Analysis: International Control of Atomic Energy
The topic of international control of atomic energy emerged prominently in the aftermath of World War II, particularly following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, which showcased the devastating potential of nuclear weapons. With the Soviet Union successfully detonating its own atomic bomb in 1949, the necessity for effective oversight of nuclear technology became urgent amid rising tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The United Nations established the Atomic Energy Commission shortly after the war to address the challenges posed by atomic energy, including the need for disarmament and regulation of nuclear facilities.
Efforts to implement international control, such as the Baruch Plan, proposed an authoritative body to manage nuclear weapons and ensure compliance through inspections and sanctions. However, the Soviet Union rejected these proposals, insisting on the destruction of existing weapons before any agreements could take effect and advocating for self-regulation over international oversight. This fundamental disagreement resulted in a stalemate, contributing to the onset of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. The ongoing struggle for international cooperation in nuclear regulation reflects broader themes of national sovereignty, trust, and the complex interplay of geopolitical interests.
Analysis: International Control of Atomic Energy
Date: October 25, 1949
Authors: Representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
Genre: government document
Summary Overview
The enormous destructive power of atomic weaponry was made clear when the United States bombed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945, at the end of World War II. Top scientists from across the world had worked in secret on the Manhattan Project, the US-led effort to develop atomic technology. In the years following World War II, the Soviet Union set up Communist governments in most central and Eastern European states, and tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, former Allies, were high. At the same time, the Soviet Union had an extensive spy network within the Manhattan Project and had itself been working to develop atomic weapons. In August 1949, the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb in Kazakhstan, and the world was faced with two powerful opposing nations with nuclear capability. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were members of the United Nations, which had set up an Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 to study the best way to control nuclear technology. In the fall of 1949, the Soviet Union was not interested in giving up the weapon it had worked so hard to develop, however, and talks about control and disarmament were at an impasse. The other members of the Atomic Energy Commission submitted this report to the United Nations, describing the obstacles to an agreement with the Soviet Union.
Defining Moment
The United States unleashed the greatest destructive weapon ever known when it dropped two atomic bombs, known as Little Boy and Fat Man, on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The United States and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies during World War II, but opposing ideologies and deep-seated mistrust ensured that the alliance would be strained further after the superiority of US weaponry was revealed. Indeed, some scholars have theorized that the bombs dropped on Japan were as much a reminder to the Soviet Union of US dominance as a strategic way to end the war.
Attempts to control this destructive technology began as soon as the bombs were dropped. The United States was aware that the Soviet Union was working on a nuclear weapon and believed that it would be eight to fifteen years before it had a workable device. Still, the urgency was clear. The United Nations, formally established within months of the bombing of Japan, passed its first resolution on January 24, 1946, establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” UNAEC had six permanent members (the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China, and Canada), and within days of the establishment of the organization, the United States had set up a group, whose members included Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority David E. Lilienthal, to study the problem of nuclear weapons; Bernard Baruch was chosen to present the group's report to UNAEC. Baruch altered the Acheson-Lilienthal report slightly, presenting a plan to establish the Atomic Development Authority, an international body both assigned to manage any facility capable of producing atomic weapons and in charge of inspecting any nuclear research facility pursuing peaceful uses for atomic energy.
The Baruch Plan also made possession of an atomic bomb illegal and imposed sanctions on nations who failed inspections. The Atomic Development Authority could impose sanctions on nations who were not in compliance and had the ability to override the veto of any members of the United Nations who disagreed with its ruling. Once the plan was fully operational, Baruch promised that the United States would begin to destroy its nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union rejected this plan, insisting that existing weapons be destroyed before the plan took effect, arguing against international control of its domestic facilities, and stating that it would not release its veto on the UN Security Council. In December 1946, the Baruch Plan was defeated 10–2 with the Soviet Union and Poland (a temporary member) abstaining. These differences—the insistence by the Soviet Union that the United States' weapons be destroyed, its unwillingness to give up its veto, and its refusal to allow international control of domestic facilities—continued through a series of reports, proposals, and counterproposals over the next three years, with no resolution.
Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate over the following years. Tension over the fate of Germany remained high, culminating in the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin. The Soviet Union initially refused to relinquish territory in Iran in 1946, causing a flurry of activity in the United Nations. As central and Eastern European nations adopted Communist governments, some by force, the United States grew increasingly worried about aggressive Soviet expansion. In April 1949, the United States and eleven other former Allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In November 1948, the United Nations General Assembly sent the six permanent members of UNAEC back into consultation, charging them with finding common ground in the control of atomic weapons. This group finally met on August 9, 1949. On August 29, the Soviet Union secretly detonated its first atomic weapon, an event that President Harry S. Truman announced to the American public on September 23. In October, the other five nations sent this report to the United Nations General Assembly, detailing the ongoing negotiations and enumerating the points of contention. The failure to reach agreement, as reported in this document, spelled the beginning of the nuclear arms race and the Cold War.
Document Analysis
This report begins with a summary of its purpose: the six permanent members had been sent into consultation by the United Nations General Assembly. Other attempts at negotiation had broken down. The group was asked to meet in November 1948, but nine months passed before it met. In the interim, NATO had been formed, and the Soviet Union was on the cusp of possessing an atomic weapon. Between the meeting and this report, the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic weapon. After ten meetings, negotiations broke down in October 1949, and the other five members of UNAEC sent this report to the assembly.
Discussions began with an agreement by representatives of the five countries on the basic principles set forth by the United Kingdom, based on UN agreements. These were accepted as fundamental to “any plan of effective prohibition of atomic weapons and effective control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.” The Soviet Union is silent in this record, though the principals are “adopted as the basis for discussion.” The heart of the disagreement comes in the first broad category for discussion, the “prohibition of atomic weapons.” Though the Soviet representative is in agreement that “atomic weapons should be prohibited,” the Soviet proposal includes controls that the other members feel are “inadequate.” The Soviet position is that weapons should be outlawed and regulations put in place simultaneously. The key issue becomes trust: the Soviet plan relied on the “pledge of each nation” rather than international controls. However, the other five nations assert that, if implemented, the Soviet plan would present a danger in that it would “delude the peoples of the world into thinking that atomic energy was being controlled when in fact it was not.”
Most of the remainder of this report is devoted to disagreements on the matter of control between the Soviet Union and the other five countries. The Soviet Union wants self-regulation and prohibition, effective immediately. The other members view this as impossible and inadequate. The Soviet Union wants periodic inspection of facilities rather than international control of them. The Soviet Union is unwilling to negotiate what it sees as a violation of national sovereignty on this issue, stating that “international management and operation were equivalent to international ownership.”
The report concludes that negotiations are at a standstill, as the Soviet Union will not accept any proposals other than its own. A list of Soviet proposals, and the reasons that the other members cannot accept them, is provided at the conclusion of this document. Indeed, the impasse proved insurmountable, and the UNAEC was officially disbanded in 1952.
Glossary
clandestine: characterized by, done in, or executed with secrecy or concealment; private
egress: opposite of ingress; the act or an instance of going; an exit; a going out
envisaged: to contemplate; visualize
gross: flagrant and extreme; unqualified; complete
impinge: to make an impression; have an effect or impact; to encroach; infinge
ingress: the act of going in or entering; entryway
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Craig, Campbell, & Sergey Radchenko. The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. New Haven: Yale UP, 2008. Print.
Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2005. Print.
Kaplan, Lawrence S. NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Print.
Luard, Evan. A History of the United Nations: The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955. New York: Macmillian, 1982. Print.