Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI)
The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) is a U.S. anti-terrorism program launched in 2002 in response to the September 11 attacks, aimed at enhancing security in four Sahelian countries: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. With an investment of nearly $8 million over two years, the initiative focused on providing military training and equipment to local armed forces to combat terrorism, specifically targeting the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), which later rebranded itself as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The PSI sought to strengthen the capacity of these countries to monitor and address suspicious movements across their porous borders, which were vulnerable to infiltration by Islamist militants.
In addition to military training, the initiative aimed to foster cooperation between military and civilian officials across the participating nations, thereby enhancing regional peace and security. While the PSI was relatively low-profile, it marked an important step in U.S. engagement in West Africa, setting the stage for the larger Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative that followed. The Sahel region itself, characterized by its unique ecological and socio-economic challenges, has a population of around 109 million, with significant issues stemming from agricultural overuse and cyclical droughts affecting livelihoods. The PSI reflects broader U.S. national security interests in addressing terrorism and supporting regional stability in this strategic area.
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Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI)
Summary: A year after the attacks of 9/11, the United States launched a small-scale, little-noted anti-terrorism campaign called the Pan-Sahel Initiative, involving four countries just to the south of the Sahara Desert: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. The initiative involved American troops normally stationed in Europe providing training and equipment to six light infantry companies in the armed forces of these four countries. Their main target was al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, focused mainly on Algeria.
In 2002, the United States launched a military training program called the Pan-Sahel Initiative to provide military anti-terrorism training to forces in a band of countries just south of the Sahara Desert. The four main countries involved in the program were Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.
The little-publicized program received slightly under $8 million over two years. PSI was administered by the State Department, which, in turn, used the money to finance American military units headquartered in Europe to conduct the training of soldiers from the four countries.
A major target of the PSI were Islamists operating in Algeria under the name Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). This organization subsequently changed its name to al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, signifying its ideological alignment with the fundamentalist Islamist al Qaeda group led by Osama bin Laden and based in Afghanistan/Pakistan.
While the Salafist Call/al Qaeda in Maghreb was active principally in Algeria, the borders between the states of North Africa and the tier of countries just to the south were largely porous. Many sources said that Islamist guerrilla/terrorists had taken refuge in states like Mali.
Further complicating the security picture in this tier of Africa was the crisis in Darfur, which saw refugees from western Sudan entering Chad, sometimes pursued by Arab Janjaweed militias.
About the Sahel
The Sahel is the east-west band of territory that separates the Sahara desert to the north from the tropical savannahs to the south. There are nine countries in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal). In general, the lands of the Sahel are highly sensitive to agricultural activities, including grazing; over-use and slight variations in rainfall can subject the soil to devastating wind erosion, especially on the edges of the Sahara.
The countries of the Sahel have a total population of around 109 million. Per-capita income in all averages under $3,000 per year. Unusually heavy precipitation during the 1960s led to over-use of the land; drought in the 1970s and 1980s led to economic disaster for many of the region's farmers and cattle growers. An estimated 100,000 people died of starvation, while 20 million others had their livelihoods threatened.
In announcing the Pan-Sahel Initiative in November 2002, the Bush administration described it as "a State [Department]-led effort to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and responding to the suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment, and cooperation. Its goals support two U.S. national security interests in Africa: waging the war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security. PSI will assist participating countries in countering known terrorist operations and border incursions, as well as the trafficking of people, illicit materials, and other goods. Accompanying the training and material support will be a program to bring military and civilian officials from the four countries together to encourage greater cooperation and information exchange within and among the governments of the region on counter-terrorism and border security issues."
The State Department's role and civilian goals notwithstanding, the principal thrust of activities on the ground was military training.
A year after PSI was announced, the Voice of America reported that activities were "at last under way" in Mali. Training got underway in Mauritania, Chad, and Niger in the same time frame.
In March 2004, soldiers from the US Special Operations Command Europe were training troops in three Mali cities-Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu. Soldiers from the Stuttgart-based 10th Special Forces Group also trained Mali soldiers.
In March 2004, the US State Department quoted Army Colonel Victor Nelson, who was overseeing the program, as saying, "PSI is an important tool against the war on terrorism and has gone a long way to open doors and strengthen relationships -notably between Algeria and Mali, Niger and Chad-in a region we have largely ignored in the past."
A State Department press release on Mar. 23, 2004, quoted Colonel Nelson describing one successful action undertaken in that month. "PSI and the six companies (of soldiers trained by the Americans) had some impact in the field in the operation against GSPC. And you saw that brilliantly displayed by the fact that [a GSPC leader, Abderrazak] Le Para, on the run from Malian and Algerian forces, ran all the way through Niger, whose security forces picked his trail up and ran him into Chad, whose forces attacked and destroyed elements of his band" on March 9, 2004. GSPC suffered forty-five killed and five captured, according to Nelson. Le Para was later captured and turned over to Algeria. Since then, GSPC adopted the name al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; it remained active in the region.
Following 2004, the PSI was succeeded by the much larger Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, funded initially with $100 million over five years, though still active in the 2020s. This initiative also included Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, and Nigeria, as well as the original four PSI countries. The aim of the program continued to be developing institutions within those countries that are capable of preventing and responding to terrorist activities.
Bibliography
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership - United States Department of State. (2019, Feb. 14). State Department. Retrieved Oct. 8, 2023, from https://www.state.gov/trans-sahara-counterterrorism-partnership
Waging War on Terror: The Implications of America's 'New Imperialism' for Saharan Peoples. Journal of North African Studies. 10:3/4. (Sep.-Dec. 2005)
Special Forces Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa." FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database. Mar. 8, 2004
Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security Assistance. 109:19. (Mar. 10, 2005)
Fighting Terrorism in Africa. 108:82. (Apr. 1, 2004)
From Small Acorns. Middle East. Issue 373. (Dec. 2006)
America's African Rifles. Atlantic Monthly. 295:3. (Apr. 2005)
U.S. Steps Up Counter-terrorism Training in the Sahel. Jane's Intelligence Review. 16:11. (Nov. 2004)
U.S. Focus on Central Sahara." Jane's Intelligence Review. 18:11. (Nov. 2006)