Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

    Summary: Pakistan's military intelligence agencythe Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)has long been accused of association with terrorist groups, including the Taliban and terrorist groups operating in the disputed Indian province of Kashmir. As the primary intelligence unit of the Pakistani military, the ISI has also conducted domestic surveillance over Pakistani politicians and has been accused of political assassinations. It has been accused of encouraging opium cultivation in Afghanistan and using proceeds from drug trafficking to finance its activities, including the development of nuclear weapons for Pakistan. The ISI was a crucial ally of the United States in channeling funds and arms to anti-Russian guerrillas in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In the 1990safter the US lost interest in Afghanistancritics say the ISI continued its contacts with the Afghan Taliban to influence the emerging government in a neighboring country. In March 2009, news reports quoted unnamed American officials as accusing some ISI agents of actively helping the Taliban's campaign against the US and other NATO forces in Afghanistan. By the early 2020s, the people of India raised concerns about the agency's overreach in governmental power.

    Territory: Based in Pakistan. Operations in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Northeast India.

    Religious affiliation or political orientation: Government agency.

    Founded: 1948.

    Key leaders: Lt. General Nadeem Ahmed Anjum (incumbent 2021) and Lt. General Faiz Hameed (2019-2021).

    Alleged activities:

    • Support for Muslim terrorists in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir in India
    • Support for anti-government insurgents in states of Northeast India
    • Support for Taliban in Afghanistan
    • Assassination of Pakistani political figures
    • Close ties to Islamic militants in Afghanistan after the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan
    • Complicity in the bombing of the Embassy of India in Kabul, Afghanistan, July 2008
    • Aided Iraq in liberating Mosul from the militant Islamic State in 2017

    Last known status: In March 2009, the New York Times quoted unnamed American and Pakistani sources as saying the "shadowy S Wing" of the ISI was actively aiding the Taliban campaign in southern Afghanistan by providing money, military supplies, and help with strategic planning, even as the United States was planning to send additional troops to the area.

    Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has long played a shadowy role in Pakistani politics, especially in its alleged role in promoting guerrilla warfare in India's Kashmir province and in neighboring Afghanistan. In 2008, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) presented the Islamabad government with evidence of ISI involvement in what had become a domestic insurgency by Pakistani Taliban forces operating in the North West Frontier province as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda were thought to have taken refuge. In March 2009, the New York Times quoted "a half-dozen American, Pakistani and other security officials" as alleging that some elements of the ISI—notably its "shadowy S Wing"—were providing the Taliban in Afghanistan with money, arms, and help in strategic planning.

    In addition to the Taliban, the ISI is suspected of supporting several designated terrorist groups active in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir and guerrilla groups active in several states in the unstable area of northeast India. The US CIA accused the ISI of actively helping plan the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul in July 2008. The ISI's support for Pakistani Islamist militants became a domestic political issue in December 2008 with the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, allegedly at the hands of the Pakistani Taliban.

    In August 2008, after Pervez Musharraf resigned as president, American officials expressed concern over the new civilian government's ability to control the ISI. Published reports said CIA officials were uncertain whether rogue elements within the ISI were responsible for supporting Islamist radicals who were making areas of northern Pakistan an extension of the campaign to install Islamist rule in Afghanistan after the 2001 US invasion drove the Taliban government out of Kabul.

    In October 2008, Lt. General Ahmed Shujaa Pasha was appointed the new head of ISI by Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. General Pasha was previously in charge of security operations in northern Pakistan when the Taliban's influence inside Pakistan grew significantly. Some analysts in Pakistan interpreted the appointment as evidence that the military—not the civilian government—remained in charge of the ISI. Journalist critics have described the ISI in print as a "state within a state" and an agency outside the control of the government.

    A common theme in alleged ISI activities was Pakistan's long-standing tensions with India, not only in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir province but also in Afghanistan, where some in Pakistan view President Hamid Karzai as sympathetic to India. The ISI's activities in support of the Taliban—as well as allegedly helping plan the July 7, 2008, bombing of India's Embassy in Kabul—are viewed by some analysts as a strategic effort by the ISI to undermine India's influence over Afghanistan. A senior American delegation confronted the Pakistani government with evidence of such ties in July 2008. In an interview, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said allegations of ISI links to militants were "not believable" because his government "would not allow that."

