Rumsfeld Doctrine

Summary: The Rumsfeld Doctrine refers to a military strategy imposed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during the first five years of the Bush administration (2001-2006) that emphasized the use of relatively small, highly mobile land forces in conjunction with air power to combat perceived enemies of the United States in the twenty-first century. Rumsfeld emphasized increased force readiness at smaller scales in order to lessen necessary supplies. The doctrine contrasted with the generally accepted military strategy followed by Rumsfeld's predecessor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, which emphasized sending overwhelming forces against an enemy. The Rumsfeld Doctrine proved effective in dislodging the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the army of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Despite their effectiveness, both attempts led to prolonged stalemates against the guerrilla forces.

The Rumsfeld Doctrine refers to a theory of military operations held by Defense Secretary (2001-2006) Donald Rumsfeld that favored three main principles:

• using fast-moving, lightly armored forces;
• high-tech weapons; and
• "shock and awe" air power in support of ground forces

Rumsfeld introduced the doctrine after he took office in January 2001, and it was used mainly in Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (from March 2003). It is sometimes regarded as the "how" companion to President George Bush's "Bush Doctrine," justifying preemptive military strikes against prospective enemies, such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Rumsfeld's doctrine marked a sharp departure from the previously dominant view of conducting warfare, which was associated with one-time chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and later Secretary of State) Colin Powell, who advocated using overwhelming force on the ground.

Both military doctrines were employed in the same theater of war, Iraq, against the same enemy, Saddam Hussein. The "Powell Doctrine" successfully drove Hussein's army out of Kuwait, having insisted on assembling a massive force beforehand. The Rumsfeld Doctrine defeated Hussein's forces in March 2003 but later saw the US Army and Marines bogged down in long-term counter-insurgent warfare.

Although Rumsfeld's doctrine was closely tied to military operations in Iraq, its implications were much more expansive, reflecting the defense secretary's vision of the role of the American military in an era after the Soviet Union had ceased to pose a significant threat to the United States.

In His Own Words

The Rumsfeld Doctrine was made explicit in a memorandum written by Rumsfeld in March 2001, shortly after taking office. It was printed in the New York Times and released by the Defense Department:

"Guidelines to be Considered When Committing US Force,

by Donald H. Rumsfeld,

March 2001

Is the proposed action truly necessary?

A Good Reason: If US lives are going to be put at risk,

whatever is proposed to be done must be in the US national

interest. If people could be killed, ours or others, the US

must have a darn good reason.

Diplomacy: All instruments of national power should be engaged

before resorting to force, and they should stay involved once

force is employed.

Basis for the Action: In fashioning a clear statement of the

underpinning for the action, avoid arguments of convenience.

They can be useful at the outset to gain support, but they

will be deadly later. Just as the risks of taking action must

be carefully considered, so, too, the risk of inaction needs

to be weighed.

Is the proposed action achievable?

Achievable: When the US commits force, the task should be

achievable at acceptable risk. It must be something the US

is capable of accomplishing. We need to understand our

limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the

US simply cannot accomplish.

Clear Goals: To the extent possible, there should be clear,

well-considered and well-understood goals as to the purpose

of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we

can know when we have achieved our goals. To those who would

change what is falls the responsibility of helping provide

something better. It is important to understand that

responsibility and accept it.

Command Structure: The command structure should be clear, not

complex -- not a collective command structure where a

committee makes decisions. If the US needs or prefers a

coalition to achieve its goals, which it most often will,

we should have a clear understanding with coalition partners

that they will do whatever might be needed to achieve the

agreed goals. Avoid trying so hard to persuade others to

join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize

the command structure. Generally, the mission will determine

the coalition; the coalition should not determine the mission.

Is it worth it?

Lives at Risk: If an engagement is worth doing, the US and

coalition partners should be willing to put lives at risk.

Resources: The military capabilities needed to achieve the

agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject

to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. Even with

a broad coalition, the US cannot do everything everywhere

at once.

