Iran Presidential Election, June 12, 2009

Summary: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of Iran's presidential election held on June 12, 2009, but his opponents refused to accept the outcome. Thousands of demonstrators protested the official results in the two weeks following the vote, and Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, demanded an end to challenges. The Revolutionary Guards fired tear gas and bullets at protesters, killing several, while Iran's clerical establishment appeared split over the legitimacy of the outcome, which was officially announced on June 13. Ahmadinejad's victory, over 63% of the votes, confounded pre-polling predictions of a tight race between the incumbent and his closest competitor, former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Moussavi, who officially received 34%. Two other candidates received 1% and 2% respectively. Moussavi denounced the official results as a fraud, and some outside analysts said the numbers suggested an unlikely swing towards Ahmadinejad from rural areas which traditionally have not voted for conservative candidates. Ahmadinejad's victory was widely viewed as a setback for U.S. efforts to coax Iran into giving up its alleged plans to develop atomic weapons, and by domestic reformers as a setback to Moussavi's promise to institute a less-confrontational, more liberal regime in Tehran.

An estimated 85% of eligible voters participated in Iran's presidential election on June 12, 2009, which pitted incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against former prime minister and perceived reformer Mir-Hussein Moussavi. The official results of the election were:

The figures implied a record voter participation of about 84%.

The official figures confounded pre-election polls, which had predicted a much closer contest.

Candidates:

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (b. 1956), incumbent, first elected 2005. Ahmadinejad is widely viewed as the preferred candidate of Iran's conservative Shiite Islamist clerics. Internationally he is known as a strong advocate of Iran's nuclear program, which he has said is aimed at developing nuclear power generating capabilities, but which many foreign powers, including the United States, say is aimed at building nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad has long been an outspoken opponent of Israel, saying that Israel should be "wiped off the map" and that the Holocaust is a "myth." His government has provided significant support to leading Shiite politicians in neighboring Iraq during the prolonged civil war between Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis. Formerly the mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad ran for the presidency in 2005. The first round of voting failed to give a majority to any candidate, and Ahmadinejad was then elected with 62.6% of the vote in a run-off. He championed the strict Islamist regime of the ruling clerics and opposed the modest liberal reforms championed by his predecessor, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad is a veteran of the Revolutionary Guards, the militia linked to the ruling Islamist clerics and closely linked to enforcing a fundamentalist regime. During Iran's war against Iraq (1980-88) Ahmadinejad served in the "Special Brigade" of the Revolutionary Guards, an elite unit reputed to participate in undercover operations outside Iran.

Mir-Hussein Moussavi (b. 1941) announced his candidacy unexpectedly on March 14, 2009, and promised to pursue reforms like those advocated by former president—and then-candidate in the 2009 election—Mohammad Khatami. After Moussavi's surprise entry into the race as a reformist, Khatami dropped out of the race, declaring that Moussavi had a better chance of beating Ahmadinejad. Iranian news reports quoted Moussavi as telling Khatami in a letter: "I, like you, believe that the correct path lies in reforms that include a return to principles and a rebirth." Moussavi was prime minister from 1981-1989 under former president (and now supreme leader of the ruling council of clerics) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. (A constitutional change eliminated the post of prime minister after Moussavi served in the post.) As prime minister Moussavi was close to the regime's hard-line conservatives during the decade of war with Iraq, and in his announcement in 2009 presented himself as the candidate best able to straddle Islamist values and liberalized political and social systems.

Mohsen Rezai, a former chief commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards during the prolonged war with Iraq in the 1980s. Viewed as even more conservative on social and religious issues than Ahmadinejad, Rezai ran on a platform of economic reform. Rezai, along with four other Iranians, is wanted in Argentina for an attack on a Jewish center in 1994 that killed 85 people.

Mehdi Karroubi, age 72, a former speaker of parliament (1989-1992) who ran openly as a reformer. Karroubi was sharply critical of Ahmadinejad for, among other things, denying that the Holocaust ever took place. Karroubi also promised a policy of "détente" towards other countries.