    The rugged area of Pakistan adjacent to Afghanistan has long eluded control by the central government. If any government organization wields influence over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, it is thought to be the ISI. Since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Al Qaeda is widely believed to have established a sanctuary in this area.

    The ISI's links to militant Islamists in Afghanistan were not always a source of US concern. ISI was a critical operational ally of the Central Intelligence Agency in funneling money and other aid to anti-Soviet guerrillas fighting in Afghanistan during the 1980s. After the Soviet withdrawal, the ISI has been accused of helping establish the Taliban and assisting its rise to power in Afghanistan, encouraging opium production and using the proceeds of opium and heroin sales to finance its political objectives. Some American officials have alleged that the ISI continued to use ties to Afghan militants to destabilize Afghanistan even after American troops invaded the country in 2001 in search of Al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden.

    The ISI has been accused of interfering in Pakistan's domestic politics over prolonged tension between civilians and the military. This alleged interference ranges from conducting surveillance of politicians to carrying out assassinations. The allegations include accusations that the ISI tried to suppress politicians in the former East Pakistan preceding the emergence of an independent Bangladesh.

    A rundown of the significant accusations involving the ISI includes:

    • Afghanistan. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the ISI became a key ally of the United States in combating the Russian presence. This included channeling money and arms to Afghan guerrillas, many of whom were Islamist fundamentalists such as Osama bin Laden and Islamist activists from elsewhere in the Muslim world. The ISI encouraged the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan with the strategic aim of addicting Soviet soldiers; after the war, the ISI was alleged to have used revenues from the sale of opium/heroin to help finance its clandestine objectives. In March 2009, the New York Times quoted American and Pakistani officials as saying some elements of the ISI were providing money and arms to the Taliban fighting NATO troops in southern Afghanistan.
    • Jammu & Kashmir. This state in northwestern India has long been a point of contention between India and Pakistant the time of independence, the state's Hindu ruler chose to become part of India even though most of the state's population was Muslim. The ISI reputedly worked closely with the United States during the administration of President Richard Nixon in support of an independent Kalistan for India's Sikhs and to discredit India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhithought by the Americans to be too friendly toward the Soviet Union. The ISI is accused of funding and supporting several terrorist groups trying to overturn Indian rule and make the state part of Pakistan. Conducted under the reported code name Operation Tupac, among the terrorist groups that allegedly receive ISI aid and training include the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF; declared a cease-fire in 1994), Hezb-ul-Mujahedin, Harakat-ul Ansar, Al Umar, Al Barq, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Toiba. The last organization was alleged of masterminding a terrorist attack in the center of Mumbai, India, at the end of November 2008. Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, many Islamist fighters transferredor were movedto Kashmir.
    • Northeast India. The myriad of guerrilla and terrorist insurgencies in the seven states of Northeast Indiathe region northeast of Bangladesh and immediately west of Burma/Myanmar many of which aim at establishing independent states for tribal and ethnic groups, have long been thought to receive financial assistance from the ISI.
    • Domestic politics. For virtually its entire history since independence from Britain, Pakistan has swung between civilian and military rule, with the balance in favor of the military. The ISI was initially established to operate outside Pakistan, but after the 1958 military coup led by President Ayub Khan, the ISI was responsible for monitoring Pakistani politiciansespecially in East Pakistan, and among diplomats stationed abroad. The ISI is thought to have arranged for the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's brother in 1985 in a futile attempt to intimidate her and discourage her from returning to Pakistan. After President Zia died in a plane crash, Bhutto eventually returned and was elected prime minister.
    • East Pakistan. Politicians in what was then East Pakistan were of particular concern to the government in Islamabad. This was the ISI's principal job during the 1960s. In 1970, a civil war erupted between Pakistan and its eastern branch, ending with Indian military intervention on behalf of pro-independence forces in East Pakistanwhich then became independent Bangladesh.
    • Nuclear Arms. Many Western analysts have accused the ISI of actively promoting the acquisition, and later the distribution, of nuclear technology. These accusations include using proceeds from opium salesdrug dealing to fund Pakistan's nuclear weapon development.

    Status

    Successive Pakistani leadersboth civilian and militaryhave reportedly tried to reign in the ISI with mixed success, leading some Western critics to allege that the agency constituted a government unto itself.

