Democracy: The Elitist Perspective

What are the dynamics of the modern democracy as it relates to the elitist perspective? This essay takes a closer look at this question, incorporating the ideas offered by Joseph Schumpeter and his contemporaries. In doing so, the reader will glean a greater understanding of the elitist debate as it pertains to the modern democratic regime.

Keywords Advantage; Bourgeoisie; Capitalism; Electoral College; Elite; Incumbency; Redistricting

Sociology > Politics & Government > Democracy: The Elitist Perspective

Overview

Joseph Schumpeter & His Work

The Austrian-born American economist Joseph Schumpeter was no stranger to duality. Indeed, despite the unstable and fractured Austro-Hungarian Empire under which he lived with political turmoil on the horizon, he was free to explore his personal and academic interests in his early 20th century environs. An outspoken critic of World War I, he would become the Austrian Minister of Finance, a post from which he would be removed when inflation spiraled out of control. Not very long afterward, the rise of Adolf Hitler's fascist regime drove him away from Europe and into the United States.

In light of his experience in service to the Empire, Schumpeter formulated a political ideology that clearly had a distrust of liberal democracies governed by the will of the public citizenry. In fact, he once offered his views of liberal democracy and autocracy in a religious context: "It is not true that democracy will always safeguard freedom of conscience better than autocracy," he said. "Witness the most famous of all trials. Pilate was, from the standpoint of the Jews, certainly the representative of autocracy. Yet he tried to protect freedom. And he yielded to a democracy" (Schumpeter, 1996).

Based on his flight from the Nazi regime and his well-known love of entrepreneurialism and capitalism, Schumpeter was not an adherent of autocratic or totalitarian rule. He simply saw cause for skepticism in the successful allowance by democratic government for consistent infiltration and influence by those ill-qualified to govern. His views were certainly unorthodox, particularly in a time of great political and economic upheaval. However, his contributions to political science as well as economics remain as relevant and important today as they did in the early to mid-20th century.

Since Schumpeter’s time, liberal democratic institutions and free market capitalist economies have not simply outlived socialist and communist trends — they have thrived in the face of these latter systems' decline. In fact, a great many nations formerly under the veil of Soviet-style communism have seen enormous strides toward political stability as well as economic development by looking westward to western Europe and North America for both inspiration and partnerships. Less developed nations in Africa, south Asia, and Latin America have also adopted democratic institutions similar to the representative democracies found in the United States, Canada, and Europe.

Then again, there are elements of modern democratic national systems that are less inspirational. Poverty, homelessness, social inequality, and political corruption do exist within most democratic institutions, just as they do in other systems. Indeed, in systems in which socio-economic classes are stratified, there have been consistent concerns about elitism among social and political activists. Among them are Schumpeter, Karl Marx, and Frederick Engels, who were not speaking against any one system as a whole but warning about the dangers of disenfranchising large segments of the population for the sake of economic or political progress.

What are the dynamics of the modern democracy as it relates to the elitist perspective? This essay takes a closer look at this question, incorporating the ideas offered by Schumpeter and his contemporaries. In doing so, the reader will glean a greater understanding of the elitist debate as it pertains to the modern democratic regime.

The Elitist Perspective

Joseph Schumpeter possessed a sharp business acumen as well as a profound appreciation of capitalism and entrepreneurialism, a characteristic that no doubt evolved from his childhood, during which his parents owned and operated a thriving textile factory. The ongoing debate over socialism and its relationship to economics piqued his intellectual curiosity, allowing him to ponder over the links between democracy, capitalism, and socialism. His most famous work, "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy," explores these three concepts in the aggregate — as socialism was introduced in contrast to capitalism, and democracy developed, in his view, concurrently with capitalism.

This latter argument, that capitalism grew historically in coordination with democracy, suggests that those who created and nurtured the capitalist mentality and therefore developed its institutions also fostered the democratic system to help protect and grow capitalism. Of course, Schumpeter explained, capitalism was introduced and maintained by a bourgeoisie, or elite, class — it only follows, then, that democracy would in turn be developed by and for the purpose of serving the interests of the ruling class — citing the fact that legislative bodies are not composed of ordinary citizens but upper-class citizens delegated to represent them. Schumpeter further asserted that capitalism and democracy, although issuing some socially positive legislation, are ill-prepared to put social laws "for the benefit of the masses" ahead of the perpetuation of capitalist and democratic institutions (Elliott, 1994).

Schumpeter was, of course, not alone in his perspective, nor was he a pioneer on such issues. The notion that Western liberal democracies were dominated not by the people but by a small handful of members of an elite socioeconomic class was, of course, introduced nearly a century earlier by Marx and Engels in their seminal work, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party." To Marx and Engels, democracy sprang from a feudal system that had been in existence long before it. While there was already in place a class system, the introduction of modern industry gave new life and new divisions to that class system, giving greater strength to the elite (who were the chief operators of that industry) and taking away from the lower classes. In fact, Marx and Engels asserted that the fact that this bourgeoisie, which was the product of this continuing trend toward economic development and capitalism, was also responsible for the development of liberal democratic systems. These systems, they suggest, not only serve and entrench the elite socioeconomic class, but help to detach the upper from the lower classes so that they become largely irrelevant (Marx & Engels, 2005).

