Abyei

Summary: Abyei is a heavily contested region in Sudan between South Sudan and Sudan. Despite the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement intended to end the prolonged Sudanese civil war, it remained unclear whether Abyei would secede with South Sudan or remain a part of North Sudan. Agro-pastoralist members (farmers) of the Dinka Ngok Tribe inhabiting Abyei favored joining an independent South Sudan. Members of the Misseriya Tribe, a nomadic Arab people, had long grazed their cattle into Abyei during the dry season and were opposed to joining South Sudan, fearing the loss of this right. The tension in the area endured through the early twenty-first century.

Overview: Abyei is a 10,546 square kilometer (4,072 square miles) region of Sudan claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. Comprised of more than 140,000 people, Abyei is inhabited by members of the ethnically Southern Dinka Ngok Tribe, who have long farmed the land, and the ethnically northern Misseriya, an Arab Tribe that relies on Abyei to graze its large herds of cattle during the dry season. The conflict over Southern Sudan's independence should not be confused with another long-standing conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan.

Several elements contribute to the conflict over Abyei:

• Ethnicity: The ethnically southern Dinka Ngok are Black Africans, while the ethnically northern Misseriya are Arabs.
• Religion: Most Dinka Ngok are either animists or Christians, whereas the Misseriya are Muslim.
• Economics: The Dinka Ngok are farmers, while the Misseriya cattle herders have long relied on Abyei for grazing.
• Oil: This issue emerged after the start of the civil war when significant oil deposits were discovered in the region.

The Dinka Ngok have been among the staunchest supporters of South Sudan's independence, but the Misseriya oppose the inclusion of Abyei because they fear losing their right to graze their herds. When the Second Sudanese Civil War began in 1983, the Misseriya were one of the first tribes to receive arms from the government in Khartoum to fight rebels in the south fighting for independence.

In 2005, the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLMA/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) designed to end the two-decade civil war, develop democratic governance, and share oil revenues. The agreement also set a timetable for a referendum that would allow the people of South Sudan to decide whether to remain part of Sudan or to become independent. In January 2011, South Sudan voted overwhelmingly (over 98 percent) in favor of independence, and though South Sudan gained independence the same year, the tensions over Abyei continued.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) left the status of Abyei unsettled. There was no decision on whether it would continue as part of northern Sudan or secede with the independent state. The CPA did, however, devote a protocol to The Resolution of the Abyei Conflict that agreed Abyei is:

"1.1.1. A bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan;

• 1.1.2. The territory is defined as the area of the nine Dinka Ngok chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905;
• 1.1.3. The Misseriya and other nomadic people retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei."

The protocol stipulated that during the interim period, before the referendum of independence, Abyei would be granted "special administrative status," whereby residents of Abyei would be considered citizens of both Western Kordofan—a region considered part of north Sudan—and Bahr el Ghazal—an area in Southern Sudan. At the end of the interim period, a second, separate referendum was to be held at the same time as the referendum for Southern Sudan to allow residents of Abyei to choose whether Abyei would retain its special administrative status in the north or be part of Bahr el Ghazal and secede with the rest of Southern Sudan in July 2011. However, the CPA left two issues unresolved: the precise borders of Abyei and who would be eligible to vote in the Abyei referendum. Regarding voter eligibility, the Dinka Ngok argued that only people who resided in the area without interruption for an extended period should be eligible to vote; that would exclude the Misseriya, most of whom are seasonal residents. The Misseriya, in turn, strongly rejected the Dinka Ngok's position, arguing that without a voice in Abyei's future, their right to enter the region with their cattle herds would be in jeopardy.

The protocol also dictated that Abyei's borders would be determined by an Abyei Border Commission, organized by President Omar al-Bashir Omar Hassan al-Bashir of North Sudan. These borders would significantly affect the independence referendum, as they would determine whether Abyei's majority would be Dinka Ngok or Misseriya. After much controversy, President Omar al-Bashir and the president of autonomous Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, agreed to refer the dispute over Abyei's boundaries to international arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.

