Moral Development

This article summarizes theories of moral development—including those proposed by Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Neo-Kohlberg theorists—as well as the central tensions that exist in the field. Although Kohlberg is often credited with introducing the study of moral development to the field of psychology, he arguably introduced as many questions as he did answers. His focus on reason as the 'backbone' of moral development, his insistence that development proceeds through a series of fixed stages, and his preoccupation with justice to the exclusion of other 'types' of morality such as compassion and care, earned him a number of critics. His critics have subsequently either discredited his theory or attempted to expand it. The summary also describes some of the personalities of the people involved in this field; Kohlberg and Gilligan have received as much attention for the supposed rivalry between the two of them as they have for the theories themselves. Because the field has been fueled by the nature of the people and relationships involved, their stories are worthy of mention.

Overview

More than any other single individual, Lawrence Kohlberg is responsible for bringing the topic of moral development to the study of psychology. Carol Gilligan, a Harvard colleague of Kohlberg's remembers his "...courage, his determination to talk about moral values in psychology, his bravery in countering the claim that psychology was a value-neutral social science" (Walsh, 2000, p. 39). Although Kohlberg was one of the first, he was certainly not the last; his work has inspired a new generation of scholars who—either by disagreeing with the central tenets of Kohlberg's theory or by expanding upon his ideas—have introduced new models of moral development. What will become clear as we review the various models are the tensions that exist in the field—is morality a function of reason, emotion, or both? Can morality be defined solely in terms of justice, rights, and responsibility, or does it also include questions of compassion and care? Does morality encompass more than our interpersonal relationships, such as larger questions about how we ought to live?

Further Insights

Piaget

Just as Kohlberg inspired a generation of scholars who followed in his footsteps, so too was Kohlberg inspired. Kohlberg had every intention of becoming a clinical psychologist, but after reading Jean Piaget's early work on moral development and religious experience, Kohlberg's career changed course. Piaget is most well-known for his work on cognitive development, but he was interested in how people learn right from wrong as well. For Piaget, and for Kohlberg, too, moral development was highly dependent on cognitive development. As an individual's cognitive structures changed over time, so did that individual's ability to reason—about both intellectual and moral matters.

Piaget studied moral development in children ranging in age from six to twelve by presenting them with moral dilemmas, as well as observing them at play. Based on their responses to the dilemmas and his observations, he concluded that children progress from heteronomous morality to autonomous morality; furthermore, they do so by advancing through three successive stages of reasoning. Younger children operate according to rules prescribed by authority figures, such as teachers, parents, police, and/or other adults. At this stage, children adhere to rules universally, without considering the particulars of a situation. Eventually, moral judgment evolves, as older children begin to equate justice with equality and then with equity. In other words, as children age, they define moral judgment as rule-following, treating everyone the same, and then treating people fairly based on the particulars of a situation.

Narvaez (2005) writes, "some believe Kohlberg was more Piagetian than Piaget." Indeed, Kohlberg does, in many cases, apply the tenets of the cognitive-structuralist paradigm to moral development more stringently than Piaget did himself. The differences become most apparent when comparing the primacy each gave the role of reason. For Piaget, the relationship between moral thought and action was not particularly troubling. Whereas many philosophers and psychologists hoped to understand why a person's behavior was often at odds with her understanding of what she ought to do—often dubbed the thought/action problem—Piaget was interested in the reverse. He believed children's behavior and interactions with others sometimes led them to new moral understandings. By contrast, Kohlberg believed "a right action performed without reason is not a moral action at all" (Bergman, 2002, p. 108). Similarly, Ferrari and Okamoto (2003) argue that Piaget recognized the role of emotion in moral development; they conclude, in fact, that Piaget believed "moral identity is essentially affective, although structured and informed by reason" (p. 347). Again, for Kohlberg reason was the 'backbone' of morality, not merely a periphery player.