Issues in the election. By all accounts the election was viewed as a referendum on Ahmadinejad's first term in office—he was first elected in 2005—which was marked by a highly confrontational attitude towards the West, and the United States in particular, and troubled economy at home. Moussavi had promised to reduce tensions with the West, especially on the issue of Iran's program to enrich uranium, and to institute economic and social reforms at home. In one respect the 2009 election was a replay of the election in 2005 in which Ahmadinejad defeated former President Mohammad Khatami, who was viewed as a moderate on the issue of strict observance of Islamic law. Ahmadinejad's victory then, as in 2009, was taken as consolidating the political hold of conservative Islamists over major Iranian institutions.

Economic Policy. In office, Ahmadinejad garnered substantial support among rural Iranians by supporting expansive development programs, sometimes at the expense of urban centers. However, the precipitous decline in crude oil prices after July 2008 posed special problems for the Ahmadinejad government, which had relied on petroleum to finance those projects. At the same time, Iran has experienced surging inflation, running at over 27% at the end of 2008, which has also caused widespread discontent with the government. One of Ahmadinejad's platforms in his first election was a promise to share the nation's wealth with lower classes.

Social Liberalization. Khatami, during his earlier terms as president, sought to introduce a moderating influence over the strict fundamentalist application of Sharia (Islamic holy law) favored by the ruling council of clerics. This made him especially popular among younger Iranians, especially those living in cities, but anathema to the clerics. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, has long been an advocate of Islamist fundamentalism.

Nuclear Program. As Iran's president Ahmadinejad emerged as the chief public spokesman for Iran's right to develop nuclear power—and specifically to enrich uranium, which could be used for nuclear reactors or for nuclear weapons--in light of strong opposition by the Bush administration and the U.N. Security Council. Ahmadinejad argued that Iran's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, and that Iran had as much right as any other nation to develop its own nuclear power capacity. In 2007, at the United Nations, Ahmadinejad declared: "I officially announce that in our opinion, the nuclear issue of Iran is now closed and has turned into an ordinary [International Atomic Energy] Agency matter."

Foreign Relations. During his terms as president, Khatami had made several overtures to the West, including the United States, in hoping to ease tensions dating from the overthrow of the Shah. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, has taken a much more confrontational position, especially with regard to his insistence that Iran has the right to develop its own nuclear power (including the right to enrich uranium), which Western powers believe is a cover story for an effort to develop atomic weapons to go along with Iran's development of long-range rockets. Ahmadinejad also made overtures in January 2007, during an extended tour of South America, to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, an outspoken foe of the United States. The explicit offer by President Barack Obama to open direct talks with the government in Tehran posed a potential threat to Ahmadinejad's earlier hostile attitude. The 2009 election also introduced two other issues. One was relations with the United States, whose newly-elected President Barack Obama offered to open direct negotiations with Iran with a view towards finding areas of agreement. The other was Iran's insistence on enriching uranium, nominally as fuel for nuclear power plants but widely perceived as a continuing effort to build a nuclear weapon. Apart from the principle of limiting proliferation of nuclear weapons, Iran's program was particularly nettlesome to Israel--thought to be well within range of Iranian missiles--which had threatened to take unilateral action to shut down Iranian nuclear facilities if negotiations to do so proved unsuccessful. In that respect Ahmadinejad's reelection was taken as a new source of tension in the region.

Results and Protests. Almost immediately after the results were announced, tens of thousands of Iranians, in Tehran and other cities, staged protest demonstrations for a period two weeks. The losing candidates refused to accept the outcome, and Iran's clerical establishment appeared to be split over the legitimacy of the vote. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, endorsed Ahmadinejad's victory even before the official results were released, and subsequently demanded that protests over the outcome be halted. The Revolutionary Guards, the militia originally formed to support the Islamist revolution of 1979, and a volunteer force of citizen-militiamen, the Basij, confronted protesters in the streets, killing some, tear gassing others, and beating on many others. Several hundred protesters were arrested, but most were soon released.