Public Support: If public support is weak at the outset, US

leadership must be willing to invest the political capital

to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period

of time may be required. If there is a risk of casualties,

that fact should be acknowledged at the outset, rather than

allowing the public to believe an engagement can be executed

antiseptically, on the cheap, with few casualties.

Impact Elsewhere: Before committing to an engagement, consider

the implications of the decision for the US in other parts

of the world if we prevail, if we fail, or if we decide not

to act. US actions or inactions in one region are read

around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to

the US deterrent and influence. Think through the precedent

that a proposed action, or inaction, would establish.

If there is to be action

Act Early: If it is worth doing, US leadership should make

a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully,

early, during the pre-crisis period, to try to alter the

behavior of others and to prevent the conflict. If that fails,

be willing and prepared to act decisively to use the force

necessary to prevail, plus some.

Unrestricted Options: In working to fashion a coalition or

trying to persuade Congress, the public, the U.N., or other

countries to support an action, the National Command

Authorities must not dumb down what is needed by promising

not to do things (i.e., not to use ground forces, not to

bomb below 20,000 feet, not to risk US lives, not to permit

collateral damage, not to bomb during Ramadan, etc.). That

may simplify the task for the enemy and make our task more

difficult. Leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as

to when the US will disengage, or the enemy can simply wait

us out.

Finally

Honesty: US leadership must be brutally honest with itself,

the Congress, the public and coalition partners. We must not

make the effort sound even marginally easier or less costly

than it could become. Preserving US credibility requires

that we promise less, or no more, than we are sure we can

deliver. It is a great deal easier to get into something

than it is to get out of it!

Note

Guidelines, Not Rules: I believe these guidelines are worth

considering. However, they should not be considered rules to

inhibit the US from acting in our national interest. Rather,

they are offered simply as a checklist to assure that when

the US does engage, it does so with a full appreciation

of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities.

Our future promises to offer a variety of possible

engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the

wisdom with which it is applied. Decisions on military

engagement always will be based on less than perfect

information, often under extreme pressure of time. These

guidelines likely will be most helpful not in providing

specific answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize

available information."

Rumsfeld's doctrine generated widespread discussion and criticism as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq dragged on after initial successes in dislodging the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's army. In particular, critics noted that senior generals in the Pentagon had explicitly called for a much larger invading force in Iraq than the one sent by Rumsfeld in expectation that a larger force would be needed to impose peace on the country after the invasion.

In hindsight, Rumsfeld's vision of transformation of the US armed forces was nothing unique, either to the US or globally. Developing technologies and the changing landscape of insurgencies meant change was already occurring, and thus new tactical means would likely be necessary. However, to many critics, his actions and guidelines outlined in the Rumsfeld doctrine directly led to a prolonged conflict and many lives lost.

Bibliography

Dunne, Charles W. “Twenty Years after 'Mission Accomplished' in Iraq: A Critical Assessment.” Arab Center Washington DC, 2 May 2023, arabcenterdc.org/resource/twenty-years-after-mission-accomplished-in-iraq-a-critical-assessment/. Accessed 4 Sept. 2024.

Dyson, Stephen Benedict. Leaders in Conflict: Bush and Rumsfeld in Iraq. Manchester University Press, 2016.

Barry, John, et al. "A Plan Under Attack." Newsweek, vol. 141, no. 14, 7 Apr. 2003, p. 12.

Hartenian, Lawrence R. George W. Bush Administration Propaganda for an Invasion of Iraq: The Absence of Evidence. Routledge, 2023.

Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations," Naval War College Review, vol. 59, no. 4, 2006. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/6. Accessed 4 Sept. 2024.

Stover, William James. "Preemptive War: Implications of the Bush and Rumsfeld Doctrines." International Journal on World Peace, vol. 21, no.1, Mar. 2004, p. 12.