Kohlberg

A product of the cultural milieu of the 1960s and 1970s, Kohlberg was very much an activist. Toward the end of his career especially, he was as interested in the practical applications of his work as much as the development of theory, to the extent that his colleagues questioned whether his work in the schools compromised his research. From the beginning, however, Kohlberg put his beliefs into action. As an engineer during WWII, he smuggled Jewish refugees to safety. In his article titled 'Beds for Bananas,' "Kohlberg recounted with glee that he and his shipmates had convinced various government inspectors that the South American freighter's makeshift passenger beds were, in fact, banana-storing containers" (Walsh, 2000, p. 37).

As steadfast as Kohlberg was in his own beliefs, he was known equally for his willingness to listen to other points of view. As one colleague remembers, "The people that Larry brought in did not necessarily agree with him. He would bring in critics. You never felt an 'us/them' or 'either/or' approach with him" (Walsh, 2000, p. 38). Indeed, Kohlberg was challenged by people who resided very close to home; one of his biggest challengers, Carol Gilligan, was a Harvard colleague. But Kohlberg did not allow others to do all the work. His willingness to listen to other points of view cultivated his revisionist tendencies. He revised his original theory many times over the years.

In the end, perhaps the evolution of the theory is its most defining characteristic—Kohlberg's work was ultimately unfinished. After more than fifteen years of intense pain and suffering from a parasitic infection he contracted in Belize, incurable by both Western and non-Western medical practices, Kohlberg committed suicide at age 59 by walking into the Atlantic Ocean on a January day in 1987. Those who worked with him closely described him as 'a model of graceful suffering' who never once complained about his pain (Walsh, 2000).

What kind of theory did this activist, teacher, and student propose? What did Kohlberg want to contribute to the field, after returning from WWII, insistent that psychology not adopt a stance of moral relativism? Perhaps a logical starting point is a brief review of Kohlberg's methodology, for while his theory became a part of the vocabulary of every psychologist, the way in which he studied morality became equally well-known. Recall that Piaget studied moral development by observing children at play and by presenting them with brief anecdotes; because Kohlberg believed morality is synonymous with reason, he had no interest in how children might act. Instead, he wanted to investigate their thought processes and thus presented a series of moral dilemmas and follow-up questions. In other words, he primarily talked to children rather than observing them interact and play. Arguably the most well-known dilemma, the story of Heinz, is presented in its entirety below.

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug, and I'm going to make money from it." So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

The series of questions following the presentation of the dilemma are as critical as the story itself. Children are asked if Heinz should steal the drug and if it is right or wrong for him to do so; they are also asked how Heinz should act if the sick person is a stranger rather than his wife. After analyzing their responses to the ten follow-up questions, Kohlberg categorizes their moral development into one of six stages. Development through stages is one of the most defining characteristics of Kohlberg's theory. He believed the stages were invariant—all people pass through each of the successive stages in the same order and without omission of any single stage, although the speed at which they progress might vary. Importantly, each stage represents an individual's thought structure, not specific content relevant to any particular moral or intellectual task; Kohlberg's moral development stages were closely tied to Piaget's cognitive development stages, such that an individual could not reach the highest stage of moral reasoning without also having reached the highest stage of cognitive development. Each of the six stages is described briefly below:

• Heteronomous morality: As its name suggests, this stage corresponds to Piaget's first level of moral reasoning. Heteronomous moral reasoning is characterized by absolute obedience to the letter of the law. At this stage, "a person assumes that moral judgments are so self-evident that no justification is needed beyond simply stating the rule that has been broken" (Thomas, 1997, p. 59).

• Instrumental morality: Instrumental morality is a pragmatic, individualistic approach to moral reasoning. People at this stage recognize that people have different perspectives of moral issues, based largely on maximizing their self-interests while minimizing negative consequences.

• Normative morality: Recognition that people are governed by shared, rather than individual, interests. People obey rules not because they are handed down from an authority—as they are in stage 1—but because they have been created by a collective community. Reasoning at this level is characterized by the golden rule—do unto others as you would do unto yourself.

