Aristotelian Ethics

At Issue

Aristotle’s ethical theory is contained in two works: the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics is later and more comprehensive than the Eudemian Ethics, and has been studied far more. A third book sometimes attributed to Aristotle, the Magna Moralia, is probably not authentic.

Aristotle’s ethical theory was conditioned by his training as a biologist. He observed that every living thing tends to develop into a mature specimen of its kind that may be either healthy and flourishing or somehow stunted. His ethical theory is an attempt to describe the healthy, flourishing way of life for human beings (the “good life”). His motivation was political, since he believed that an understanding of the good life should guide lawmakers. He believed that since human beings are naturally social beings, a normal person whose natural inclinations are properly cultivated will be virtuous; hence, wrongdoing is a function of stunted development. In basing ethical behavior upon human nature (the essence of human beings), Aristotle largely founded natural law theory.

Aristotle followed Greek practice in calling the good life eudaimonia, often translated as “happiness.” He observed that people agree that happiness is an intrinsic good and that attaining happiness is the guiding directive of life; however, they disagree concerning the nature or content of the happy life.

Aristotle criticized three popular candidates (then and now) for the happy life: sensual pleasure, pursuit of honors and recognition, and money-making. He assumed that human happiness must be unique to human beings. Hence, a life of sensual pleasure cannot be happiness, since sensual pleasures derive from behaviors—eating, drinking, sex—that animals also display; that is, they are not based upon human nature. He also assumed that happiness must be achievable through one’s own efforts. Hence, receiving honors cannot be happiness, since merit is not necessarily recognized; it is not “up to us.” Moreover, recognition is pursued as a warrant of excellence; therefore, excellence is valued more highly than recognition even by those who esteem recognition. Aristotle dismissed the life of money-making on the ground that money is essentially a tool and therefore cannot be an end in itself.

Aristotle recognized sensual pleasure, honors, and money as concomitants of the good life but held that genuine happiness is “an activity of the soul in accordance with excellence”: Happiness consists in self-development, or the positive, habitual expression or realization of potentials inherent in human nature. Since human beings are both social and rational, they possess basic potentials for moral goodness and intellectual goodness (wisdom). Aristotle held that intellectual goodness is produced by training and moral goodness by habituation. Therefore, all persons are morally and intellectually neutral at birth and are subsequently shaped by their experiences and education. Modern criticisms that media violence leads to violence in society agree with Aristotle that character is shaped rather than inborn. In this view, the notion of education is expanded to include all character-determining experiences, moral education becomes the foundation for society, and censorship may seem attractive.

Moral goodness consists of possession of the virtues, which include courage, temperance, generosity, “greatness of soul,” magnanimity, response toward small honors, mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, wit, “shame,” and justice. Some commentators allege that this list specifies an ideal of the Greek upper class, so that Aristotle’s ethics is relativistic. Aristotle believed, however, that he had grounded his theory upon human nature, and his intent was not relativistic.

A virtue is a trained disposition to express a particular emotion, through behavior, to a degree that is neither deficient nor excessive relative to a given agent in a given situation. For example, a generous rich person will donate more money than will a generous poor person. Aristotle coined the phrase “golden mean” to denote the midpoint between excess and deficiency to which virtuous actions conform. He probably arrived at this idea by analogy with Greek medical theory, according to which bodily health consists of a balance between opposite bodily states.

Aristotle held that character is fixed by repeated actions: One becomes like what done does. Hence, every virtue results from repetition of acts of the relevant sort, which train their corresponding emotions. For example, one becomes generous by, in effect, practicing to be generous through repeated instances of giving. Moral education consists in training persons to experience pleasure in doing virtuous acts and displeasure in doing vicious acts. Hence, a virtuous person will enjoy behaving well. The tie between virtuous behavior and pleasure solves the problem of motivation (“Why be moral?”) to which more rationality-based theories tend to be subject, but it also invites the criticism that Aristotle’s ethical theory is egoistic.

Intellectual goodness is of two kinds: Practical and theoretical. Practical wisdom is knowledge for the sake of action. It enables one to discern the golden mean in particular situations. Doing so is a complex process that cannot be reduced to rules; it requires experience. The rejection of a definite method for determining right actions distances Aristotle’s theory from rule-based theories as varied as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Theoretical wisdom is knowledge of basic truths of philosophy and science solely for the sake of knowledge. Aristotle held that theoretical wisdom is the noblest part of life and that the happiest life is a life of moral goodness with a large admixture of study and learning. Critics respond that study tends to isolate one from society.

Bibliography

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. 2d ed. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.

Rorty, Amélie O., ed. Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

Sherman, Nancy. The Fabric of Character. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Urmson, J. O. Aristotle’s Ethics. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988.