on certain aircraft. The Air Force first planned to launch the LAAR program in 2013 with one hundred aircraft. However, that plan was revised and reduced to 15 aircraft used for training purposes only. This reduction in scale can ostensibly be attributed to military budget cutsinitiatives similar to LAAR were met with similar resistance by lawmakers. Part of this stemmed from scale-downs in military operations.
By 2011, the US had withdrawn most combat forces from Iraq, with similar reductions occurring in Afghanistan. In 2020, the program was transferred to the US Special Operations Command in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. However, following the release of the 2021 budget, it was once again clear the program would not be funded. US Special Operations Command has announced they will attempt to resurrect the program with the independent action Armed Overwatch. In 2021, the US withdrew all remaining forces in Afghanistan. In 2022, the Air Force announced its intention to divest the five aircraft it had purchased for this mission.
In-Depth Overview
The US Air Force conceived the LAAR program following experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrated a need for incorporating smaller, lighter, slower-moving aircraft into the military arsenal. At the time, some Air Force planes could do the job, whether fast-moving jets or slower-moving propeller-driven options like the A10. However, such missions generally required support aircraft, formerly known as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and changed to Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C). While the US Air Force was the first to formalize the need for purpose-built aircraft with the LAAR program, all the branches of the US armed forces recognized the utility of light attack aircraft for some time.
The push for light attack aircraft can be traced back to two key developments in modern warfare:
1. The US began dropping fewer bombs in favor of conducting reconnaissance and targeted missile strikes. Pilots also found themselves performing 'armed overwatch' missionsin which fighters used precision targeting pods to gather and send live, full-motion video to troops on the ground and commanders in operations centers."
2. Not only was using jets to perform these tasks costly, but it also caused high-performance aircraft to degrade faster. According to Air Force Magazine, "One year in Southwest Asia translates into five to seven years' worth of real degradation. Simply put, the jet aircraft fleet is wearing out too swiftly."
Another reason to develop light attack aircraft was arms sales. Once the US withdrew the majority of its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, those countries were tasked with policing threats themselves. Iraq and Afghanistan had neither the need nor resources to purchase high-performance jets and therefore, at least conceptually, they were thought to be interested in light attack aircraft. This theory was supported by a precedent set by other countries using the OV-10 to fly counter-insurgency (COIN) and drug enforcement missionsfor example, Colombia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela, Iran, and Lebanon. As of September 2011, "the only firm commitment to buy a light-attack aircraft has come from the Afghan Ministry of Defense to support its fledgling air forces." It is unclear how many aircraft Iraq and Afghanistan may acquire should Armed Overwatch get underway.
The Air Force's original plans to launch the LAAR program in 2013 with one hundred aircraft were reduced to fifteen aircraft used for training purposes only. This reduction in scale was ostensibly attributed to military budget cuts; initiatives similar to LAAR were met with similar resistance by lawmakersn mid-October 2011, the House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees and Senate Armed Services Committee rejected the $17M US Central Command (CENTCOM) Combat Dragon II program. In 2010, the House Armed Services Committee and House and Senate Appropriations committees rejected a $22M Department of Defense (DoD) reprogramming request to deploy light-attack aircraft to combat as part of the Navy-initiated Imminent Fury program. In 2020, the program was transferred to the US Special Operations Command in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. However, following the release of the 2021 budget, it was once again clear the program would not be funded. US Special Operations Command has announced they will attempt to resurrect the program with the independent action Armed Overwatch. Ultimately the Air Force only procured and operated five aircraft for this mission. These were two Textron AT-6s and three Sierra Nevada A-29s.
The Marketplace & Skeptics
It is likely private manufacturers first became interested in light attack planes because the US military spends almost $2 billion annually on training aircraft. However, as unconventional threats became prominent, other vendors began offering their products to the military because their products suddenly became dual-use. According to Loren Thompson, an analyst at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va., "When you're dealing with relatively low-end threats, there's all sorts of possibilities for marketing to militaries that wouldn't have existed in the past."
Despite the military's enthusiasm for light attack aircraft, their proposals were rebuked by budget committees. Private analysts were skeptical of the potential effectiveness of light attack aircraft. "Such aircraft are little more than flying coffins when facing anything other than small arms," said Peter Singer at the Brookings Institution. If the US does not purchase light attack aircraft, manufacturers will have to seek other markets.
Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group in Fairfax, Va., said only a country with no other options would pursue such planes. "There is a small, unfilled niche at the bottom of the market - something that can do basic, very basic, airpower and reconnaissance missions. If you can afford a more capable aircraft, you also care about your pilots." He believed the market resembled an inverted pyramid: the less sophisticated the product, the fewer number of buyers there were. However, it is important to note that Aboulafia's criticisms came in the context of light attack aircraft being the only type of aircraft in a fleetnot a specialized tool for a specialized job. Iran, for example, flies the Bavar 2 and deploys a swarming strategy, hoping that a high number of light attack aircraft will eliminate a target.
In the end, light attack aircraft may never "get off the ground" if unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can do the same job. In less developed countries, however, UAV technology has not progressed beyond the experimental stage. Therefore, the foreign market continues to hold opportunities. The US has also not completely abandoned its interest in light attack aircraft, and despite being discluded from military budgets, it was hoped US Special Operations Command could resurrect interest through Armed Overwatch.
Domestic Use (US)
In September 2010, Admiral Sandy Winnefeldthe head of US Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the joint US-Canadian air defense commandrecommended exploring slow-moving military aircraft for use over the United States. He cited an incident in February of that year when a disgruntled man crashed his plane into an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) building in Dallas, Texas. In such a situation, fighters simply cannot respond effectively.
Winnefield also mentioned when coupled with UAVs, such aircraft would be helpful in responding to national disasters. Currently, the FAA will not allow UAVs to fly over US airspace for fear of collision with civilian aircraft. Light aircraft with an onboard pilot would circumvent that restriction.
In the 2020s, it remained unclear whether a new program would fund the purchase of light attack aircraft for either domestic or international use; however, several American companies continued to design and market the planes for purchase.
Moving On
In 2020, five aircraft were purchased for the mission, but the Air Force declined to establish a multi-year program to sustain its small fleet. This action ensured the light aircraft would not be a permanent fixture in the Air Force's fleet of aircraft. In 2022, evident that it had procured aircraft that were now looking for a mission, the Air Force signaled its intention to move on. In August 2022, it announced it would divest the five aircraft it had purchased for this missionlikely through a sale to a foriegn military partner.
Bibliography
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Hadley, Greg. "Air Force Set to Get Rid of Small A-29, AT-6 Fleets, Program Official Says." Air & Space Forces Magazine, 10 Aug. 2022, www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-set-to-get-rid-of-small-a-29-at-6-fleets-program-official-says/. Accessed 30 Aug. 2024.
Majumdar, D. "Companies Seek Market for Light Attack Aircraft." Defense News, 15 Oct. 2011, www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7875329&c=ASI&s=TOP. Accessed 8 Oct. 2023.
Malenic, Marina. "NORTHCOM Chief Eyes Light-Attack Planes for Homeland Role." Defense Daily, vol. 247, no. 50, p. 1., 2010
Weisgerber, M. "Lawmakers Nix Light-Attack Aircraft Proposal." Defense Mirror, 14 Oct. 2011, www.defensemirror.com/news/6162/U‗S‗‗Lawmakers‗Nix‗Light‗Attack‗Aircraft‗Proposal. Accessed 30 Aug. 2024.