Ahmadinejad, the declared victor, insisted afterwards: "It was the most clean and free election in the world. No fault was discovered. The whole nation understood this." Pointing to a record participation, he said: "This is a new beginning for Iran … we have entered a new era. We must all join hands to achieve Iran's lofty goals."

The voting, the results, and the subsequent protests gave the election a significance that appeared to go beyond the question of whether Ahmadinejad would be given a second term. It appeared to reveal a significant crack in the solidarity of Iran's Islamic clerics behind the authority of the Supreme Leader, and appeared to give the military, especially the Revolutionary Guards, a greater role in enforcing the authority of the government. Since the forced exile of the Shah of Iran in 1979 Iran has been governed by a unique form of "Islamic Republic" that combines the religious authority of senior religious figures with popular participation. For example, the Supreme Leader is elected by an 86-member Assembly of Experts who themselves are popularly elected. At the same time, the Supreme Leader appoints six ayatollahs to serve on the 12-member Guardian Council; the Majlis elects six jurist members to the Council from a list of nominees chosen by the Head of Judicial Power, who is a senior judge appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council must approve all candidates for the presidency and for parliament.

The election in Iran also demonstrated for the first time the political influence of new Internet technology. Protesters used the Twitter service as a communications tool, both to organize protests and to report to the outside world what was happening after foreign correspondents were expelled by the government following the vote. News reports said the U.S. State Department encouraged the management of the Twitter service to delay a scheduled maintenance in order to avoid a temporary shut-down during the Iranian protests.

The Iranian government, evidently reflecting the views of the Supreme Leader, arrested several Iranian employees of the British embassy, accusing them of interfering in the election.

The protests had some impact. After several days the Guardian Council said it would investigate some results. After randomly choosing about 10% of the ballots for recount, officials said they found only "slight regularities." Based on the official results, slightly over five million votes would have to change hands in order to push Ahmadinejad's total below the 50% required to avoid a run-off. On June 30, 2009, the Guardian Council, widely regarded as the most influential group of clerics in Iran, declared the vote was valid and free of major fraud. The declaration served to cut off a possible avenue of appeal, and also reflected the continued dominant influence of the Ayatollah Khamenei.

On the other hand, on July 5, 2009, the Assembly of Qum Seminary Scholars and Researchers declared the election had been skewed and called for a new one. Although the association has no official role, it was regarded by some observers as a significant sign that Iran's clergy was not united in supporting Khamenei. Some reports suggested that the statement by teachers and seminarians might reflect the behind-the-scenes work of former President Ali Rafsanjani in seeking to undermine the religious authority of the election. The statement was released on the same day that Rafsanjani issued a public statement supporting the protest movement.

On July 4, 2009, Moussavi released a 24-page document on the Web providing details of his accusation that the election was marked by fraud. He alleged that Ahmadinejad's supporters had provided cash and food in exchange for votes, had increased wages, and had printed millions of extra ballots before the voting.

An analysis of official figures, province-by-province, by the British think-tank Chatham House, released in early July 2009, said the votes cast in two conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, exceeded the number of eligible voters in those provinces. (Defenders of the election said that some voters may have voted outside their home provinces.) Comparing the 2009 official results with votes from earlier elections, the study said that in a third of all provinces, the official results implied that Ahmadinejad had received votes from his previous voters, plus all new voters, plus up to 44% of former "reformist" voters, even though reformers and conservatives had long been at odds. The study also suggested that in 2005 Ahmadinejad had been notably unpopular in rural areas, whereas four years later he carried rural areas; the study suggested such a swing was "highly implausible." The Chatham House study also cited earlier studies that seemed to show that "tombstone voting"—ballots cast by voters who had died before the election—was a familiar phenomenon in Iranian politics.