• Social-system morality: People at this stage look beyond the informal, commonly agreed upon rules described in normative moral reasoning. Instead, individuals recognize codified, institutionalized norms put forth by social systems such as churches and governments.

• Social-welfare morality: Morality based on the promotion of universal values and rights. Individuals at this stage recognize that social systems often cannot protect the rights of all people - especially minority groups. People at this stage make decisions to uphold equity, equality, and general welfare for all, even if such decisions go against society's rules.

• Morality of Universalizable, Reversible, and Prescriptive ethical principles: The highest stage of moral reasoning, characterized by universal morality—applicable for all people at all times; reversible morality—switching the places of the defendant and plaintiff in any moral incident would not change the outcome; and prescriptive morality, based on promoting positive outcomes (e.g., compassion, care, respect for others) rather than prohibiting negative ones (e.g., do not steal or cheat).

Whether or not moral development proceeds through these fixed, invariant stages is one of the more controversial aspects of Kohlberg's theory. As Thomas (1997) reports, there is some empirical evidence for the first five stages, "however, there remains a question about whether Stage 6 might perhaps be an idea condition never actually achieved in practice" (p. 61). Kohlberg also suggested these stages were universal, cutting across all cultures. Snarey, however, suggests that Kohlberg's model is biased in favor of middle-class, urban, industrialized nations. Research continues to explore cultural variations of Kohlberg’s model.

If Kohlberg's ideas about fixed stages are controversial, he takes a bit of a more moderate line with respect to the question of causation. Labeled an interactionist, Kohlberg suggests that both environment and heredity play a role in one's moral development. He believed the level of logical reasoning a person attains is largely determined by genetics but that moral development is also influenced by motivation, exposure to social roles, and the type of justice practiced in a child's immediate environment. Schools and families that allow students to make decisions and assume responsibility encourage moral development, Kohlberg argued, more so than autocratic, dictatorial environments.

In the twenty-first century, Kohlberg's work has contributed invaluable foundational insight in the field, but his theories are not immune to criticism. The dilemmas he used to come to his conclusions lacked ecological validity—they were artificial and, therefore, not indicative of real world results. His samples were primarily White upper-class males, making the resulting definition of morality androcentric. Additionally, his research utilized a cross-sectional design and hypothetical occurrences rather than a longitudinal study, which would have ruled out irrelevant variance in the findings. However, this type of longitudinal study was later carried out by researchers in the 1980s—even using some of the original participants from Kohlberg's study—which confirmed Kohlberg's conclusion.

Gilligan

Carol Gilligan has often been portrayed in academic and popular circles as Kohlberg's loudest critic. A caricature that Kohlberg himself, Gilligan argues, helped create; the "Kohlberg-Gilligan" debate took on a life of its own, very different from the real people who inhabited the roles. Gilligan does not even like to view herself as a critic. "No doubt, Kohlberg has many critics, but Gilligan emphatically denies that she is one of them" (Jorgensen, 2006, p. 193). Indeed, others too have begun to view Gilligan's theory as an extension or expansion of Kohlberg's rather than as an attempt to discredit it. Kohlberg himself, some argue, embraced her work. "It seems that Kohlberg did not reject Gilligan's work, but felt that her research. . . enlarged the social cognitive domain, and could exist alongside his justice domain" (Jorgensen, 1993, p. 187). Either way, many scholars disagree with some fundamental tenets of Kohlberg's theory. Gilligan, for better or worse, has been portrayed as the leader of the pack.

Gilligan first challenged the methodology Kohlberg used to develop his theory. She did not feel that hypothetical moral dilemmas were accurate representations of the way people grappled with right and wrong in their everyday lives. She writes, "His focus on hypothetical rather than real dilemmas sharpened my awareness of the disparity between the assumptions governing research methods and the realities of people's lives. With a group of graduate students, I set out to explore identity and moral development in actual situations of conflict and choice" (Gilligan, 2004, p. 132). In addition, Gilligan questioned Kohlberg's sample; he had used mostly men, causing Gilligan to wonder if the resulting theory could accurately represent the moral development of women. "My question was not how well can women do when measured by standards derived from studying men, but rather, what had been lost by leaving out women?" (Gilligan, 2004, p. 132).

