Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Summary: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an American response to the war on terrorism that gives the US Navy and navies of allied countries the right to stop and inspect merchant ships at sea suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction. Since it was first proposed by President George W. Bush in the spring of 2003, 106 nations have agreed to let merchant vessels carrying their flags be stopped and searched. North Korea, one of the primary targets of the PSI, has said that any such seizure of North Korean-flag ships would be taken as an act of war. After South Korea said it was signing onto the PSI following an underground nuclear test by North Korea in May 2009, Pyongyang threatened immediate massive military retaliation in case any of its ships were stopped and searched by South Korean navy vessels. India, China, and Indonesia are also opposed to the actions of the PSI. Although a few cases of stops and seizures have been made public, the United States has long said it would not publicize such events, partly to avoid escalating tensions.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) began as a proposal by President George W. Bush in 2003 to intercept ships at sea suspected of carrying shipments of material related to weapons of mass destruction. From the outset, North Korea was a primary subject of the initiative, along with Iran—-both of which were at the time non-nuclear powers suspected of developing atomic weapons.

The initiative was proposed by President George W. Bush in a speech delivered in Poland in May 2003. It was part of the larger American "war against terrorism" and campaign against the three designated "axis of evil" countries (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea). The Bush administration accused all three members of the "axis of evil" of endeavoring to obtain or develop nuclear weapons. One of the countries, North Korea, in fact, announced it had conducted an underground test of an atomic weapon about six weeks after Bush's speech.

Initially, eleven countries signed on to participate in the PSI. Over the next six years, that number grew to around ninety countries, mostly in the form of agreements with the United States to let ships flying their flags be stopped and searched at sea by the US Navy. By 2024, 113 countries had endorsed the PSI.

In spring 2009, the PSI came to the fore in the wake of North Korea's announcement that it had conducted a second underground test of a nuclear weapon, as well as North Korea's test-firing of half a dozen mid-range missiles thought capable of carrying an atomic warhead as far as Japan. In response to these events, South Korea said it was joining the PSI, and North Korea responded by saying any seizure of its ships by South Korean vessels would be regarded as an act of war and would spark an immediate "massive" military response.

Legalities. The main provision of the PSI - stopping merchant vessels on the high seas in times of peace - appeared to contravene Section VII, Article 92 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states: "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas" and Article 96, which states that "Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service shall, on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." The convention provides three exceptions to freedom of navigation: ships engaged in piracy, slave trade, or illegal broadcasting.

The Bush administration sought to update the 1982 UN Convention which also dealt with a myriad of other issues, such as the limits of territorial waters, navigation of straits, and pollution control, in the face of perceived threats from non-nuclear states like North Korea and Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction that might be sent by ship.

The PSI was also intended to apply to aircraft flying in international air space.

A month after Bush's proposal, then-Undersecretary of State John Bolton said in testimony to Congress on June 4, 2003, that in the prior two months, the United States had intercepted a shipment of aluminum tubes thought likely to be headed for North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and that a combined French-German effort had intercepted sodium cyanide, also thought bound for North Korea. Despite Bolton's announcement, the US administration said it did not expect to make public announcements about searches carried out under the PSI, partly to avoid public or diplomatic controversies. For the most part, such searches that may have been conducted have not been made public.

The PSI, while presented as an update to the Law of the Sea, initially garnered support from just a dozen nations that were already declared allies of the United States in the war against terrorism. A month after it was proposed by Bush, on June 15, 2005, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Australia endorsed the "Madrid Initiative," named for the city where a conference on the proposal was held. In practical terms, the PSI mostly affected the United States, which, with 297 deployable vessels in its Navy fleet in 2024, accounts for a large amount of the world's naval vessels.

Over the next four years, about eighty additional countries signed onto the initiative, perhaps most notably Panama and Liberia, nations that provide a "flag of convenience" for scores of merchant vessels. Under bilateral agreements with the United Nations, these nations agreed that the Navy could search vessels flying their flag upon two hours' notice; failure to object within two hours would be taken as permission to proceed with searches at sea. The overall membership of the PSI reached 113 members in 2024.

From the outset, the United States urged that the PSI should apply not only to the merchant ships of states like North Korea, thought to be developing weapons of mass destruction, but also to ships suspected of ferrying materials to or from "non-state actors," such as Al Qaeda. Although some aspects of the PSI explicitly denied the rules of the Law of the Sea, the United States defended the initiative as being consistent with "relevant international law and frameworks," including resolutions passed by the Security Council.

The PSI initiative specifically referred to "states or non-state actors of proliferation concern," referring to countries or "entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials."

The PSI fit into the larger US assertion, adopted after the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, of its right to "peremptory" action to protect against future attacks.

Related initiatives. In practical terms, monitoring vessels for possible cargo related to weapons of mass destruction or nuclear proliferation initiatives was applied to ships well within territorial waters and primarily to ships already docked. The Law of the Sea had long recognized the right of nations to extend sovereignty to waters twelve nautical miles (about fourteen statute miles or eighteen kilometers) offshore, as well as control of ships and crews once they were docked in a harbor.

Since 2003, the PSI continued to evolve and expand, reflecting changing global security issues throughout the early twenty-first century. As threats have evolved throughout the world, the PSI has changed to combat those threats.

In the 2020s, the PSI dealt with myriad issues, such as those relating to customs and export enforcement, finance, and technology. The year 2023 marked the twentieth anniversary of the creation of the PSI, and endorsing states reaffirmed their commitment to the mission of the PSI. Yearly conferences, workshops, and exercises worldwide led to the initiation of new endorsing countries, such as Madagascar in 2024. The PSI remained the framework for proliferation standards.

Bibliography

Newman, Andrew and Brad Williams. "The Proliferation Security Initiative." Nonproliferation Review 12:2 (July 2005). 20p.

“The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) at a Glance.” Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/proliferation-security-initiative-psi-glance. Accessed 12 Oct. 2024.

“Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proliferation-security-initiative-psi/. Accessed 12 Oct. 2024.

Shulman, Mark R. "Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security." Strategic Studies Institute. April 1, 2006. 62p.

“Statement on the Fifth Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative.” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 44, no. 21, June 2008, pp. 762–63. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f6h&AN=32653558&site=ehost-live. Accessed 12 Oct. 2024.

Winner, Andrew C. “The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction.” Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 129–43. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1162/0163660053295211. Accessed 12 Oct. 2024.