In July 2009, following a hearing of both positions, the arbitral panel issued a new ruling that redrew the borders and effectively shrank the size of Abyei. The redrawn boundaries gave the region's richest oil fields to north Sudan while giving control of the remaining region, with at least one oil field, to the south. Broadly accepted by the Ngok Dinka, the ruling proved unsatisfactory to the Misseriya, who were left mainly outside the redrawn borders, increasing the likelihood that Abyei would vote in favor of secession. The Dinka Ngok interpreted the ruling as meaning that they are residents of Abyei, not most Misseriya, and entitled to vote in the Abyei referendum. The Misseriya have also accused the Sudan People's Liberation Army of restricting their migrations by imposing time limits, insisting that they travel unarmed, blocking some migration routes, and levying taxes.

With crucial issues in Abyei still unresolved, the North Sudanese army began increasing the number of troops in Abyei in May 2010, especially in the far northern region around the Diffra oil field—a move that seems to challenge the terms of the CPA. This military deployment also bolsters the argument that oil is a significant factor in the Abyei conflict. Talks over details of the Abyei referendum, scheduled for January 2011, were canceled in October 2010. Tensions rose, and in May, five thousand Armed Forces of Sudan soldiers seized control of the region, leading to violent conflict. The UN deployed a unit to aid in peace and protect civilians. Still, the southern chief administrator of Abyei was removed from office, and the President of northern Sudan appointed a northern administrator.

From the mid-2010s to the mid-2020s, the Abyei region was host to an exceptional escalation of violence, with nearly all instances involving civilians. Of all the regions in this area of Sudan, Abyei experienced the highest fatalities, mostly from militia conflicts. When South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the oil-rich Abyei Administrative Area gained even more value for the north and south, spurring increased violence. In 2023, the violence was noted by The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project to be particularly deadly in the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka towns. While monitoring the country, the United National Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), primarily composed of Ethiopian soldiers, noted the presence of South Sudanese soldiers in Abyei, raising concern the conflicts would only escalate.

Role of Oil.

Some analysts argued that the Abyei conflict hinged on who would control the lucrative Heglig oil field—the main oil deposit in Sudan. In 2011, however, the International Crisis Group concluded that the dispute over Abyei was "not primarily about oil, as the fields currently in Abyei only constitute a very small percentage of Sudan's total production" following the 2009 Court of Arbitration ruling.

In late April 2011, Sudanese Omar Hassan al-Bashir declared that "Abyei is northern and will remain northern" and that if there is any attempt by the south to secede Abyei, he will not recognize the south's independence. This high-risk strategy indicates that President Bashir will not rely on democratic means to solve the Abyei issue and will threaten civil war. On May 8, 2011, the International Crisis Group in Belgium warned that "Abyei is on the brink of dangerous new conflict that risks escalation of violent confrontation between security forces and other armed proxies from North and South Sudan on the eve of Southern independence."

Main Players. Both ethnic groups contesting Abyei have militias or are supported by larger groups in Sudan and South Sudan, including:

• National Congress Party (NCP): the dominant party in Khartoum, representing anti-secessionists from Sudan. The NCP maintains militia forces in Abyei, contrary to the terms of the CPA.
• Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army: the main force representing secessionists in South Sudan. The SPLM/A also maintains militiamen in Abyei, contrary to the terms of the CPA.
• Joint Integrated Units (JIUs): an armed force established by the CPA that combines elements of the Sudanese Army and the Sudan People's Liberation Army to maintain peace before the scheduled referendums on independence. The force is widely believed to have been a weak spot in the implementation of the CPA.
• Joint Integrated Police Units (JIPU): similar to the Joint Integrated Units of armies, the JIPU was intended to be an integrated police force. In 2010, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army was accused of outfitting soldiers with police uniforms.
• United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS): an international force authorized by the Security Council in June 2004 "to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace support operation."

Bibliography

"Abyei Offers Lessons for the Region on Climate-Related Security Risks." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 23 Sept. 2021, sipri.org/commentary/blog/2021/abyei-offers-lessons-region-climate-related-security-risks. Accessed 5 Oct. 2023.

Furukawa, Mitsuaki, and Daniel Deng. “Social Capital Across Agro-Pastoral Assets in the Abyei Area with Reference to Amiet ‘Peace’ Market.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 14, no. 2, 2019, pp. 164–178. doi.org/10.1177/1542316619847638.

International Crisis Group. Sudan Breaking the Abyei Deadlock. International Crisis Group, 2007.

"Sudan: Deadly Violence in the Disputed Abyei Area." The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 Mar. 2023, acleddata.com/2023/03/17/sudan-march-2023-situation-update-deadly-violence-in-the-disputed-abyei-area. Accessed 5 Oct. 2023.