There is an ongoing debate as to whether the views of Marx and Engel, and later Schumpeter, are verifiable in the present day. This paper next explores this in greater light by examining the system in place within what is perceived to be the icon of liberal democracy: the United States.

The Electoral College

From its beginnings, the United States of America was a nation to be governed by a system that was built for, by and of the people. Every elected legislator, as well as the President, would be responsive to the needs of his or her constituents first and foremost. Then again, the process by which these elections would take place was intended to be far more complex than a simple popular vote.

Under the Second Article of the Constitution, each state is required to appoint a number of individuals who would, in turn, elect a President. The number of Electors each state would have would be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which each state is entitled under the election system. The rules under which Electors would be appointed, however, would not be clearly defined in the Constitution — Senators and Representatives themselves would set the criteria. The Elector's vote would be transmitted to the Congress, along with every other Elector's ballot, which would then count the Electoral votes to select the President (Tansill, 1987).

The Electoral College, as it is known, seems superfluous and unnecessary at first glance. In fact, a simple, popular-based vote was suggested at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, but was voted down for an unusual reason. Southern states had received extra representation because slaves (who did not vote) were counted among the population — if a popular vote took place, the advantage southern states (whose economic contributions were considered invaluable) enjoyed would be nullified. In the interests of compromise and efficiency, the Founders developed the Electoral College, believing that since General George Washington would likely be the first President anyway, development of an electoral system at that time was not necessary (Waldman, 2008).

There have only been a few instances in US history during which a presidential candidate won the popular vote but not the Electoral College (or vice versa). Arguably, the most controversial of these was the 2000 election, during which former Governor George Bush defeated former Vice President Al Gore by an Electoral College vote of 271–266 (Gore won the popular vote by more than 500,000). That election sparked a raging fire of public and political sentiment that the Electoral College, however well-intentioned in 1787, was confusing and unnecessary and, in the minds of many, needed to be abolished altogether.

The Electoral College debate seems to add fuel to the fire started by Marx, Engels, and Schumpeter — without direct popular voting as the singular mechanism whereby the President is elected to power, the elite seem to have control over the government. There is no federal statute determining how Electors should be appointed, which potentially opens the door for upper-echelon cadres to determine the next President rather than the individual voters. Additionally, the fact that candidates tend to come from major parties and not as individuals means that these Electors are not voting for an individual but a party slate. This situation adds to the view held by some that the American system actually creates a disconnect between the people and their government, which in turn is organized and run by a minority elite class.

Changing the Electoral Process

The case of the Electoral College and its relevance to the elitist perspective offered by Schumpeter and his predecessors, however, is not completely supportive. The Electoral College may support this theory insofar as a special system was created that conceptually disconnects the voters from the Presidency. To abolish it, as many activists advocate, would require that a complex, long-lasting process be initiated (akin to the amendment ratification process). With such an entrenched system in place, the elitist argument is somewhat validated. Then again, the lack of defined rules for appointing Electors leaves states and their Legislators to determine for themselves how these Electors are elevated to their posts. In this arena, the elitist perspective begins to show cracks.

For example, a growing number of states are passing rules that would require the Elector to vote in accordance with the popular vote of his or her state. In 2007, Maryland became the first to pass a "National Popular Vote" law, and Illinois and Hawaii quickly followed suit a month later (Wheeler, 2007). By 2013, ten states had enacted such laws (nationalpopularvote.com, 2012).

The point to be made here is that although the Founders created a Presidential election system that allowed for a concentrated, elite social group to in effect choose the next leader of the free world, the question of whether the country's liberal democracy is in fact governed by the social elite is not easily answered. After all, there are only a few examples of Presidential elections in which the Electoral College overruled the popular vote, and the most 2000 election sparked a push to either abolish it or use it for the public good.

Life in Congress

If the system by which Presidents are selected suggests elitism and a detachment from the individual voter, the Congressional elections may be considered more connectible in this regard. Of course, there is a question of how the House and Senate conduct themselves once elected, and it is in this arena that one might see cause again to invoke the spirits of Schumpeter, Marx, and Engels.

In 2006, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, fears of economic tumult, and other issues pertaining largely to the Presidency of Republican George W. Bush led to a tidal wave of Democratic victories in the House and Senate, as well as a large number of gubernatorial races. The election saw a fundamental shift in the partisan makeup of Capitol Hill as well as across the country. Democrats took 30 seats in the House and six in the Senate, as well as six gubernatorial offices and countless state legislative posts. Considered a "wave election," it represented one of the few times in modern US history that a sizable number of incumbent House and Senate members were ousted by challengers.

The issues at stake are considered by many to be the primary cause of the "tsunami" election of 2006. In truth, incumbency in Congress has been an incredible asset for legislators; the incumbents frequently win reelection, often by large margins. This "incumbency advantage" remains an important factor in the American political system.

