Street oratory
Street oratory refers to the practice of public speaking in outdoor spaces, often characterized by individuals addressing a gathered audience on various topics, typically without government censorship. A notable example of this is Speakers' Corner in London's Hyde Park, where speakers engage with attendees every Sunday, discussing a wide array of issues freely. This form of expression has inspired similar customs in other parts of the world, such as a brief attempt by students in Beijing's Purple Bamboo Park during the 1980s.
In the context of the United States, street oratory is entwined with the First Amendment, which guarantees free speech but includes stipulations regarding peaceful assembly. While the content of speech is protected, the government retains the authority to regulate the assembly itself, especially when public safety is at risk. Over time, legal frameworks have evolved to enhance the protection of street orators, notably through landmark Supreme Court decisions that have addressed issues like the "heckler's veto," where hostile audience reactions could silence speakers. As a result, contemporary street orators often enjoy stronger protections, allowing them to express their views amidst diverse audience reactions.
Street oratory
Definition: Speeches given in streets, parks, or other public places
Significance: Since the 1960’s, the U.S. Supreme Court has given street oratory strong, but not unlimited, protection from censorship under the First Amendment
One of the classic symbols of free speech in Western civilization is in the Speakers Corner in London’s Hyde Park. Every Sunday afternoon, this corner is filled with people listening to street orators declaiming on a wide variety of topics from lecterns or podiums provided by the government, unmolested from any censorship of the ideas expressed. This form of street oratory is such a well-known custom that, in the 1980’s, Chinese students, faculty, and intellectuals created the same custom in one corner of Beijing’s Purple Bamboo Park, but with limited success.
![Man heckles Iranians demonstrating for Khomeini at police line in Washington, D.C., 1980. By Leffler, Warren K., photographer. Work for hire for US News and World Report.[1] [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons 102082443-101771.jpg](https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/img/embimages/ers/sp/embedded/102082443-101771.jpg?ephost1=dGJyMNHX8kSepq84xNvgOLCmsE2epq5Srqa4SK6WxWXS)
Whatever its value as a symbol, the U.S. street oratory issues are more complicated. While the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment promises the government shall make no law censoring speech or press, it promises this only for those who “peaceably assemble.” The use of “peaceably” means the government does have a right to censor or exercise prior restraint over assemblies. Since street oratory means speech before an assembly, the assembly can be censored or regulated even if the speech itself cannot.
Over much U.S. history, speech before assemblies was regulated by the concept of “clear and present danger,” and was guided by the example that no one was allowed falsely to shout “fire” in a crowded theater. Since the 1960’s, the clear and present danger doctrine has fallen into disuse, and street oratory has become better protected. In Feiner v. New York (1951) the Court upheld Feiner’s conviction for delivering a strong pro-black civil rights speech before a mixed race audience, some of whose whites took offense and threatened the speaker with violence. Policemen ordered Feiner to stop speaking, and upon his refusing, arrested him. Perhaps influenced by Feiner’s uncooperative attitude, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction, although the Court had ruled in Hague v. CIO (1939) that government censorship of street oratory, demonstrations, and assemblies limited to “promoting the free movement of traffic in public areas” implied governments could not control speech content but only time, place, and manner of presentation.
By the 1960’s the Supreme Court had eliminated the so called “heckler’s veto” (in which a hostile audience stifles a speaker by threatening to riot, thereby provoking a police response against the speaker). Since Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court has rejected such a veto by insisting that police protect the speaker’s free speech no matter what the audience response is—thereby effectively overturning Feiner. A related example can be found in the Court’s reaction in the famous Skokie, Illinois, Nazi march case in which the courts firmly upheld the Nazis’ right to march even though the townspeople threatened to riot if they marched. In the end, the Nazis chose not to march in Skokie, but the principle, so closely related to street oratory, was confirmed.