Psychophysical parallelism

The psychophysical refers to a relationship between the physical and the nonphysical, the internal response and the external stimuli. Psychosocial parallelism, otherwise known as parallelism, is the philosophical theory that the mind and body exist in preestablished harmony. This is a relationship in which mental and bodily events occur without a causal relationship, occurring independently but inseparably. This theory is somewhat controversial, as it seems to deny the possibility of free will, as the actions of the mind and the body are already established and synchronized. Psychophysical parallelism has become a foundation of current theories in the discourse of the mind-body problem.

Background

Parallelism was a response to a heated philosophical debate taking place in the 1850s. At the time, philosophers were struggling with what is known as the mind-body problem, the understanding of how mental states and processes, such as beliefs and thoughts, are related to physical states and processes, given that the mind is inherently nonphysical. At the time, materialism was a reigning philosophy, which argued that all mental processes were the result of physical processes, citing a direct, causal relationship. When asking about the origin of mental processes such as thoughts or beliefs, materialists believed that the physical was the primary cause and that the mind was secondary, in essence, a reaction of the physical.

Part of the controversy regarding materialism was the aim of its proponents to weaken religious doctrine, which relies on the soul being separate and independent of body processes. Rene Descartes (1596–1650), the father of dualism, argued that there are two foundations, mind and body, and that the mind can exist outside the body while the body alone is unable to think. This philosophy was favored in Christian theology, which maintains that the soul exists in a separate state that is distinct from the physical world. This was further supported by the philosophical concept of idealism, which asserts that reality and action are the results of the mind, challenging materialist theories that failed to prioritize the mind.

German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) first suggested parallelism in the early eighteenth century. He described the body and the mind like two clocks, side by side, synchronized in perfect time. This was interconnected to his theory of monadology, in which he concluded that the universe was composed of an infinite number of units called monads, the building blocks of life. Monads exist in a hierarchy, and humans possess monads capable of the highest levels of thinking. Leibniz theorized that monads could not be influenced by forces outside themselves. When it was perceived that a monad caused a reaction, it is because other monads are created in such a way to seem like they are being affected. According to Leibniz, the universe, as created by God, was shaped to be in preestablished harmony, and no interaction between monads, or the mind and body, are necessary because they are already synchronized.

Psychophysical parallelism, introduced by Leibniz, was made popular by German physicist and philosopher Gustav Theodor Fechner in his work, The Elements of Psychophysics, in the 1860s. Fechner rejected any theological components of the initial theory but maintained the conclusion that mental and physical states are not causally related. He also argued that, while they are causally independent, they are still functionally dependent on each other.

Impact

Psychosocial parallelism allowed philosophers to engage simultaneously in both materialism and idealism without major conflict between the two philosophies. The conclusion that the physical and the metaphysical were not causally related did not presuppose any other facets of the nature of this interaction. It also argued about the functional dependence of these states, in which the mental and the physical are still aspects of the same entity, that is a human being.

In the 1920s, John B. Watson argued a new theory: that behavior does not have any mental causes. Rather, any behaviors are the result of observable, outside stimuli. This theory continued developing through the work of American psychologist B. F Skinner and others, cataloguing the causal relationships between stimuli and behavioral responses. In this viewpoint, the mind-body problem disappears, as there is no interaction to debate.

However, there are weaknesses to this theory. As the study of psychology has grown and expanded, so has the understanding of the complexity regarding various mental processes and their relationship to behaviors. In the 1950s, two schools of thought began to form. The first argued that the mind-body problem was one that would never be understood fully despite how much we know about the functions of the brain. The second argues that advances in neuroscience are getting us closer to a full understanding, despite knowing that science does not claim to understand everything. These two approaches demonstrated the doubts that dualism and materialism had exhausted the realm of philosophical possibilities when it came to explaining the mind-body problem.

In the 1980s, a new school of thought arose that was completely separate from that of dualism and materialism. Functionalism argues that mental states are organized solely by their functional role and have causal relationships between other, differing mental states. In this view, it is not the substance that matters, but how these parts are fitted together in a whole. It also disregards the physical aspects and focuses only on mental processes.

While the mind-body problem still exists, current philosophies are continuing evolutions of the old, broadening and focusing on the tenets of dualism, materialism, and parallelism. While Fechner's established psychophysical parallelism may not be at the forefront of this debate, you can see its foundation in the works of Moritz Schlick's critical realism and Rudolf Carnap's radical solution to the "essence problem," which then becomes the foundation for Herbert Feigl's theories. Feigl took the next step away from parallelism to the identity theory, which argued that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain, but he does not hold that the mind and the brain are identical.

Psychophysical parallelism, despite first being suggested in the early eighteenth century, became a philosophical foundation for the continuing theories attempting to explain the mind-body problem. Even the newest arguments are rooted in a long-standing tradition. Psychosocial parallelism remains a foundational philosophy for modern discourse and the continuing quagmire of the mind-body problem.

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