2021 Texas power crisis

The 2021 Texas power crisis occurred in February when the state of Texas experienced an ice storm that taxed its power grid. Below-freezing temperatures and two winter storms arrived on the heels of the ice storm. On February 15, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) began rotating power outages, leaving more than 4.8 million customers without power, in some cases for days. At least 246 people died due to the power crises, many from hypothermia. Thousands of households were without water when their pipes froze and burst, flooding their homes.

The Texas legislature announced an investigation into the emergency. The crisis was attributed to failure by officials to heed warnings to winterize the power grid after previous power outages. The power grid for most of the state was not connected to the national power grid. This prevented the possibility of shifting sufficient power from elsewhere to Texas during the crisis.

Background

Texas is the largest producer of energy in the United States, and is also one of the largest energy consumers. The state has a history of celebrating itself as an independent spirit not beholden to the federal government’s rules. In this spirit, Texas resisted connecting its power grid to the national power grid. The practice of remaining separate dates to the early twentieth century, when electric utilities began linking their systems. Regulation of the energy system in Texas was only enacted after a blackout in the Northeast in 1965 led the state to create the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). This agency was formed to make sure the grid met national standards.

Texas pursued a plan of energy independence during the 1990s. The state deregulated electricity generation, leaving it in the hands of private companies that generated, transmitted, and sold energy. Those who promoted the plan to do away with the public utilities promised consumers low-cost electricity and additional choices. Under the law, rates were tied to fuel costs. Only the companies that provided power lines remained regulated.

Overview

An ice storm struck Texas on February 10, 2021. In addition to the frigid temperatures that covered the state for days, road conditions became treacherous. Utility companies later stated that crews were unable to reach facilities to evaluate their condition. On February 12, Governor Greg Abbott issued a disaster declaration. The problems brought on by the ice storm were compounded a day later when Winter Storm Uri hit. On February 14, ERCOT set a new record for winter electricity demand, 69,222 MW of usage, and asked customers to turn off lights and appliances and turn down thermostats to conserve energy.

A third blow arrived on February 15 as another winter storm hit the state. ERCOT declared a Level 3 Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) and began rotating power outages, or rolling blackouts, to attempt to conserve energy. Later, the agency admitted that the Texas grid was minutes from a failure that could have left consumers in the dark for weeks. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) permitted ERCOT to adjust the wholesale price of electricity due to increased demand. The wholesale price rose to its cap, $9 per kilowatt-hour (kWh). About 4.4 million customers were without power. The next day, as the temperature dropped to a record 12 degrees Fahrenheit at the Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport, 3.1 million consumers still had no electricity.

By February 18, more than half a million households still did not have power. ERCOT ended emergency conditions and rolling blackouts on February 19. Originally, authorities pronounced that thirty-two people had died of causes related to the winter storm. These included deaths by hypothermia as well as house fires, carbon monoxide poisoning, and car accidents. By April 9, the death toll had reached 133 people. By 2022, the state's official death toll due to the crisis was 246 people, though researchers believe this number is a severe undercount.

Many stories of those who died emerged in the days and weeks following the power crisis. A sixty-year-old man with a learning disability died in his apartment near Houston. His father said when he found his son’s body, the temperature in his apartment was 37 degrees Fahrenheit. His family filed a lawsuit against ERCOT. In Conroe, where the temperature fell to 12 degrees, an eleven-year-old boy died of hypothermia when his home had no power for two days. His family also sued. The Houston Chronicle conducted its own investigation and reported that on April 2, 194 deaths were related to the cold snap and blackouts. This was nearly twice the state’s preliminary official count at that time. At least one hundred deaths were caused by hypothermia and at least sixteen were attributed to carbon monoxide poisoning as people struggled to stay warm. The Houston Chronicle continued investigating the death toll and official state counts. Their reporting found that though the crisis occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, the week of the power crisis was the eighth-deadliest week during the pandemic, a twenty-nine percent increase in deaths as compared to the same week the previous year.

The power outage caused widespread disruption in people’s lives. Families huddled around grills outside to stay warm and melted snow to drink and flush toilets. Colleges and universities across the state closed and then opened warming buildings for students. Texas State University provided warming buses. Although hospitals had generators to keep the lights and equipment working, some lost water pressure. Across the state, residents scoured stores for bottled water when boil water notices were issued and grocery stores began to run out of food as supply chains were disrupted by the weather.

Cold-related failures occurred in February 2021. The water used to circulate in equipment froze. Moist air froze valves. Natural gas pipelines did not perform well, so natural-gas-fired power plants did not function well either. Power loss also prevented natural gas companies from producing gas, which is a major fuel for home heating systems in Texas.

The system was set up so that power companies did not produce a surplus of energy, which would help in a crisis. Instead, they increase generation only when demand drives up the prices. Power-generation companies reaped huge profits during a 2014 polar vortex that nearly collapsed the system. The companies are not incentivized to have a reserve of fuel—usually natural gas—available near power plants to ensure they can operate in an emergency. When the power went off in Texas, natural gas production ceased, and the supply line in the power system broke.

The average price per megawatt hour was about $35 in 2021. During the February freeze, prices leaped as high as ERCOT’s maximum rate, $9,000 per megawatt hour. Many customers had chosen variable-rate electricity contracts. Following the outages, they were billed thousands of dollars because of the price leap caused by increased demand. Some customers saw bills for five days of power as high as $17,000.

With one exception, ERCOT board seats were held by representatives of the energy industry, including power-generating companies. Texans were incensed when they learned that five members of the board did not reside in the state. Those five members resigned, and a sixth person living in Virginia who was being considered to fill an empty seat withdrew his name.

Governor Abbott called on the legislature to require generators and power plants be winterized. Lawmakers opened hearings to question PUC and Electric Reliability Council of Texas officials on February 25. In April, the state House proposed legislation to require state officials to designate some gas facilities as critical. This would prevent utility companies from cutting power to natural gas facilities that fuel power plants during emergencies, as they had done during the winter storms.

Ken Paxton, the attorney general of Texas, began investigating ERCOT and several power companies. When the PUC announced an investigation into ERCOT, a number of officials resigned, including the PUC chair and a commissioner. ERCOT’s board of directors fired its chief executive officer.

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