Gilligan discovered that a great deal had been left out. In listening to women's voices, she learned that issues of relationships and responsibilities, as opposed to justice and rights, were at the center of women's moral dilemmas. Dubbed a 'morality of care', as opposed to a morality of justice, Gilligan's theory suggested that Kohlberg was only telling half the story. She writes, "in this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract" (as cited in Woods, 1996, p. 377). Although Gilligan has often been criticized for highlighting gender differences in moral development, her intention was to suggest a different way of thinking rather than to generalize about either sex. In fact, subsequent research suggests men and women use both styles of reasoning—care and justice—in different situations, although women tend to use the care orientation, and vice versa, more often.

If Gilligan's intention was not to prove differences between men and women in terms of their reasoning about right and wrong, it was her intention to ensure that women's voices were no longer excluded from theory building. Her contribution to social science is in fact, larger than her contribution to the study of moral development. She explains, "I wrote In a Different Voice to show how the inclusion of women's voices changes the voice of psychological theory" (Gilligan, 1996, p. 132). Bringing women's lives into focus, she believes, is a disruptive act, changing our collective account of history altogether.

Neo-Kohlberg

There are many critics who regard Kohlberg's work as "outmoded, beyond repair, and too faulty for anybody to take seriously. These critics suggest that research would advance more profitably by taking a different approach" (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999, p. vii). Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma, however, strongly disagree. While recognizing certain flaws in both the methodology and content of Kohlberg's theory, Rest et al have reformulated his original thesis, naming it a "Neo-Kohlbergian Approach." The best way to introduce it is to demonstrate the ways in which it addresses the weaknesses of Kohlberg's theory.

First and foremost, Rest et al. agree with critics who suggest that Kohlberg focuses too narrowly on moral judgment at the expense of other psychological processes. The neo-Kohlbergian approach includes judgment, but alongside what they suggest are three equally important processes—moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral action. Sensitivity involves both perception—being able to recognize a problem—but also moral imagination, the ability to empathize, take another person's perspective, and imagine all possible outcomes. Moral motivation involves the selection of priorities—choosing to give money to a charity, for example, rather than buying something for oneself—and long-term motivation, fueled by one's religious, professional, or personal code of ethics. The Neo-Kohlbergian model of moral development also includes moral action, defined as both the 'staying power' to complete an ethical action as well as the 'know-how' to reach one's goal. Rest et al. argue that "to complete an ethical action one must have skills in conflict resolution, assertiveness, leadership, and planning" (Narvaez, 2005, p. 147).

While the Neo-Kohlbergian approach centers around the four components described above, it also shifts perspective with respect to several other important points. Like Gilligan, Neo-Kohlbergian theorists make room for an understanding of morality that includes more than simply justice and rights. Narvaez (2005) explains "Although the neo-Kohlbergian perspective also emphasizes the primacy of justice...it conceives of care as inherent in justice, becoming more fundamentally integrated in the later stages" (p. 121). For Rest et al. care is subsumed in what they call moral sensitivity, or the ability to consider the needs of others. In addition, the neo-Kohlbergian perspective shares the belief with Kohlberg's critics that stage theories are "too broad-brush, missing much of development, and underestimating early signs of change" (Narvaez, 2005, p. 120). Whereas Kohlberg adopted a hardline with respect to stage development, believing that they are universal and fixed, neo-Kohlbergians adopt a "soft-stage" model of development. More specifically, neo-Kohlbergians prefer using the terminology 'schemas' rather than 'stages', to refer to the changes that occur in moral judgment structures as children develop. Finally, neo-Kohlbergians take issue with Kohlberg's methodology; instead of relying solely on verbal expression—believing that people often know more than they can say—Neo-Kohlbergians utilize methodologies that tap implicit and tacit memories. Rest, et al.  have been using the Defining Issues Test (DIT) for decades, measuring moral development with people of all ages and nationalities.

