George F. Kennan
George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was a prominent American diplomat and historian known for his significant contributions to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. After studying at Princeton University and training as a foreign service officer, he joined the U.S. embassy in Moscow in 1933. Kennan developed a critical perspective on the Soviet Union, which he articulated in his influential "Long Telegram" in 1946, where he expressed skepticism about the potential for U.S.-Soviet friendship and called for a strong American response to Soviet ambitions.
His subsequent article, published in 1947 under the pseudonym "X" in Foreign Affairs, outlined the strategy of containment, arguing that a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military efforts could mitigate the Soviet threat. Kennan believed that while the Soviet Union posed a persistent nuisance, it was not an unstoppable force and would eventually decline. Despite the nuanced recommendations in his writings, American policymakers largely adopted a more aggressive stance toward the Soviets. Kennan's influence on foreign policy peaked in the late 1940s, and he later transitioned to work as a diplomatic historian until his passing. His legacy remains a subject of discussion in the context of American diplomacy and Cold War strategies.
George F. Kennan
- Born: February 16, 1904
- Birthplace: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
- Died: March 17, 2005
- Place of death: Princeton, New Jersey
Kennan was the foremost expert on the Soviet Union in the U.S. Department of State during the 1940’s. His containment policy helped frame the American Cold War debate for decades.
Born in Wisconsin in 1904, George F. Kennan attended New Jersey’s Princeton University and then trained as a foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State. After Russian language training in Latvia, he joined the staff of the U.S. embassy in Moscow when the Soviet Union was recognized by the United States in 1933. His attitude toward the Soviets was based on a deep disdain for Marxism and a consistent belief that firm pressure on the Soviet Union would allow the United States to blunt the impact of Soviet ambitions worldwide.
During the period from 1944 to 1946, Kennan became exasperated by the actions of American officials who were assuming that an era of Soviet-American friendship was possible. He responded with the famous “Long Telegram” of 1946, a blistering eight-thousand-word indictment of Soviet methods and goals. The harsh tone he employed tended to obscure the fact that Kennan maintained that moderate measures were sufficient to deal with the Soviet challenge.
Kennan’s telegram ignited a great deal of discussion in Washington, D.C., and he was recalled from Moscow and given the task of leading an entirely new agency within the Department of State, the Policy Planning Staff. Some of the keenest minds in American diplomacy and military affairs were founding members of this agency, and they churned out a steady stream of policy papers examining both long-range strategy and urgent crises.
The “X Article”
In 1947, Kennan had the opportunity to publish an article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Foreign Affairs magazine. Because State Department employees were not allowed to write for external publications, his article appeared under the byline “X”; it has ever since been known as the “X Article.”
Kennan’s article analyzed the factors that motivated Soviet leaders and examined their views of the world. He believed that the mix of Marxism-Leninism and traditional Russian suspicion and xenophobia guaranteed that U.S.-Soviet relations would remain tense for an extended period of time. Kennan also believed that as long as the major industrial areas of the world were kept out of the Soviets’ grasp, the Soviets would be a persistent nuisance but not a dire threat. The industrial zone of Germany was a region that the Soviets coveted, but Japan, Great Britain, and North America were not realistic targets for Soviet power.
Kennan argued that containment of the Soviets could be accomplished by using a multifaceted diplomatic, economic, and military strategy. Once this strategy was in place, the Soviets would be worn down. Their grip on the satellite nations of Eastern Europe would loosen, and after that the Russians would grow weary of the failed promises of communism. The imposing edifice of Soviet communism would either gradually erode or suffer a sudden collapse. Keenan maintained that the United States would prevail amid the Soviet breakdown, but Americans would need a steady resolve and a great deal of patience in order to wait out the decline.
Impact
Kennan’s “X Article” was a carefully thought out and extremely subtle appraisal of the state of the world in 1947. However, this subtlety was its undoing. American policy makers were willing to embrace Kennan’s grim portrayal of the Soviets, but they ignored his recommendations for dealing with the Soviet Union. Kennan would repeatedly point this out, but his remonstrances fell on deaf ears. His influence on American foreign policy peaked in 1947 and 1948, and he left the State Department in 1953. After that, he continued to work as a diplomatic historian and pundit until his death in 2005.
Bibliography
Hixson, Walter L. George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
Kennan, George F. Memoirs. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.
Polley, Michael. A Biography of George F. Kennan: The Education of a Realist. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.