Street oratory

Definition: Speeches given in streets, parks, or other public places

Significance: Since the 1960’s, the U.S. Supreme Court has given street oratory strong, but not unlimited, protection from censorship under the First Amendment

One of the classic symbols of free speech in Western civilization is in the Speakers Corner in London’s Hyde Park. Every Sunday afternoon, this corner is filled with people listening to street orators declaiming on a wide variety of topics from lecterns or podiums provided by the government, unmolested from any censorship of the ideas expressed. This form of street oratory is such a well-known custom that, in the 1980’s, Chinese students, faculty, and intellectuals created the same custom in one corner of Beijing’s Purple Bamboo Park, but with limited success.

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Whatever its value as a symbol, the U.S. street oratory issues are more complicated. While the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment promises the government shall make no law censoring speech or press, it promises this only for those who “peaceably assemble.” The use of “peaceably” means the government does have a right to censor or exercise prior restraint over assemblies. Since street oratory means speech before an assembly, the assembly can be censored or regulated even if the speech itself cannot.

Over much U.S. history, speech before assemblies was regulated by the concept of “clear and present danger,” and was guided by the example that no one was allowed falsely to shout “fire” in a crowded theater. Since the 1960’s, the clear and present danger doctrine has fallen into disuse, and street oratory has become better protected. In Feiner v. New York (1951) the Court upheld Feiner’s conviction for delivering a strong pro-black civil rights speech before a mixed race audience, some of whose whites took offense and threatened the speaker with violence. Policemen ordered Feiner to stop speaking, and upon his refusing, arrested him. Perhaps influenced by Feiner’s uncooperative attitude, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction, although the Court had ruled in Hague v. CIO (1939) that government censorship of street oratory, demonstrations, and assemblies limited to “promoting the free movement of traffic in public areas” implied governments could not control speech content but only time, place, and manner of presentation.

By the 1960’s the Supreme Court had eliminated the so called “heckler’s veto” (in which a hostile audience stifles a speaker by threatening to riot, thereby provoking a police response against the speaker). Since Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court has rejected such a veto by insisting that police protect the speaker’s free speech no matter what the audience response is—thereby effectively overturning Feiner. A related example can be found in the Court’s reaction in the famous Skokie, Illinois, Nazi march case in which the courts firmly upheld the Nazis’ right to march even though the townspeople threatened to riot if they marched. In the end, the Nazis chose not to march in Skokie, but the principle, so closely related to street oratory, was confirmed.