Under the concept of the incumbency advantage, those who have won an election once tend to win reelection with greater ease than the margins by which they won their first campaign. There are many contributing factors, many of which center around familiarity with the individual and his or her accomplishments, whether recent or long in the past (DeWitt, 2007). Among these attributes is the recognition the incumbent enjoys in his or her district as the result of his or her service. In this field, incumbents hold a distinct advantage over challengers that, in most electoral cases, prove daunting (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000).

With such an advantage, incumbents have felt less need to campaign as zealously as do challengers (Howell & Oiler, 1981). Additionally, because much of their solidity in their posts comes from their ability to deliver home budget earmarks (so-called pork) and use the media, Internet and other technological outlets to highlight their legislative accomplishments, ensuring that the they are in the minds of the voters long before Election Day is less arduous a task than it would be for would-be challengers to take the spotlight.

If the incumbency advantage appears to elevate legislators above the democratic process, it also helps modify the voting base to solidify their hold on their Congressional seat even further. Every 10 years, state legislatures (using US Census data) update and sometimes redraw state legislative and Congressional district boundaries, a practice known as "redistricting." As these legislative bodies maintain strong connections to their Congressional delegation (via the aforementioned pork projects), legislators have long been able to work with their state counterparts to ensure that such redistricting creates districts whose demographic and ideological compositions are favorable to the their reelection efforts. In fact, the introduction of sophisticated mapping software and associated technology means that legislators are even more well-suited to "cherry-pick" their constituents (Mahtesian, 2006). In other words, Schumpeter, Marx, and Engels might have felt validated in applying their theories to the life of an American Congressperson — in their view, those officials become entrenched in their posts by virtue of their incumbency, and this solidification is largely perpetuated through the manipulation of the democratic system.

Conclusions

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels grew embittered with what they saw as the divisive elements of capitalism and democracy. They were not seeking the destruction of democracy and capitalism — rather, they sought to reconnect previously disenfranchised social groups, specifically the workers and the impoverished, to the government and economy that was dominated by an elite class.

Had these three iconic political and economic philosophers had an opportunity to study the American political system, they might have found indisputable validation of their views, particularly pertaining to the elitist perspective. After all, the Electoral College was created as a compromise to underpopulated but still invaluable members of the new nation — today, it exists as an antiquated reflection of a process that at its genesis was ultimately expected to be revised. The 2000 election transformed an issue among historians and political scientists into a pressing concern for all Americans.

Congress has also provided some evidence of the elitist perspective. The fact that so few incumbent Representatives and Senators have been ousted by challengers in the last several decades already supports charges of elitism in Congress. Further supporting evidence comes from the idea that Congresspeople and their supporters in the states they represent often modify the constitution of their districts to ensure that these legislators remain in office.

It is perhaps due to the fact that Schumpeter, Marx, and Engels did not see a politically active constituency in their own political systems that they might not understand the incompleteness of an application of their theories in the modern United States. Indeed, the issue centering around the Electoral College has given rise to a national debate (including those who are not political scientists), and while many believe a relevant change to the Constitution might be in order, many more have actually circumvented the issue by adding a purely democratic element to the Electoral College, removing a large percentage of that perceived elitism. Similarly, in Congress, the incumbency rule continues to provide longevity to elected officials' tenures. Once again, however, the people are the "x-factor" — the 2006 mid-term elections, which was certainly atypical, represented a sea-change from the effects of the incumbency advantage, as a record number of incumbents were removed from office by challengers who, only a few years earlier, had little chance of achieving such a goal.

As gleaned from this paper, whether the United States provides concrete evidence of the elitist perspective is at best debatable. However, what is clear is that, in the American system, politics is a dynamic concept, subject to change based not on entrenched leaders but by the citizens themselves.

Terms & Concepts

Bourgeoisie: In Marxist terms, the elite social class.

Capitalism: Economic system defined by private ownership of property.

Electoral College: American political system whereby Presidency is determined by a select group of appointed individuals.

Elite: Sociological term for a small, dominant group within a larger society.

Incumbency Advantage: Theory which suggests that elected officials are less likely to be ousted because of their elected status.

Redistricting: Practice of updating or redrawing legislative districts based on population shifts.

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Suggested Reading

Brown, L. (2012). How close is too close?: The 2012 election in the electoral college. Society, 49, 418–422. Retrieved October 24, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=79448314

Burnham, W.D. (1987). Elections as democratic institutions. Society, 24, 38–48. Retrieved June 22, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=10979117&site=ehost-live

Graeber, D. (2011). Value, politics and democracy in the United States. Current Sociology, 59, 186–199. Retrieved October 24, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=59196391

Hartvigsen, D. (2007). The manipulation of voting systems. Journal of Business Ethics, 80, 13–21. Retrieved June 23, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Business Source Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=31892213&site=ehost-live

Klemp, N. (2007). An aristocracy of manipulators. Conference Papers — New England Political Science Association, 1. Retrieved June 22, 2008, from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=26974430&site=ehost-live

Robinson, W. (2007). Democracy or polyarchy? NACLA Report on the Americas, 40, 32–45. Retrieved June 23, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=23618093&site=ehost-live

Roshwald, M. (2003). Democracy and elite. Modern Age, 45, 147–154. Retrieved June 23, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=10196313&site=ehost-live