Viewpoints

Arnold (2000) suggests the study of morality has been plagued by disagreement and controversy to a greater extent than other topics because of the sensitive nature of the topic itself. "Perhaps because morality, by its very nature, elicits such deeply felt convictions, its study has been characterized by unique challenge and rampant controversy—and, as a result, a truly revisionist spirit" (p. 365). Indeed, since Kohlberg proposed his theory, the field has experienced tremendous growth and change. New theories have emerged, including moral foundations theory which is a social psychological theory that argues that morality and ethics are more cross-cultural and intuitive as opposed to the developmental approaches of Piaget and Kohlberg. But the theories presented here paint just one small picture of the field. Almost every theory of development—from behaviorist theories to attribution theory to social learning theory to Freud's psychoanalytic theory—has something to say about how people learn right from wrong. Philosophers, too, have been grappling with similar questions for centuries. Moral development will likely remain a topic of great interest in the decades to come.

Terms & Concepts

Autonomous Morality: According to Piaget, our moral development proceeds from heteronomous morality - morality with a strict focus on rules handed down from authority figures—to autonomous morality—morality that pays attention to issues such as equality and equity, and the particulars of a situation.

Care: Kohlberg has been criticized for conceiving morality as a function of justice alone, to the exclusion of other characteristics such as compassion and care. Carol Gilligan, a Harvard colleague, among others, has proposed alternative theories of moral development that focus on our relationships to other people instead of more formal and abstract notions of justice.

Developmental Stages: Kohlberg's theory is based on the work of Piaget, who proposed that children's cognitive development proceeds in a series of fixed and invariant stages. Like Piaget, Kohlberg suggested that moral development proceeds through six stages: heteronomous, normative, instrumental, social-system, social-welfare, and universal and prescriptive morality. Neo-Kohlberg theorists abandon the hardline stage theory.

Heteronomous Morality: According to Piaget, our moral development proceeds from heteronomous morality with a strict focus on rules handed down from authority figures—to autonomous morality—morality that pays attention to issues such as equality and equity, and the particulars of a situation.

Moral Action: The Neo-Kohlberg approach to moral development criticized Kohlberg for focusing too narrowly on moral judgment or reasoning. They suggested four components to moral development, one of which is moral action. Action involves two skills - the perseverance to see an ethical action through to the end, and the know-how to achieve the goal.

Moral Judgment: According to Kohlberg, judgment or reason is the backbone of morality. He believed that a moral action performed without reason was not a moral action at all. His theory was often criticized for focusing too narrowly on judgment, to the exclusion of psychological processes such as affect and motivation.

Moral Motivation: The Neo-Kohlberg approach to moral development criticized Kohlberg for focusing too narrowly on moral judgment or reasoning. They suggested four components to moral development, one of which is moral motivation. Motivation includes short-term motivation—selection of priorities—as well as long-term motivation, fueled by one's religious, professional, or personal code of ethics.

Moral Sensitivity: The Neo-Kohlberg approach to moral development criticized Kohlberg for focusing too narrowly on moral judgment or reasoning. They suggested four components to moral development, one of which is moral sensitivity. Sensitivity involves the ability to recognize a problem, and the ability to imagine all possible actions and consequences for self and others.

Schemas: Neo-Kohlberg theorists abandon Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. Instead, they describe changes in reasoning in terms of schemas—mental representations actively constructed by people.

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Suggested Reading

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Munsey, B. (Ed.). (1980). Moral development, moral education, and Kohlberg. Religious Education Press.

Thomas, M. (1997). An integrated theory of moral development. Greenwood Press.

Van Haaften, W., Wren, T., & Tellings, A. (Eds.). (2000). Moral sensibilities and education II: The schoolchild. Concorde Publishing House.

Van Haaften, W., Wren, T., & Tellings, A. (Eds.). (2000). Moral sensibilities and education I: The preschoolchild. Concorde Publishing House.