    In October 1999, Pakistan's Army Chief of StaffGeneral Pervez Musharrafseized power in a coup. Shortly afterward, he named an Islamic conservativeLt. Gen. Ahmed Mahmudto lead the ISI. This apparent tilt toward Islamic conservatives was seriously challenged by the 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington, and Musharraf subsequently acted to moderate the ISI leadership. Some critics questioned how compelling Musharraf had been in doing so. When ISI chief Mahmud disobeyed orders and urged the Taliban not to hand Osama bin Laden to the United States, Musharraf replaced Mahmud with Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq.

    In January 2002, following an Islamist fundamentalist terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in Delhi, Musharraf began disbanding two key departments of ISI in charge of operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Nonetheless, many analysts questioned whether the Kashmir department was closed down. Moreover, the government of Pakistan has come under intense pressure from the United States to cut its ties with radical Islamist organizations in the region. These ties were largely maintained through the offices of the ISI. As one measure of this, ISI cooperated in the capture in 2002, in Pakistan, of Al Qaeda's operations chief, Abu Zubaydah.

    In February 2008, just days before elections that installed a civilian government, Pakistan's military and the ISI negotiated a truce with tribal leaders and militants in North Waziristan, adjacent to Afghanistan, where many Afghan militant refugees are based. Another truce has been reported under negotiation between the Pakistan military and Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander accused of masterminding the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

    In July 2008, CIA Deputy Director Stephen R. Kappes visited Pakistan, bringing evidence of ties between ISI and Islamist radicals, particularly a network run by Jalaluddin Haqqani. The so-called Haqqani Network is a group of Afghan Taliban fighters who fled to northern Pakistan after the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and have since led a resurgent Taliban guerrilla war against the Americans and the government in Kabul. Haqqani is also alleged to have maintained close ties to Osama bin Laden of Al Qaeda and with Mullah Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban, who appointed Haqqani the Taliban's top military commander in 2001. Bin Laden was killed in an American special operations raid inside Pakistan in 2011.

    In October 2008, Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani appointed Lt. General Ahmed Shujaa Pasha as the new head of ISI. Pasha previously commanded the Pakistani army in northern Pakistan, the site of the rising domestic Taliban insurgency. His appointment was widely interpreted as evidence that the military—rather than the civilian government—was in charge of the ISI.

    In August 2021, the Taliban ended two decades of conflict in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of American military forces. The Taliban overthrew the U.S.-supported government of Afghanistan as much of the U.S.-trained Afghan military ceased to exist. The ISI was believed to have been complicit in training and equipping Taliban forces. ISI support activities, nonetheless, may have come at a cost to Pakistan's own security. According to reporting, Taliban attacks inside Pakistani borders spiked in the years following the Taliban takeover.

    In 2022, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif granted the ISI vetting power over government positions, which raised concerns among citizens.

    In one instance in 2024, members of the Pakistani judiciary accused the ISI of waging a campaign to intimidate Pakistani citizens and conduct human rights violations.

    Bibliography

    Baloch, Shah Meer. "Fear for Democracy in Pakistan as ISI Gets Power Over Civil Service." Guardian, 12 June 2022, www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/12/fear-for-democracy-in-pakistan-as-isi-gets-power-over-civil-service. Accessed 5 Oct. 2023.

    Gregory, Shaun. "The ISI and the War on Terrorism." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 12, Dec. 2007, www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10576100701670862. Accessed 21 Aug. 2024.

    Hussain, Abid. "Judges vs Spies: Pakistan’s Jurists Accuse Intel Agency ISI of Intimidation." Al Jazeera, 27 Mar. 2024, www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/27/judges-vs-spies-pakistans-jurists-accuse-intel-agency-isi-of-intimidation. Accessed 24 Aug. 2024.

    Jalālzaʼī, Mūsá K̲h̲ān. Pakistans Spy Agencies: Challenges of Civilian Control Over Intelligence Agencies Bureaucratic and Military Stakeholderism Dematerialization of Civilian Intelligence and War of Strength. VIJ Books India Pty, 2020.

    Nader, Nadery. "Unraveling Deception: Pakistan’s Dilemma After Decades of Promoting Militancy in Afghanistan and Beyond." Asia Dispatches: The Wilson Center, 26 Sept. 2023, www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/unraveling-deception-pakistans-dilemma-after-decades-promoting-militancy-afghanistan-and. Accessed 21 Aug. 2024.

    "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?" JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, vol. 48, 2008, p. 7,