U.S. Congress Overrides Presidential Veto to Pass the War Powers Act
The War Powers Act, enacted in 1973, was a significant legislative response aimed at curbing presidential power regarding military engagements without congressional approval. This act emerged from concerns about the expanding authority of the executive branch, particularly noted during the Vietnam War. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress holds the power to declare war while the president serves as commander in chief, leading to a complex and often contentious relationship between the two branches. The Act mandates that the president must notify Congress within forty-eight hours of deploying troops and requires congressional approval for extended military actions beyond sixty days, with an additional thirty days allowed for safe withdrawal.
Despite its intention to foster better cooperation between Congress and the executive on military matters, the War Powers Act has faced criticism for its effectiveness. Many argue that it has not succeeded in ensuring that presidents adequately consult Congress during military crises. Furthermore, concerns about its constitutionality and the continuing tendency of presidents to act unilaterally in foreign military operations have led to ongoing debates about amending or repealing the Act. Since its passage, U.S. presidents have utilized the War Powers Act during various military interventions, but the tension between legislative oversight and executive action continues to be a point of contention in American politics.
U.S. Congress Overrides Presidential Veto to Pass the War Powers Act
Date November 7, 1973
The Vietnam War raised concerns about an “imperial presidency,” and the U.S. Congress moved to reassert its constitutional authority to curtail the war powers of the chief executive by overriding President Richard M. Nixon’s veto to pass the War Powers Act.
Also known as War Powers Resolution; War Powers Act of 1973; Public Law 93-148
Locale Washington, D.C.
Key Figures
Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994), president of the United States, 1969-1974Jacob K. Javits (1904-1986), U.S. senator from New York
Summary of Event
The War Powers Act of 1973 emerged as an effort to limit the power of the U.S. executive to make or declare war without congressional authorization before committing American forces overseas. Under Article I, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the right to declare war and raise troops, but Article II, section 2, states that the president acts as commander in chief. The division of powers between the legislative and executive branches became blurred with the outbreak of World War II and the escalation of the Cold War throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s. Congress wanted more cooperation between the executive and legislative branches in determining foreign policy decisions as the Vietnam conflict progressed.
Congress’s first attempt to curb presidential authority was the Case Act in 1972. This act required that the president make a report to Congress for international agreements within sixty days. However, the Case Act proved ineffective because of the executive’s flexibility—agreements could easily be repackaged as treaties or accords before submission to Congress.
The situation in Vietnam continued to escalate, and accusations that Richard M. Nixon’s presidential administration had falsified data in reports to Congress about clandestine activities, particularly the secret bombing campaigns in neighboring Cambodia and Laos, soon triggered a second action by Congress. Spearheaded by Republican senator Jacob K. Javits, along with a coalition of two other legislators, the War Powers Resolution was introduced for enactment. Supporters contended that the president should provide Congress with more information regarding the scope, cost, and military objectives of future foreign interventions by U.S. forces. If members disagreed with the president’s military goals, troops would then be withdrawn.
In July, 1973, both the House of Representatives (voting 284-135) and the Senate (voting 75-18) passed the War Powers Resolution to restrict presidential power. The provisions of the resolution stated that the president must report to Congress within forty-eight hours if American forces were to be sent into a foreign conflict; if the numbers of combat troops were to be increased greatly, Congress would need to approve the measure within sixty days. The deployment of forces could be extended another thirty days if the president provided an argument that more time was necessary for the safe evacuation of refugees or withdrawal of American troops. Detractors argued that the bill would imperil the nation in times of military crisis and that the resolution would infringe on the president’s authority as commander in chief during emergency situations. Nixon vetoed the bill, but Congress overrode the presidential veto and enacted the resolution on November 7, 1973.
Since the passage of the War Powers Act, U.S. presidents have submitted reports for congressional approval of military operations outside American borders. President Gerald R. Ford used the resolution to evacuate forces and refugees from Vietnam and, on May 15, 1975, to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez, a vessel that had been seized by the Cambodian navy three days earlier. Throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s, presidents issued congressional reports for the rescue of American hostages in Iran; for U.S. missions in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and Central America; and for the evacuation of forces from Grenada and Somalia. The resolution has been used for military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, and for military action taken after the terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C., and New York City on September 11, 2001. With the deployment of American military forces in Iraq and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, the War Powers Act has remained a controversial measure.
Significance
Questions regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Act continued to persist into the twenty-first century. Although the courts have not ruled directly on the constitutionality of the act, the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983) did address whether Congress has the right to exercise a legislative veto over an executive agency. Jagdish Chadha was a foreign-exchange student in Ohio studying political science. His parents were Indian in nationality, whereas he was born in Kenya. His student visa expired, and Chadha was threatened with deportation. The case hinged on Congress allowing the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) broad authority to determine deportations while the House and Senate still retain the ability to overrule immigration decisions by the INS. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not use this veto power because it violated principles of bicameralism and separation of powers.
Scholars contend that presidents still do not consult with Congress and are not predisposed to consider congressional interests in times of overseas conflict. Rather than restricting the use of armed forces, the War Powers Act allows the chief executive to pursue military objectives and to act unilaterally because of the ninety-day grace period for operations; Congress cannot force a withdrawal despite the enactment of this resolution. Some members of Congress have argued that the act has proven ineffective in improving communication between the legislative and executive branches and should be amended or repealed in its entirety.
Bibliography
Darling, W. Stuart, and D. Craig Mense. “Rethinking the War Powers Act.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 7 (1977): 126-136. Addresses the debate over the provisions of the War Powers Act and concludes that Congress and the president should have clearly defined expectations for the deployment of troops and overseas involvement. Argues that the act cannot anticipate every contingency, but it can help refine presidential foreign policy-making decisions.
Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Explores the evolution of executive war powers throughout American history and examines how Congress has attempted to restrict or place limits on these powers.
Grimmett, Richard F., ed. The War Powers Resolution. New York: Novinka Books, 2002. Collection of essays examines the uses of the War Powers Act from 1975 through 2001 and the issuing of reports from the administrations of Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush.
Howell, William G. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006. Examines the influence of political institutions, conditions, and relations between the executive and judicial branches of the U.S. government on presidential policy making in the late twentieth century.
Javits, Jacob K. Who Makes War: The President Versus Congress. New York: William Morris, 1973. The senator’s memoir provides Javits’s own perspective on the introduction and passage of the War Powers Act.
Johnson, Robert David. Congress and the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Presents a historical interpretation of Congress during the Cold War period, making use of research conducted in several manuscript collections not open to scholars in the past. Challenges the perception that Congress was weak and ineffective against the executive branch by analyzing spending measures, the internal workings of various subcommittees, and how specific legislators influenced international policy.
Nathan, James A. “Revising the War Powers Act.” Armed Forces and Society 17 (Summer, 1991): 513-543. Contends that the War Powers Act contains ambiguities that confound the relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government. Argues that improvements to the provisions of the statute and timeliness of its applications during a military undertaking would help resolve these issues.
Thomas, Ann Van Wynen, and A. J. Thomas. The War-Making Powers of the President. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1982. Presents a historical and analytic treatise on presidential versus congressional authority to conduct military action abroad.